近日，乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽伦斯基、美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和美国副总统 J.D. 万斯在白宫内部的激烈辩论引起热议，但最让国际社会震惊的是对乌克兰局势叙事的突然转变。这预示着大国地缘政治的新时代正在卷土重来，塑造国际关系。我院云山领军学者、欧洲研究中心主任李形教授，在南华早报发表了题为《To Europe’s shock, Trump is bringing back great power geopolitics》的文章。
文章分析指出，二战后，美苏等大国塑造全球秩序，冷战后美国主导世界。如今，国际秩序从单极走向多极，美国霸权的衰落、欧盟为战略自主而战、中国作为全球大国的崛起以及俄罗斯日益自信，都预示着这种转变。大国地缘政治的新时代正在卷土重来，塑造国际关系，重点关注领土安全、资源获取和大国的战略定位。
To Europe’s shock, Trump is bringing back great power geopolitics
The world, especially Europe, has been stunned by recent developments, particularly the intense debate within the White House between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US President Donald Trump and US Vice-President J.D. Vance. But what shocked the global community the most has been the sudden shift in the war narrative.
Trump has framed Ukraine as the cause of the conflict and suggested that Nato, the transatlantic military alliance, was to blame for provoking Russia. This has completely disrupted the Western consensus on supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Not only did the United States oppose the recent UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression, Trump has also demanded that Ukraine repay the US for its military aid. If Ukraine couldn’t come up with the money, it was suggested that it paid with its minerals and rare earths. What a reversal, and in such a short time.
The European Union has long considered itself a great power, even aspiring to be a modern superpower. But, faced with the reality of its geopolitical limitations and lack of strategic and security autonomy, it has come to the harsh realisation that it is more of a chess piece than a chess player. It is a bitter pill for Europe to swallow.
Europe has been shocked by the broader shift in great power geopolitics, particularly America’s changing priorities under Trump, whose “America first” policy does not, in many ways, align with European interests. Europe is in a state of panic, unsure of where it stands in this new geopolitical reality.
After World War II, the global order was largely shaped by great power geopolitics, involving in particular the US, the Soviet Union and Britain. France was a much-weakened power while China, though a victor in the anti-Japanese war, was in the midst of a civil war. Later, as British influence waned, America and the Soviet Union were left as the main shapers of world politics.
The post-war geopolitical landscape was fashioned by key agreements between the great powers, notably at the 1945 Yalta and Potsdam conferences, where post-war Europe, Asia and other regions were divided up. This Cold War bipolarity dominated international relations until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
With the end of the Cold War, the world was led to believe the international order had entered an era of “perpetual peace”, as envisioned by Immanuel Kant in 1903, with Francis Fukuyama declaring the “end of history”.
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the US enjoyed unparalleled dominance, dictating international institutions and security frameworks, shaping economic globalisation largely in its own image. There were no great powers, just one superpower: America.
But a clear shift is emerging, from the unipolar moment of the post-Cold-War era to a multipolar world, with great power geopolitics resurfacing. The decline of US hegemony, the EU’s struggle for strategic autonomy, China’s rise as a global power and Russia’s increasing assertiveness all signal this transformation.
Trump’s unconventional approach to international relations has been deeply transactional, focusing on deals that provide clear, tangible benefits to both sides, and often centred around economic and strategic interests.
His “America first” policy prioritises US interests, which has sometimes led to diplomatic tensions but also created opportunities for negotiations based on practical outcomes rather than ideological differences.
This approach, particularly in US-China relations, could pave the way for agreements that bypass the usual political sensitivities and value politics, focusing instead on pragmatic solutions. Given China’s growing economic clout and geopolitical weight, the two nations have ample areas in which to find common ground, especially in trade, technology and energy. Trump has sent clear signals that he is going to strike deals with Beijing.
The US now acknowledges China as a great power, rather than viewing it merely as a competitor to be contained – marking a significant shift in its approach.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a vocal China hawk while in the Senate, had advocated for a confrontational stance on issues including trade imbalances, human rights and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Now he appears to be emphasising a balance of power between the US and China, signalling a recognition that China is a global power with growing economic, technological and military capabilities – one that the US cannot easily challenge or marginalise.
Great power geopolitics, with an emphasis on the balance of power, largely faded after the end of the Cold War. It is now making a comeback. The dynamics indicate that great powers such as the US and China are shifting towards avoiding direct dominance over one another, while striving for coexistence.
This approach involves setting clearer boundaries and expectations regarding their spheres of influence – whether on issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade relations or nuclear proliferation.
The new era of great power geopolitics is returning to shape international relations with a focus on territorial security, access to resources and the strategic positioning of powers. This era is defined by the pursuit of national interests, a respect for spheres of influence, the maintenance of a balance of power and strategic stability, and the avoidance of direct conflict.
A good example is how China has shown support for Trump’s recent attempt to strike a deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. It was the first time in many years that great powers have come to an agreement on a major global conflict, signalling a return of great power diplomacy and negotiation in key areas of mutual concern.
文章来源：《南华早报》
发布日期：2025年3月7日
