近日，我院云山领军学者李形教授在习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交网站中发表题为《Europe's agony for the passing order》的文章。
文章认为，欧洲领导人宣称他们正在为“基于规则的国际秩序”的终结而哀痛。事实并非如此。他们真正怀念的，是一种曾令欧洲无需作出艰难战略抉择、却能持续获益的舒适地缘政治安排。
Europe's agony for the passing order
The current international order is undergoing a profound transformation marked by intensifying hegemonism, unilateralism, protectionism and power politics. Once framed as a temporary deviation from liberal globalization, these developments have reasserted themselves as an increasingly influential force in global politics.
This shift was openly acknowledged at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, where global leaders reached a rare consensus: the "rules-based international order" has effectively ended. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's declaration that the old system is "not coming back," describing the moment as a "rupture, not a transition," encapsulates the gravity of the current historical juncture. To Europe's surprise, the new era is marked by a harsher and more contested global landscape defined by the so-called Donroe Doctrine, military intervention and competing visions of order.
However, European leaders' deep concern over the end of the so-called "rules-based international order" is steeped in irony. Framed as expressions of concern over instability and norm erosion, recent statements by European leaders portray Europe as a passive victim of a collapsing system. Yet such narratives conveniently overlook a fundamental historical truth: the old order was not inherently fair or consistently applied. Rather, it served European interests and reinforced Europe's sense of moral superiority, while disproportionately enabling U.S. hegemony. In practice, Europe was one of the primary beneficiaries — and an active accomplice — of that very order.
Throughout the post-Cold War period, Europe was not merely aligned with U.S. power but deeply embedded within it. Through NATO, Europe participated in or endorsed a series of external interventions — Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria and various "color revolutions" — justified under the banner of international norms and liberal values. These actions did not reflect an impartial, universally applied rules-based system, but rather a hierarchical order in which rules were selectively interpreted and enforced. For Europe, this order functioned as a shield — one that insulated it from hard geopolitical choices while delivering security, prosperity and moral legitimacy.
The irony becomes sharper now that the United States itself is openly reassessing, and in many ways abandoning, its commitment to maintaining this order. As Washington declares a return to great power competition and recalibrates its strategy accordingly, European leaders suddenly find themselves anxious and disoriented. The order they once defended as universal is now nostalgically remembered as the "good old days." This sense of abandonment reveals an uncomfortable reality: Europe's attachment to the U.S.-led rules-based order was rooted primarily in structural dependence.
The key questions, therefore, are: Why are U.S. allies in Europe so vocal in lamenting the disappearance of the old order? What factors make them so nervous about its collapse? The answers lie in Europe's long-standing dependence on three external pillars that constituted the structural foundations of its peace and prosperity for decades. First, Europe outsourced its security to the United States. Under the NATO umbrella, European states enjoyed strategic protection while underinvesting in their own defense capabilities. Second, Europe benefited from inexpensive and abundant Russian energy, which sustained its economic competitiveness and social stability without seriously confronting its geopolitical implications. Third, Europe integrated deeply into China-centered global supply chains, reaping the gains of economic globalization.
The unraveling of the old order has exposed the fragility of this arrangement. Europe now finds itself in simultaneous tension with all three major powers on which it had become dependent. Relations with the United States are increasingly transactional and uncertain, as Washington prioritizes its own strategic competition with China. The rupture with Russia has turned energy into a strategic vulnerability rather than an economic advantage. Meanwhile, Europe's increasingly adversarial stance toward China threatens supply chains and industrial resilience. This convergence of crises has created a strategic shock for a Europe that was neither politically prepared nor institutionally designed to operate in a world defined by power politics.
As the United States embraces its own framing of "great power competition," Europe's predicament highlights a deeper dilemma. While Washington is relearning the application of power politics, European states remain psychologically and structurally anchored to a self-image as a "normative and regulative power." Europe's complaints about the end of the “rules-based order” appear less as principled critiques than as expressions of strategic anxiety.
The unease stems not from the loss of rules per se, but from the collapse of a system that allowed Europe to maintain influence while avoiding strategic autonomy. The sense of loss is therefore not about the collapse of a rules-based system, but about the disappearance of a comfortable geopolitical arrangement. Europe helped sustain this order, benefited from it immensely, and ultimately failed to prepare to outgrow it.
Ironically, the instability European leaders now decry is partly the consequence of their own choices. For decades, they endorsed an order that tied Europe's sovereignty to U.S. primacy. The current situations in Venezuela and Greenland illustrate broader geopolitical shifts where strategic interest, not international norms, now drives behavior among allies and rivals alike.
The growing transatlantic rift cannot be adequately explained as a disagreement over the "rules-based international order" alone; rather, it reflects a deeper and more consequential divergence within the so-called "shared value system" that historically underpinned the U.S.-Europe alliance. For decades, differences between the U.S. and Europe were managed within an assumed framework of value convergence, liberal norms and strategic alignment. That assumption is now eroding. American political discourse increasingly frames Europe not as a partner, but as a region drifting away from core principles that the United States claims to defend. This shift is significant because it recasts transatlantic tensions from disputes over policy preferences into questions of identity, values and political legitimacy.
This transformation is clearly illustrated by Vice President JD Vance's characterization of Europe as a "threat from within," signaling a profound redefinition of Europe's role in American strategic thinking. Europe is no longer treated merely as a junior partner, but increasingly as a potential civilizational dissident. The Trump administration's new National Security Strategy institutionalizes this perception by abandoning the long-standing assumption of European convergence with U.S. priorities.
Instead, it explicitly speaks of "helping Europe correct its current trajectory" and of "cultivating resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations." This is not the language of partnership. It is the language of intervention. Washington is openly signaling its intent to reshape European political and social development from the outside, further destabilizing the Western alliance.
China and the Global South must prepare for a world in which the U.S. increasingly seeks to reimpose selfish balance-of-power politics. This does not mean accepting Washington's zero-sum framing — but it does require a clear-eyed understanding of it and a sincere embrace of China's proposal of building a community with a shared future for humanity.
文章来源：《习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交》
发布日期：2026年1月28日
