France dives back into the Pacific

Paris is refocusing attention on its island territories,the new strategic front line between Asia and the Americas, writes Cleo Paskal

After arelatively quiet period, Paris is re-energizing its maritime empire, par­ticularlyin the Pacific. In the past year alone, there have been huge military sales,paradigm-shifting diplomatic initiatives, and unusual visits by Frenchpolitical lead­ers to far-flung islands. The first question is why? The secondquestion is: what does that mean in the context of China’s grow­ing role as aPacific maritime power?

France hasimpressive global reach. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea, every qualifying island can claim up to a 200 nautical mile exclu­siveeconomic zone (EEZ). France has islands all over the world that qualify,including the Pacific territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, andWallis and Futuna.

The full tallyof islands means France has the second largest EEZ in the world, around 11million square kilometres, sec­ond only to the slightly larger EEZ of theUnited States. There are dots of France all over the globe, many in criticallocations convenient for effective monitoring and strategic positioning.

Paris’s attitudetowards her extremities tends to change over time, and is a by-product of coreconcerns. Take the evolving view of French Polynesia. It con­sists of more than100 islands and atolls, including Tahiti and Bora Bora, spread out over thecentral southern Pacific and cov­ers an enormous area, with an EEZ of 4.8million sq km, about twenty times the total land mass of the United Kingdom.

For some ofFrance’s post-Second World War leaders, fixated as they were with spectre of anuclear conflict in Cold War Europe, the remoteness of the overseas territoriesrepresented a potential safe zone where leadership could retreat, and regroup.Charles de Gaulle’s concept of a ‘dispersed France’ viewed the ‘French ter­ritoriesin the furthest oceans’ as being crucial for the survival of the state should‘European’ France be devastated, or become indefensible. While Francedecolonized other possessions, the ones in the Pacific were held on to verytightly indeed.

The first Frenchatomic tests were done in 1960 in Algeria, but plans were already in place tofollow Britain and the United States and test in the Pacific. At the time theregion was considered enough ‘at the edge of the map’ as to be secure whilepromising little political inconvenience. France built major infrastructure inFrench Polynesia, including an airport, in order to facilitate the testing.

Over the nexttwo decades, technologi­cal advances meant that the world became smaller, andthe seemingly remote tests started to create problems not only with FrenchPolynesians, but with ‘neighbours’ thousands of kilometres away.

In 1985, thisculminated in a covert operation in which members of French in­telligence usedexplosives to sink the Rain­bow Warrior, a Greenpeace ship that had beenprotesting against France’s nuclear tests, resulting in the death of a photogra­pher.France became diplomatically iso­lated in the region, and the testing went on.

Then, the ColdWar ended. As with much of the rest of the West, there was an ‘End of History’haze. The West had won, and it was time to shed some of the strate­gic burdenand focus on economics. France conducted its last nuclear tests in the Pacificin 1996, and some in Paris were starting to ask questions about the costs ofmaintaining these far-flung territories. In 1998, the Nouméa Accord was agreed,promising New Caledonia a referendum on independence by 2018.

Others were also‘unburdening’. Britain and the US shifted more of the regional strategicoversight to Five Eyes partners Australia and New Zealand.

In 2006, the UKclosed high commis­sions in Vanuatu, the Kingdom of Tonga, and Kiribati (whichhas an EEZ the size of India). Nick Squires, covering the event for TheDaily Telegraph, reported that Prime Minister Tony Blair told his NewZealand counterpart Helen Clark that Wellington would now be London’s eyes andears in the region.

‘The Union flagwas lowered yesterday for the last time in Tonga, one of Britain’s oldestfriends and allies, as China prepared to extend its foothold in the SouthPacific,’ Squires wrote. ‘Blair will be disappointed if he thinks New Zealandcan act as a regional gendarme’.

In the past tenyears, policies coming out of Canberra and Wellington have indeed alienatedformerly strong western allies among the 14 Pacific island countries.Meanwhile, China has extended its reach deep into the region.

China helpedFiji set up a counter organization to the Canberra and Welling­ton-dominatedPacific Island Forum grouping. It is providing scholarships to study in Chinafor thousands of influential Pacific Islanders. It is handing out soft loansand funding major infrastructure projects across the region.

Much of thisactivity is paired, overtly ornot,with recipient countries accepting increased Chinese immigration. In manyPacific island countries, these newly arrived Chinese communities are highlycontroversial. In Tonga, in the past decade alone, newly arrived ethnic Chinesehave taken control of more than 80 per cent of the retail sector. A newlyarrived ethnic Chinese woman was also the first, and only, person in Tongafound guilty of human trafficking.

The tensionshave been growing for at least a decade. In 2006, Chinese shops were attacked inunprecedented (though unrelated) riots in both Tonga and the Solomon Islands.In 2004, Fijian police arrested a network of Hong Kong citizens and shut downthe largest methamphet-amine lab found in the region. Since then, this dualtrack of major Chinese invest­ment, coupled with increased migration anduncertain domestic consequences, has played out across the region, including inAustralia and New Zealand.

Meanwhile, inthe French Pacific terri­tories, there is also major, and growing, Chineseengagement. Again, Paris’s policy towards French Polynesia seems to befollowing two tracks.

On one hand,France’s economy needs all the investments it can get. On the other, as China’sinterest in the South Pacific has increased, it has become clear to all in Par­isthat, far from being ‘at the edge of the map’, France’s Pacific territories areon the new strategic frontline between Asia and the Americas, and are becomingincreas­ingly valuable.

China has beenvery open about wanting to use French Polynesia as a trans-ship­ment andrefuelling point between China and South America. France has responded byloosening visa requirements for Chinese tourists, signing agreements allowingfor direct flights, encouraging investment in hotels, and more, includingmultiple Tahiti port visits by the Chinese Navy’s Yuan Wang class of trackingand surveil­lance ships.

Which brings usto the flurry of French activity in the past year or so. Institution­ally,France’s Pacific territories were his­torically kept apart from English-speakingOceania, especially during the nuclear tests period. However this past year,with sup­port from Australia and New Zealand, New Caledonia and FrenchPolynesia joined the Pacific Island Forum, giving Paris backdoor entry into oneof the most important regional groupings.

In the pastyear, several French political leaders have visited the region, some promisinga resolution to long-standing nuclear fallout compensation grievances. At thesame time, Paris is burnishing its bilateral relations with Pacific island coun­tries.At the COP21 climate change meet­ing in Paris in 2015, French officials metwith Pacific Island leaders without the presence of either Canberra orWellington. Note these are all French initiatives, noth­ing to do with theEuropean Union.

The marqueeevent in Paris’s Pacific year was the announcement by Australia that it wouldbe buying a dozen French subma­rines at a cost of 50 billion Australian dol­lars.Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French defence minister, excitedly said: ‘We are marriedto Australia for 50 years.’

The submarinedeal was a surprise to many, not least the Japanese. There had long beenrumours that Canberra would opt to buy from a Japanese government-backedconsortium led by Mitsubishi. The decision to buy from France may have beenpurely technical but, if that was the case, Canberra should have dropped somehints to Tokyo. As it was, the surprise made the decision look like a slap inthe face from China by proxy.

The movecompounded years of mixed messages from Canberra. For more than a decadeAustralian leaders have been tour­ing Washington, Tokyo and Delhi touting therole of Canberra in a strengthened Indo-Pacific security architecture. In 2007this developed into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with members Austral­ia,the US, Japan and India. A year later, Australia pulled out of the ‘Quad’ appar­entlyover concerns that it would affect Australia-China relations. Since then,Australia has continued sending con­flicting signals about its relationshipwith China and its strategic priorities. While some former Australian primeministers talk about how the United States should ‘share’ the Pacific withChina, others, and members of the strategic and defence com­munities, raisedeep concerns about China’s role in the region.

The submarinedeal encapsulates the contradictions. Submarines are an offen­sive weapon. Whywould Australia procure them if it were not concerned about China? North Koreadoesn’t warrant a dozen subs. But if Canberra is serious about standing up toBeijing, why alienate Japan? And why drop out of the Quad? And why, after theAustralian government dragged its feet before reluctantly allowing the US torotate Marines through the city of Darwin, did it then allow the lease of theport of Darwin itself to a Chinese company?

The Five Eyeshave been counting on Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zea­land, forstrategic oversight in English-speaking Oceania. For a range of reasons, thathasn’t stopped the rapid spread of Chinese influence across the region,including in Australia and New Zealand.

At the sametime, Paris is getting more active in French Oceania and is, itself, engagingmore with China in the region.

Meanwhile Franceand Australia are moving closer through growing strategic linkages created bythe submarine deal. They were always close physically. Via New Caledonia,France and Australia share a maritime border. It may be a coincidence, butthere is now hardly any coverage of the growing unrest in French Caledonia inthe Australian press, and little support in Can­berra for an independent NewCaledonia.

If France’s pastrelationship with its Pacific territories is anything to go by, the currentimperative of metropolitan France will only lead to more involvement in theregion. France needs investment, global leverage, and a back-up plan in casethe EU fails. Flirting with China in French Polyne­sia is likely to continue aslong as the mon­ey flows, even if only to mainland France.

At the same timeParis will get more involved in regional organizations, such as the PacificIsland Forum, with the aim of trying to direct – along with Canberra andWellington – key policy directions. It will use these various levers to try tohandle tricky issues, such as the outcome of the New Caledonia vote – if ithappens.

There is verylittle chance France will give up the strategic positioning and defence andsecurity installations in New Caledonia, whatever the outcome. While all thisold-school power-playing might seem clever to planners in Paris, it may not besmart over the long term as it is not likely to endear France to the people ofthe Pacific. The Kanak people of New Caledo­nia have a lot more friends acrossthe region that a Parisian administrator will ever have, not only with otherPacific islanders but with foreign countries that would be happy to trip upFrance. Updated colonial approaches won’t work.

So what does France’srenewed interest mean for China? Imagine the Australian subs are built, anddeployed, perhaps even running through exercises with French naval assets inthe region. Australian and French businesspeople, scientists and strategistsare working together more often, and more deeply.

In the meantime,Chinese investors have bought more infrastructure in Australia and Chineseshipping and tourism are pouring vast sums into the economy of FrenchPolynesia, while Chinese investors are partnering with French firms in Paris.What has to happen for those subs to actu­ally get used?

Since the timeof John Foster Dulles in the 1950s, the key concept of the defence architectureof the Pacific has been the ‘Island Chain’. The idea is there are three roughlynorth-south island ‘chains’ that must be controlled to contain threats fromChina – and Russia. Or, conversely, seen from Beijing, there are chains Chinaneeds to control, or at least influence, to be free of maritime constraints.The first island chain contains current East and South China Sea islandhotspots. The second island chain comes down east of the Philippines andincludes the American Mariana Islands. The third chain runs down from Hawaiithrough Oceania.

The big questionis, are Australia and France contemplating drawing a fourth line in the water,one that runs not north-south, but west-east across the top of their southernPacific position? A line, studded with bases and military assets, behind whichthey could retreat, and regroup, in case of conflict in the central and northPacific. If so, our strategic map has funda­mentally changed.