by JohnGordon IV, JasonH. Campbell

 

ResearchQuestions

1.     What were the environmental factors and other key considerationsthat impacted the mission design in Bougainville, East Timor, and the SolomonIslands?

2.     What were the key Australian agencies that participated in thethree operations, the coordinating mechanisms that were adopted, and what rolesdid they play?

3.     How can different branches of the Australian Government bettershare information, given what was learned from each operation?

4.     In the future, how can Australia better hold whole-of-governmentoperations outside its territory?

Thisreport examines the governmental organizational structures used in threeAustralian-led interventions in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the SouthwestPacific regions: Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. Whole-of-governmentefforts requiring coordination across many parts of the Australian Governmentcharacterized each of these unique operations, in which differentorganisational approaches were used to manage the participation of variousagencies.

During thecourse of the research, it became apparent that, over time, numerous lessonswere learned as branches of the Australian Government gained experience in howbest to interact with one another and manage complex operations of this type.The report describes the key Australian agencies that participated in the threeoperations, the coordinating mechanisms they adopted, and the specific rolesthey played. In addition to providing insights that should be useful for thepreparation and conduct of operations outside Australia, the information inthis report also should be useful in terms of better whole-of-governmentoperations inside Australian territory.

KeyFindings

NationalSecurity Committee Framed the Whole-of-Government Coordination

·        The NSC's creation in 1996 was a significant step towardfacilitating Australia's whole-of-government approach in overseasinterventions.

·        Subsequent administrations have been able to use NSC to varyingdegrees, indicating that the committee is effective and useful.

AustralianGovernment's Small Size Made Personal Relationships Key to Within-Agency andWhole-of-Government Coordination

·        Fundamental to enabling an interagency approach was theinteraction among senior personnel within and among agencies.

·        Personal relationships among senior personnel meant thatinformation about ongoing operations could be quickly disseminated.

InteragencyProcesses Were Developed and Evolved over Time, Based on Needs of anIntervention

·        Australia's Department of Finance and Trade (DFAT) was the leadagency in most cases because of the international considerations, modest-to-lowthreat levels, and the need for holistic multiagency approaches to achievenational objectives of the interventions.

·        The Australian Defence Forces led the initial planning for theInternational Force in East Timor due to the potential of violence.

·        The Interdepartmental Emergency Task Forces was directed by theDFAT. The task forces worked beneath the NSC to facilitate whole-of-governmentoperations.

AgencyCultures and Processes Differed, but Understanding Improved over Time

·        Differences in organizational cultures and perspectives existedamong the organisations, but could have been considered as a positiveattribute.

·        In the early years covered in this report, the lack offamiliarity with different processes and culture caused tension andmisunderstanding.

·        Over time, the police and the military learned to plan andoperate together.

Recommendations

·        Planners should prepare for the possibility that any givenintervention might be protracted. Future planning exercises should include thepossibility that interventions could last longer than originally thought.

·        In order to lessen the impact of disparate approaches to informationsharing in future operations, an interagency-specific approach should beconsidered.

·        Incorporating instruction on how these agencies collect and useintelligence into training programs will help foster better cross-agencyperspective.

·        Agencies can create a mechanism to capture important informationabout insights and lessons learned while they are still fresh in bothindividual as well as organization memories.

·        There may be advantages to taking a more-consistent approach todeployment times.

·        Campaign planning should include a clear delineation of commandand control responsibilities among agencies.

Tableof Contents

·        Chapter One

Introduction

·        Chapter Two

Bougainville

·        Chapter Three

EastTimor/Timor-Leste

·        Chapter Four

SolomonIslands

·        Chapter Five

Conclusionsand Recommendations

 

Researchconducted by

Thisresearch was conducted within the InternationalSecurity and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National SecurityResearch Division (NSRD).

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