Regional foreign policy dynamics and their implications for the Mediterranean Region  

Newchallenges are reshaping the international order, requiring government leadersto consider new strategies and tools that integrate diplomatic, economic andmilitary instruments of power. Nowhere is this more evident than around theMediterranean Sea which has re-emerged as a region of global strategicimportance, where political tensions, armed conflict, economic and socialinstability and transnational criminal networks demand solutions that crosstraditional institutional boundaries of domestic and internationalpolicymaking.

Thegeopolitical situation on the southern coast of the Mediterranean has radicallychanged. The European Union (EU), United States (US) and their regionalpartners face serious challenges there. Long-lasting issues such as theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict, or the tensions between Turkey and Greece,continue, but new problems have overtaken them following the 2011 Arab Spring.

TheUS, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintain a significantmilitary presence in and around the Mediterranean, but military capabilitiesmust be nested within a whole-of-government, international approach. Thechallenges in this region demand unprecedented levels of civil-military andintergovernmental cooperation even as political dynamics with the United Statesand Europe suggest a possible retrenchment.

Inthis context, RAND established the Mediterranean Foresight Forum (MFF) in 2015to support the development of comprehensive, integrated civil-militaryresponses to complex regional challenges through an innovative combination ofresearch, scenario-based sensitivity analysis and strategic-level exercises.

Thispublication is part of a series of four RAND Perspectives (PEs), each focusingon different challenges in the Mediterranean region. Other PEs cover the issuesof Defence and Security, Criminal Activities and Cross-cutting Challenges.

Key observations

lThe political and securitydynamics of the Mediterranean region continue to evolve in response to the Arabuprisings. US and European foreign policy in the region is struggling to keepup.

lThe objective of US andEuropean foreign policy for the next five years must, at a minimum, be to avoida further deterioration of regional stability due to state collapse or furtherinroads from terrorist groups.

lThree countries along thesouthern littoral pose the biggest challenges: Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.Conditions in these three states are intertwined and a coordinated approach isneeded.

lThe central problems ofmigration and terrorism will likely require a greater investment of resourcesfrom both sides of the Atlantic.

lTo better coordinate theseefforts, key European and US leaders should hold senior-level discussions todefine their regional objectives and assess their tools and levers ofinfluence.

Introduction

TheMediterranean region today is fraught with a dismaying array of complex politicalstability and terrorism challenges. The regional foreign policy dynamic was fordecades dominated by the Arab-Israeli rift, but a number of new conflicts andconcerns now overlay that cleavage. The 2011 Arab uprisings and the subsequentweakening or collapse of previously stable authoritarian regimes fundamentallytransformed regional politics, in many cases proliferating jihadist groups fromISIS, to al-Nusra, to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Today, conflict in Syriaand severe instability in Libya are the most daunting challenges. Any progresson these or the region’s other problems will surely require forging durablepeace accords and rebuilding at least some form of state authority in bothcountries. Only then can a lasting solution to the threat posed by jihadistgroups, mass migration and dangers to energy supplies be achieved.

Thechallenge of strengthening state authority, however, forces the larger questionof the depth of US and European commitment to regional democracy promotion,especially in cases where cooperation with non-democratic regimes may be themost expedient route to achieving state-building and counter-terrorismobjectives. Even before its 2011 revolution, Egypt epitomised this dilemma;with President Sisi now at the helm, Western policymakers will confront thesetradeoffs, though President-elect Trump has signalled his early support forSisi’s strong anti-terrorism anti-Islamist strategy. Beneath the democracypromotion issue lie a host of other questions about US and European leverage,capabilities and strategy for the region.

This short paper, one in a series of RAND papers on theMediterranean, overviews the roles of key regional actors from a political andforeign policy perspective and draws conclusions for US and European policylooking ahead.

Regionaloverview

Algeria

TheNorth African state that faced the least instability during the Arab uprisings,Algeria now approaches a risky period. President Bouteflika was re-elected tohis fourth term as president in 2014, despite health problems that kept himfrom appearing in public. Since then, rumours that he may be incapacitated havecirculated widely. His younger brother, Saïd, reportedly controls anever-narrowing circle of access to the president and many in the Algerian elitesuspect that a soft coup has taken place and that Bouteflika is no longermaking the real decisions (Gall, 2015). Dismissals of once-top generals,including the longest-serving intelligence chief in the region, General Toufik,has further heightened speculation about events behind the political curtain inAlgiers.

Foryears Algeria has been marked by a unique form of elite politics. Thecombination of military, political and economic elites who dominate Algeria’sstate institutions and associated wealth are commonly referred to as lepouvoir. Bouteflika managed to secure the support of those elites in 2014because there was no alternative candidate who could assure the collectivegoods of le pouvoir

Thisshort paper overviews the roles of key regional actors from a political andforeign policy perspective and draws conclusions for US and European policylooking ahead.

5

withoutendangering the whole system (Porter, 2015). However, with Bouteflika’s healthnow failing, the struggle for succession has resurfaced intra-elite rivalries.Bouteflika’s dissolution of the powerful Department of Intelligence andSecurity (DRS) in early 2016 was more evidence of that struggle. Algeria’sgeneral population has been largely placated by generous social spending andother government initiatives, but if Algeria’s elites continue to feud, itcould again come to play a role in determining Algeria’s future. With oilprices a fraction of what they were in 2011, Algeria has to draw more on itsforeign currency reserves to maintain high levels of social spending. OnceBouteflika fades from the scene, the infighting within Algeria’s elite couldproduce a deep crisis.

Thestrength of Algeria’s state institutions is difficult to assess due to thesecrecy surrounding the Algerian state. The most important institutions are themilitary, the intelligence apparatus and the national oil and gas corporationthat allows the state to maintain its wealth. These institutions are surelystrong. The government is still vulnerable to protests, however, and if it isto avoid instability will need to continue to find the funds to meetprotesters’ demands, most immediately a housing shortage.

Thischallenge notwithstanding, state collapse in Algeria remains unlikely. Incontrast with states that experienced the 2011 uprisings, Algerians have the recentmemory of their bloody civil war to dampen enthusiasm for revolt (Chivvis &Kadlec, 2015). In addition, Algerian Islamists, crushed during that civil war,remain a small minority. Even if Algeria were to have free elections, it isunlikely the Islamists would be able to make meaningful gains.

Sinceits hard-won independence from France in 1962, Algeria has maintained a neutralforeign policy. It strongly defends the principle of non-interference in itsown and its neighbours’ affairs – especially if that interference is European.Its primary core interests remain: supporting the separation of Western Saharafrom Morocco, which has led to an ongoing stalemate and a closed border betweenthe two countries (one potential strategic opportunity for the region would bethe easing of tensions between Morocco and Algeria with the aim of reopeningthe border); countering the presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)in Algeria and neighbouring states, such as Tunisia; and minimising instabilityon its borders in Libya and Mali. As it demonstrated in its response to theal-Qaeda-linked attack against the In Amenas gas fields in 2013, it will nothesitate to launch a heavy-handed response, even if the result means the deathof hostages, including Westerners.

AlthoughAlgeria has historically practised a non-interventionist foreign policy, it ispossible that if ISIL continues to extend its presence in Libya, particularlyin southern Libya, which borders Algeria, it could choose to get involvedconstructively. In the 2014 French intervention in Mali, Algeria limited itsrole to diplomacy,

The strength of Algeria’s state institutions is difficult toassess due to the secrecy surrounding the Algerian state. The most importantinstitutions are the military, the intelligence apparatus and the national oiland gas corporation that allows the state to maintain its wealth.

yetfor the first time opened its airspace to French and coalition aircraft(Chivvis, 2015, 181–83).

 

Tunisia

Ofall countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Tunisia has made the mostprogress towards democratic transition. It has held two major nationalelections, which both were highly regarded by international observers. In 2014,the interim Islamist Ennahda-led coalition government ceded power to asecular-led coalition under the banner of Nida Tounes, a change that put thecountry on a stronger path for democratic consolidation. Tunisia alsounanimously passed a new constitution in January 2015 after extended debatebetween Islamists and secularists, a feat that was possible thanks to the boldleadership of two major figures from each side, Ennahda’s Rached Ghannouchi andNida Tounes’ Caïd Essebsi (now Tunisia’s president). Tunisia is stronger nowwith a constitution that has broad national support.

Nevertheless,there are challenges ahead. First, the party system is still in its infancy,and based more on key personalities and identity politics than clear, concretepolitical platforms. Neither major party is unified. Nida Tounes, for example,brings together traditional secular business elites in an unlikely coalitionwith secular leftists. It has suffered a spate of resignations over how theparty should be governed and succession from Essebsi. Ennahda is more unifiedas the party of the once disaffected, but itself has experienced turmoil overits direction and leadership. Such divisions could pose a risk to Tunisia’spolitical stability in the future if they create deadlock and dysfunction inTunisia’s political institutions, especially the parliament.

Moreover,the key role that party leadership has played in managing strains within thepolitical system begs the question of how the country will fare once thesefigures are no longer on the scene. Essebsi and Ghannouchi have managed togalvanise support for their moderate policies thanks to their personalprestige. If they were to depart the scene, or fall from grace with theirsupporters, a more fractious form of populism could emerge. In particular, ifhardliners were to get control of Ennahda, especially with support of AnsarAl-Sharia or other jihadist-sympathetic groups in Tunisia, this would makepolitics more fractious and turn the country against the West, complicatingefforts to support Tunisia’s democracy.

Tunisia faces economic challenges that could undermine itspolitical consolidation.

Tunisiaalso faces economic challenges that could undermine its politicalconsolidation. Demand for greater economic opportunity was central in Tunisia’s2011 uprising, yet economic disenfranchisement remains strong, especially ininterior regions. Unemployment hovers at 15 per cent, the government has notreformed extensive Ben-Ali regulations, and corruption is widespread. TheInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international institutions areworking with Tunisia on economic reforms, but these reforms are difficult andwill require the political will and capacity to take on entrenched interestssuch as business elites and trade unions. Continued economic stagnation remainsa threat to Tunisia’s broader stability. Already, the parliament voted out onegovernment in August 2016 due to its perceived ineptitude in confronting theseissues. The new government passed an importantinvestment law in September andhosted a major donor conference in November, which resulted in $8 billion inaid and loan pledges over the next four years (Amara, 2016).

Tunisia’s tourism economy ismeanwhile threatened by the chaos in neighbouring Libya and Tunisia’s ownradicalisation prob­lem. Tunisia experienced three major attacks in 2015, twoon tour­ist destinations – the Bardo Museum in Tunis and a beach resort inSousse. As of February 2016, an estimated 6,000–7,000 Tuni­sians were fightingor training with ISIL in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and elsewhere across the region(Trofimov, 2016). Returnees will undoubtedly pose an unprecedented threat withwhich Tunisia’s overstretched security services will need to contend.Additionally, Tunisia has long been battling al-Qaeda-linked attacks in thewest of the country.

Despite these challenges, theTunisian state administration has proven durable. It withstood the collapse ofthe Ben-Ali regime, with the defence ministry in particular playing a peacefulrole in supporting the revolution. Reform of the interior ministry, in particular,remains a major obstacle. During the Ben-Ali era, the interior ministry wasall-powerful. It has continued to maintain a position of power since 2011, andretained deep connections to the Ben-Ali elites. Its own workings arebyzantine, yet its ability to slow down and block political reforms – either byacting through its powerful police unions or by threatening individualpoliticians – is widely recognised as a core challenge to strengtheningTunisian democracy. The interior ministry is also a key partner for Washing­tonand European capitals when it comes to counter-terrorism in Tunisia, furthercomplicating matters.

The Tunisian state administration has proven durable. Itwithstood the collapse of the Ben-Ali regime, with the defence ministry in particularplaying a peaceful role in supporting the revolution.

Given its small size, Tunisia playsa limited role on the regional stage. Currently, it is most focused on thestability of Libya. Wealthy Libyans are ever-present on the streets of Tunis,which serves as host to most of the international community’s diplomaticrepresentatives assigned to Libya. But Tunisia has very limited resources toinfluence affairs in its larger neighbour. After paying little attention toTunisia after its initial transition, Gulf coun­tries pledged significantfinancial assistance during the November investment conference, including $1.25billion in project support from Qatar, $800 million from Saudi Arabia, and $500million from Kuwait. The Gulf has a limited interest in Tunisia, although Qatarprovided some financial support to Ennahda during its period in office. TheUnited States (US) and its European partners are focused on supporting Tunisiain consolidating its demo­cratic gains and are devoting a considerable, and growing,level of assistance to security and economic stabilisation. Focus areas for theWestern powers include border security, tourism security, and training andequipping Tunisia’s counter-terrorism forces.

Libya

Libya faces the greatest turmoil ofall the countries in the Middle East other than Syria and Yemen. In the summerof 2014, after stumbling on critical post-war reconstruction tasks and holdinga contested election, the Libyan government split between two 8

entities, one based in the easterncity of Tobruk and one based in Tripoli. Powerful Islamist interests from thecity of Misrata backed the sizeable rump General National Congress in Tripoli,while the somewhat more secularly oriented government in Tobruk gainedrecognition from the international community. Violence then erupted betweenbackers of the rival governments and forced the international community out ofLibya, including all American and European embassies.

Over the course of 2015, the UnitedNations (UN) worked to resolve the dispute through a national dialogue,producing a Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015. That agreement calledfor the establishment of a new Libyan government that would draw on both theTobruk and Tripoli governments and the formation of a Presidency Council, whichin turn would appoint a cabinet to govern the country. The Presidency Councilwas formed in March 2016, but as of December the Tobruk parliament was refusingto ratify the government, complicated by the influence of the powerful easternmilitary leader, General Khalifa Heftar.

Practically the only institutionstill working in Libya is the Central Bank and its automatic payment system forthe vast public payroll, which controversially includes many militia units thatwere given salaries after the revolution. Previously, Libya could offset thesecosts with oil revenue. But with oil prices at record lows, uneven and limitedproduction, and ongoing threats to oil facilities and territory, the budgetdeficit is soaring, forcing the government to draw on foreign currencyreserves. Recent battles for control over key oil export terminals threaten theprospects of immediate recovery even if the political situation improves.

Since no government has anypolitical authority to reform the public payment or subsidy system, it is onlya matter of time until Libya faces a dire financial crisis. The internationalcommunity has tried to orchestrate a deal where the Central Bank would releasefunds to the unity government, but the Bank Governor intends to resist theseentreaties until there is an approved finance minister. Libya had $68bn inforeign reserves as of May 2016, according to estimates by Bloomberg, and wasrunning a budget deficit of around 60–70 per cent of GDP, according to theWorld Bank (Shennib & Alexander, 2016). Additionally, the country now facespersistent shortages of electricity, fuel, medical supplies and currency, whichall contribute to the challenges of establishing the credibility of theGovernment of National Accord.

Adding to these problems is thepresence of ISIL and the ongoing violence in Benghazi and elsewhere. Initially,ISIL infiltrated the coastal city of Derna and gained allegiance from localjihadist groups. It was then driven out by other jihadists. As a result, itmoved west and took advantage of old regime sympathisers in the town of Sirte,much as it had aligned with ex-Baathists in Iraq. ISIL maintained a strongholdin Sirte throughout 2015 and the first half of 2016 until Misratan militiasretook the city over the summer and autumn of 2016 with the assistance ofhundreds of US airstrikes and small units of British Special Forces (Chivvis,2016, 413–30). ISIL still remains a threat to the country, however. Itsfighters were reported to be regrouping elsewhere, especially in the

Since no government has any political authority to reform thepublic payment or subsidy system, it is only a matter of time until Libya facesa dire financial crisis.

south.Moreover, the militias from Misrata who led the offensive and sufferedsignificant casualties will expect some form of political or militarycompensation, which will complicate the already fragile government’s effort tobuild support and unity.

Furtherexacerbating the situation is General Heftar, who has almost single-handedlyprevented the functioning of the UN-backed Government of National Accord.Heftar draws strength from tribal allegiances and support from Gaddafi’s formerofficer corps. His battle against Islamists in Benghazi is controversial andhas been ongoing since 2014. His supporters refuse to accept a government inwhich he does not play a key role, yet his detractors, mostly from Misrata,refuse to accept a government in which he plays any role whatsoever. Heftardoes not control all the forces in the east and is even not fully respectedwithin the army’s ranks, but there he remains. In September 2016, Heftarcaptured key oil facilities of the Sirte basin, but came under renewed attackin December by the militias he evicted.

KeyWestern allies, the US, United Kingdom (UK), France, Italy, Germany and theEuropean Union (EU) have all been invested in the Libyan Political Agreement.They have made pledges of support to assist the Government of National Accord,but delivering on those commitments remains difficult since it remainsextremely challenging to implement technical assistance in Libya and Libya’sgovernment and political players need to make the core decisions about thecountry’s future on their own. Adding to the complexity is the delicate balancebetween assistance and interference, which Libyan government leaders continueto resist. Finally, the new Trump administration may tilt more toward Egypt’santi-Islamist agenda, which would weaken or end the GNA. Indeed, with therecent changes in governments in the UK and Italy and upcoming elections inFrance, the West’s Libya policy could shift markedly. At the same time, Moscowhosted Heftar for high-level consultations in November, and may be seeking amore influential role in Libya.

Europeremains particularly concerned about the migration from Libya, whosestatelessness and criminal networks have made it the key link in the centralMediterranean route. At some point, the Western allies may lose patience inthis process and consider supporting other alternatives such as militaryintervention. One possible option, though controversial and very difficult toimplement, will be the effective division of Libya, perhaps between itshistorical regions, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan in the south. Such adiscussion would entail an extensive debate about resource division, tribal andurban identities and security arrangements. Nevertheless, it is worth thinkingabout a Plan B for Libya if its current survival as a state becomes in doubt.

As noted above, all of Libya’sneighbours are extremely concerned about its stability. Because of theiranti-Islamist views, Egypt and Algeria have supported the anti-Islamist figuresin Libya, including Heftar, but only Egypt has done so materially. From 2012 to2015, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar were at odds in supporting rivalLibyan factions (the UAE attempt 10 ing to advance its ardent anti-Islamistagenda; Qatar supporting the Islamist parties). International diplomats reportthat more recently most of the regional actors are pushing their Libyancontacts to accept a Government of National Accord. The dire economic situa­tionmeanwhile threatens a broader humanitarian crisis.

Clearly, if the Libyan statecollapsed entirely, there would likely be a surge of terrorist activity acrossthe region and ISIL would seek to re-establish a safe-haven. Illegal migrantswould surge from Africa and Libyan citizens, a once-prosperous people, wouldadd to the region’s refugee crisis in droves. Libya’s neighbours could assumesome risk by establishing buffer zones within Libyan territory, Tuni­sia’stransition would face new threats, and the EU could escalate its naval presencein the Mediterranean. However, such an overt collapse would be impossible forthe US and Europe to contain.

Egypt

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, asymbol of regional stability for 30 years, was forced from office in February2011 as a result of the Tahrir Square revolution. Following a brief interim ofmilitary rule, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was elected to power in early 2012.After a tumultuous year and a half, General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi staged a coupagainst President Mohammed Morsi’s govern­ment. The military and its backersclaim that Morsi’s election was illegitimate and argue that the military actedon the population’s behest since large protests demanded Morsi’s resignation,but the coup marked a return to the authoritarianism of the Mubarak era,starting with the brutal massacre of approximately 1,000 pro-Morsi protestersat Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in August 2013. Egypt avoided the worst outcomes ofthe Arab Spring – the state collapse of Syria and Libya – but the initialpromise many saw in the Tahrir Square protests evaporated.

Under President Sisi, crackdowns ondissent have continued and hope of democratic progress has been deflated. TheMuslim Brotherhood’s party, Law and Justice, has been outlawed, Morsi and histop allies have been sentenced to death, and others have fled or been exiled.Secular but critical journalists and non-governmen­tal organizations have alsobeen targeted. Sisi has governed without a parliament, issuing laws bypresidential decree. The US Depart­ment of State has criticised the Sisigovernment for ‘the excessive use of force by security services…unlawfulkillings and torture; the suppression of civil liberties, including societaland governmental restrictions on freedoms of expression and the press and thefree­dom of peaceful assembly and association; and limitations on due processin trials.’ (State Department, 2014) Many Egypt-watchers question the degree ofcontrol that Sisi actually wields over Egyp­tian politics, pointing tocontinued factionalism within the state itself (Cook, 2015).

Egypt avoided the worst outcomes of the Arab Spring – the statecollapse of Syria and Libya – but the initial promise many saw in the TahrirSquare protests evaporated.

The Sisi government, however,claims that it has a broader base of support than Mubarak did. Politically itportrays itself as Islamic, though not Islamist, in an effort to draw support.It has also focused on economic recovery and aims for a broader distribu­tionof Egypt’s national wealth. Under Sisi, the Egyptian economy grew at 2 per centin 2014 and slightly over 4 per cent in 2015 (see IMF World Economic OutlookDatabase, April 2016). It has launched large economic projects on the Suez andelectricity infra­structure in an effort to boost the economy. Its tourismindustry, however, has been hit hard by the terrorist threat in Sinai, espe­ciallyin the aftermath of the downing of a Russia-bound Metrojet flight in October2015, which led several European countries to cancel direct service to theSharm al-Sheikh resort and produced a 40 per cent drop in tourism in the firstquarter of 2016 alone (Reuters, 2016).

Egypt has sought todiversify its defence relations, given the strains with the US and the Obamaadministration’s decision to hold up major acquisitions in response to Sisi’scoup. Egypt has thus sought weapons purchases including S-300 air defencesystems from Russia and the Mistral warship from France.

Egypt’s economic growth under Sisiis also partly due to generous support from interested Gulf States. SaudiArabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Oman have contributed directly to the govern­ment’sfinances and invested to the tune of $30bn in the Egyptian economy (El Tablawy,El Wardany & Syeed, 2016). Recognising that this level of external supportis unlikely to continue indefi­nitely, Egypt and the IMF agreed on the terms ofa $12bn reform package in September 2016. The package requires Egypt to adoptmuch-needed subsidy and tax reforms aimed to alleviate its signifi­cant budgetdeficit and invest in job growth (IMF, 2016).

Additionally, Egypt has sought todiversify its defence rela­tions, given the strains with the US and the Obamaadministra­tion’s decision to hold up major acquisitions in response to Sisi’scoup. Egypt has thus sought weapons purchases including S-300 air defencesystems from Russia and the Mistral warship from France. As discussed below, USdefence support to Egypt remains sizeable, but was retooled by the Obamaadministration in response to Sisi’s seizure of power.

Finally, as a result of theirmutual opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and regional jihadists,Israeli-Egyptian politi­cal and military ties have improved under Sisi. Israelhas approved modifications to its peace treaty to allow the Egyptian militaryto pursue terrorists in the Sinai more easily and an Egyptian foreign ministervisited Jerusalem in July 2016 for the first time since 2007, paving the wayfor a potential Netanyahu–Sisi meeting.

Egypt’s main security problems nowstem from the grow­ing threat of jihadist groups, including ISIL affiliates inthe Sinai Peninsula. Outside Libya, ISIL’s most visible group in North Africaoperates in the Sinai. In 2014, a group known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM)rebranded itself as an ISIL affiliate under the name Wilayat Sinai. ABM was anal-Qaeda-inspired group bent on the destruction of Israel, which launchedattacks in the Sinai and across the border with Israel from 2011. Wilayat Sinaiis now estimated to number at least several hundred and potentially more corefighters and is widely believed responsible for the Metrojet downing (TheTahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, n.d.).

Egypt will have to address thisthreat while also ensuring the anarchy in Libya does not spread to itsnorth-west, where terrorist networks operate across the border into easternLibya. It thus sees General Heftar as an ideological and practical partner. Itsarmy is not structured or trained for counter-terrorism operations given itshistoric focus on Israel, and this partially accounts to its failure to securethe Sinai. The military’s shortcomings were underscored when it bombed Mexicantourists in September 2015 after mistaking them for militants. Despite theseerrors, the Egyptian military has been reluctant to receive US or other outsideadvice about the appropriate approach to dealing with the insurgency.

 

The European Union andthe United States

The Mediterranean has increased inimportance as a foreign policy concern for the US and Europe in recent years,first for positive reasons, and then for not-so-positive ones. The 2011anti-authoritarian revolts first promised to make the region a strong,democratic partner for the US and Europe alike. When the outcome of thoserevolts produced violence and chaos, however, the region’s problems became moretroubling and more acute. The US and Europe share a range of overlapping butnot identical foreign policy objectives in the region, with the majordifferences arising largely from European proximity. To generalise, the US hascapabilities in some areas that Europe lacks, but the Mediterranean’s saliencein Washington is less than in European capitals. Europe has more limited capabilitiesand leverage, but a greater interest in finding remedies to the region’smultiple overlapping crises.

For Europe the conflicts andconsequent collapse of state control in Syria and Libya have both sparked asurge of refugees and created conditions for uncontrolled migration both fromthese countries and several others, some as far from the Mediterranean itselfas Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. It is still far too soon to discern the gravityof the humanitarian, political and security impact of this great migration onEurope, but that the impact is already very great is clear (Frontex, 2015;Gartenstein-Ross, Barr, Wilcoxon & Basuni, 2015; Parkes, 2014).Interestingly, a November survey of migrants in Libya conducted by theInternational Organization for Migration reported that a majority of migrantsprefer to stay in Libya, particularly from Egypt, Sudan, and Chad. (IOM 2016)Nevertheless, Europe’s primary foreign policy objective in the region is andwill remain addressing the challenge of this mass migration due to economicissues and preventing the jihadists from taking advantage of migrant routes tospread across Europe and perpetrate attacks. Doing so will require effortsalong multiple vectors, within European polities, along the central and easternmigration routes and, ultimately, via cooperation with the countries of theMediterranean themselves.

Europe lacks many of the toolsnecessary to achieve these objectives, however. To begin with, Europe’spolitical influence in the region is limited (Vachodova, 2005). One of the EU’smost valuable forms of influence in the past has been the soft power generatedby the promise of closer relations, and especially membership in the EU. Thatpower of attraction was key to Europe’s critical role in the stabilisation ofcentral and parts of eastern Europe in the quarter-century after the Cold War.But with the derailment of the Eastern Partnership due to the Ukraine crisis,Brexit and the severe, and growing, political and economic strains within theEU itself, the EU’s power of attraction is now much diminished. At the sametime, the failure of the Arab revolts (with the exception of Tunisia) hasdimmed prospects for closer association, let alone membership in the EU(Asseburg, 2014; Youngs, 2015).

Militarily, Europe also lacks manyof the resources that would allow it to better protect its regional interests.European defence resources have diminished since the end of the Cold War –important European contributions to stabilising the Balkans, and the conflictsin Afghanistan and Iraq and now the Sahel, notwithstanding (Larrabee et al.,2012). Given Russian aggression, Europe now faces a dual challenge ofstrengthening itself for traditional defence and deterrence while at the sametime investing in the capabilities needed to help end the violence that has ledto state collapse across the region. France has contributed significantly tostabilising the Sahel, and other European countries have made some, mostlysmall-scale, contributions to this and related tasks. Nevertheless, there is agreat deal more that currently needs to be done, and the requirements may growgreater over time. Unfortunately, Europe lacks the military capabilities for alarge-scale stabilisation operation in a single country – be it Libya, Syria ora future failed state – without major US assistance. In addition, after thesix-month 2011 operation in Libya, NATO concluded that the Alliance lacked manykey capabilities required for modern operations, such as intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and aerial refuellingcapabilities. Moreover, the individual countries which participated in theoperations ran out of ammunition and had to be resupplied by the US. As ofearly 2016, even plans for a one-to-two-brigade operation to supportstabilisation in Libya ran aground due to lack of available Europeancapabilities (and political will).

This is by no means to imply thatEurope has no military capability of value in the Mediterranean. Three EUoperations – Triton, Poseidon Sea and Poseidon Land – aim to strengthen bordersecurity and provide humanitarian assistance along the southern andsouth-eastern littoral. In addition, the EU has attempted border managementoperations in Rafah, between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, and in Libya after the2011 revolution. Neither operation, however, was successful. The Rafah missionwas suspended in 2007 after the Hamas takeover of Gaza and has remained instand-by since, while the Libya operation failed to deploy due to the growingchaos in the country (EEAS, 2014a & 2014b, 2015).

Europe’s most powerful tool is itsability to provide economic largesse through the European Commission orbilaterally. Europe’s ability to provide assistance and markets for troubledsocieties offers leverage with many states and could help to acceleratereconstruction efforts in states that have been destroyed. The EU provided€3.82bn in assistance to the countries of the Mediterranean rim (excludingTurkey) between 2007 and 2011 and has increased assistance to countries such asTunisia since then. In November, the European Investment Bank promised 2.9billion euros in loans to Tunisia by 2020 (Amara). The non-EU Mediterraneanregion collectively accounts for 8.6 per cent of the EU’s external trade(European Commission, 2016). The EU has floated the idea of establishing aEuro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and signed Association Agreements withMorocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, and continues to seek to deepen thesearrangements.

Moreover, the EU is increasinglylinked with the Mediterra­nean on energy issues. Especially given Russia’sinvasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions, the EU has turned to the regionas a potentially critical energy supplier. The EU seeks to foster deeperpolitical and trade dialogue with northern African and eastern Mediterraneanpartners on energy, in particular to create a Medi­terranean gas hub in thesouth of Europe. It also seeks to foster the development of an integratedmarket and production hub of renew­ables in the region (Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2007; Euro­pean Commission, 2011; ENPI Info Centre, n.d.; The Africa-EUPartnership, 2013–2016). The EU and Algeria have also launched a platform forpolitical dialogue on energy matters (European Com­mission, 2015).

Yet in the prevailing environment,Europe’s considerable eco­nomic power is of more limited utility than it mightbe. Regional turmoil will make it difficult to deepen these agreements orrealise the potential of a free-trade area anytime soon. Economic power alonewill moreover do little to stem the growth of jihadism or the flow of migrantsfrom the south – however important it may be to doing so. At present, the bestthe EU can offer is leverage for reform with countries such as Algeria,Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, although conditioning aid on reform remainscontroversial.

If the EU lacks many of the toolsneeded to pursue core inter­ests in the sub-region, the US is better positionedin some ways but less well positioned in others. Its perspective on the region,for simple geographic reasons, will always be different from Europe’s: whereasdevelopments in the Mediterranean increasingly raise fundamental and evenexistential issues for Europe, the immediate effects of regional turmoil arefar less immediate for the US, which does not face the migrant challenge, ismuch less threatened by terrorism from North Africa (although it takes thethreat seriously as evidenced by the recent campaign to support Libyanoperations against ISIS in Sirte), and has none of the cultural or energy con­nectionsthat Europe has with the region.

Military power is by far thegreatest US asset in the region. Large US bases at Ramstein, Vicenza andLakenheath, for example, combined with smaller bases in eastern Europe and theMedi­terranean, offer considerable power projection capability. The US SixthFleet, headquartered in Naples, no longer includes an aircraft carrier, but hassubstantial warfighting, crisis response and intelligence-gatheringcapabilities. For example, the military 15

operation against ISIS in Libya,Operation Odyssey Lightning, was conducted off a Marine amphibious assault shipcapable of launching Harrier jets and Cobra attack helicopters. The operationis supported by MQ-9 Reaper drones based at Sigonella airbase in Italy, and itwas recently revealed that Tunisia is allowing the US to use a base in theborder region, which could provide much more consistent overflight coveragegiven weather conditions over the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, if the US hassignificant power-projection capabilities, these capabilities are already inhigh demand for deterrence operations in central and eastern Europe andcounter-ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria, as well as operations outside theregion. To further complicate matters, the Mediterranean includes countriesfrom no less than three combatant commands, CENTCOM, EUCOM and AFRICOM, a factthat does not always contribute to a holistic military approach to the region’sproblems, even within the Defense Department, let alone across the US agencies.

US economic leverage through tradeand financial flows over the region is more limited than European leverage. In2014, for example, the US exported $27.6bn to the region, in comparison withEurope’s $117.6bn, close to five times greater. If Israel is removed from thetally, US exports drop to $12.5bn, with EU exports at $95.8bn, close to seventimes greater (International Monetary Fund, 2016b).

The US has long-standing closedefence relationships with Egypt and Israel, and defence ties have been institutionalisedas a central component of the 1979 Camp David Accords. Egypt received $76bn inbilateral foreign aid from the US between 1948 and 2015 (Sharp, 2015). Israelhas been the largest recipient of US aid since the end of the Second World War,receiving $3bn in grants annually since 1985 (Zanotti, 2015). In September2016, Washington signed a new ten-year Memorandum of Understanding with Israelincreasing that military assistance to $3.8bn. In addition, countries in theregion receive modest amounts of US aid through programmes such as the TransSahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership Initiative, the Strategic GovernanceInitiative and the Enterprise Fund. A notable exception is Algeria, which haspreferred to keep the US at arm’s length.

US interests in the region havechanged dramatically in recent years. Unlike for Europe, aside from theimportance of the Suez as a sea-lane of communication for energy from the Gulf,the region has never factored significantly in US energy security concerns. Formost of the Cold War, US objectives were to support Israel, ensure the securityof the Suez Canal, counter Soviet influence and clients, and protect the CampDavid Accords. Since 9/11, however, concern with terrorism has far overshadowedthese traditional US objectives. Clearly Arab-Israeli peace and the security ofthe Suez remain important issues for the US. However, concern with the region’sproduction of jihadi terrorists now is the primary lens through which theregion is viewed, and that concern has spread west to North Africa and theSahel. This has in turn led to greater pressure on the authoritarian regimes ofthe region for democratic reform, as their repressive regimes are often viewedas a source of jihadism.

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The US concern with the potential terroristthreat in and from the region has only increased after the disillusionment ofthe Arab Spring. Since 2014, the main focus of US attention has been on thesecurity threat posed by a growing ISIS presence in Egypt and particularly inLibya. Concern with ISIS now dominates US policy toward the Mediterraneanlittoral, from Morocco to Syria (with the exception of Israel).

Increased concern with ISIS andjihadism more generally, however, poses a difficult challenge for USpolicymakers when it comes to democracy assistance programmes in the region. Onthe one hand, such programmes are still widely viewed as necessary componentsof long-term reforms to counter radicalisation from Morocco to Egypt. On theother hand, such programmes greatly complicate relationships with currentcounter-terrorism partners, including Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and even somepolitical forces in Tunisia.

Nevertheless, if the US tendency toview the region through the counter-terrorism lens has grown, overall, theMediterranean remains much less important to America than to Europe. This ispartly due to geography and partly due to the fact that US priorities withChina, Russia, Iran, North Korea and, now, the Levant eat up most of theavailable bandwidth in Washington. And although the likelihood of a terroristplot against the US emanating from Libya is growing (along with the likelihoodof an attack against US interests or personnel overseas), it is still less thanthe likelihood of a terrorist plot from the Levant or from a cell in Europe.

 

Turkey, Russia and theGulf States

Although the Gulf States haveincreased their role in the region, their overall importance can sometimes beexaggerated. As noted in the subsection on Egypt, the Emirates, Saudi Arabiaand Kuwait have all played a significant role supporting Egypt economically.More recently in the context of the rising threats from ISIL and Iran, therehas also been some discussion of forging an Arab military alliance, whereEgypt’s land forces would presumably play a role. However, there is littleindication that talk has – or will – elevate into concrete planning let aloneconcrete deployments. The core of the Egyptian-Saudi-UAE alliance relates tothe existential threat these states see from political Islam and Sunni radicalism.Consequently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are subsidising the Egyptian economy toreduce the risk that Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s authoritarian government will facerenewed challenges from Islamists or broader popular unrest.

The UAE and Egypt collaborated at leaston one military operation in Libya, striking Islamist militia targets inTripoli in 2014, but the move only provoked the Islamist militias’ conquest ofthe Libyan capital (Kirkpatrick & Schmidt, 2014). As regional leaders ofthe 2011 intervention in Libya, the UAE and Qatar played a unique role, bothflying bombing missions and quietly sending arms and special forces elements toassist Libyan fighters. That support continued through the post-conflictperiod, as the UAE and Qatar each supported respective factions in Libya thathave commonly been labelled as anti-Islamist and Islamist. More recently, theUAEand Qatar have come under significant diplomatic pressure to stop theirsupport for Libya’s factions, and appear to have complied to at least some degree.Egypt, however, still backs the problematic General Heftar strongly and Egypt’sexternal financial backers have been unwilling or unable to do much to changeCairo’s policy. Regional actors will continue to monitor developments in Libyaclosely and step in again, particularly if a breakdown in order occurs.

Turkey has sought to exert itspower in the region both in protection of political Islam and to promote itsindustries. The region represented $14.5bn in exports for Turkey in 2014, or alittle less than 10 per cent of Turkey’s global export markets (whereas the EUrepresented 43 per cent). Turkish construction and other industries are activeacross the region. Under the AK party, the Turkish flag has tended to followits trade. In the case of Libya and other countries, Turkey’s strong supportfor Islamist factions has brought it into conflict with other regional playersincluding the US, Egypt and some Gulf States. Turkish foreign policy is nowconsumed with the crisis in Syria, which poses an existential threat to thestability of the modern Turkish state. In July 2016 these strains led to afailed military coup. Shortly thereafter the Turkish government sent a groundcontingent into Syria to stabilise its border and prevent the formation of whatit feared was soon to become a unified Kurdish entity in northern Syria.

Russian interests in the regionhave been significant and ongoing. Russia maintains its only naval base outsidethe former Soviet Union at Tartus, in Syria, and may be looking to upgrade itsfacilities there (Bodner, 2015; Haidar, 2015; Harmer, 2012; Kozak, Spaulding& Urchick, 2015). In September 2015, Russia intervened forcibly in theSyrian conflict, demonstrating its intention to remain a major power in theregion and ensure a friendly government in Damascus. Thanks to its access toLatakia airbase in Syria, it has airpower projection capabilities across theeastern Med and has strengthened its A2/AD capabilities there (Kagan and Kagan,2015; IHS Jane’s, 2015; Spaulding, 2015). The October 2015 downing of theMetrojet flight killed 219 Russians and led to an intensification of Russianair and ground operations against the Islamic State in Syria, including withlong-range bombers and sea-launched cruise missiles from the Caspian Flotilla.In subsequent months, however, Russia continued to strike both Islamic Stateand moderate rebel fighters who threatened the Syrian regime. Through Septemberand October 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State JohnKerry negotiated truces aimed at halting the fighting and deliveringhumanitarian assistance. However, the truces barely lasted hours and relieftrucks were notably bombed. As of December 2016, the rebel held sections ofAleppo were near collapse.

Russia appears to be seeking toprofit from the regional chaos and difficulties the US and Europe have hadnavigating the post-Arab Spring waters. Russia initially countenanced the NATOintervention that toppled Colonel Qaddafi in Libya, supporting UNSCR 1973,asserting it had only allowed a limited operation. Soon it had misgivings,however, and frequently voiced criticisms of the NATO operation since. Its rolein post-Qaddafi Libya has remained limited (although General Heftar has visitedMoscow twice this year and was received warmly), but in Egypt, Russia hassought to take advantage of the cooling of US-Egyptian defence relations underGeneral Sisi, raising eyebrows in Washington. In addition to an arms deal thatwill give Egypt advanced air defences including the long range surface-to-airmissile system S-300 and other systems, Russia will build Egypt’s first nuclearpower plant(IHSJane’s, 2015a & 2015b). The possibility of negotiations on a free-tradezone between Egypt and Russia’s putative ‘Eurasian Economic Union’ has alsobeen mooted (Eurasian Economic Commission, N.d.; Hussein, 2015; RIA Novosti,2013, 2015). (Russia also cooperates on nuclear issues with Algeria.) Notably,Russian political influence among European Mediterranean partners – above allGreece – is far greater than among northern European states, even if Russia’srelationship with Turkey ran aground over Syria in 2016.  

Russia’s greatest interest in theregion is protecting the Assad regime, which reflects a commitment tosupporting like-minded regimes elsewhere in the broader region, including Iran.It is also a statement of Russia’s intention to remain a major power in theregion. With Russian military backing, the Assad regime is nearly guaranteed aseat at the table in determining the future political map of the Levant. Theintervention was also a statement of Russia’s desire to remain a great power, along-standing objective of Russian foreign policy. As long as the Russiandomestic situation does not experience a major negative shock, Russia can beexpected to continue to seek a regional role, at least in Syria, and likelyelsewhere along the Med (Magen, 2015; Margelov, 2013; Schumacher & Nitoiu,2015).

 

Looking ahead

The Mediterranean region has grownin significance to the US and Europe over the past five years as a result ofthe political earthquake in 2011, the resulting political turmoil and thesubsequent spread of jihadist groups, especially, but not only, ISIL. Just asthe region is still evolving in response to the Arab uprisings, US and Europeanforeign policy must adapt and find new instruments and avenues to influencethese diverse countries. Despite domestic pressure to turn inward, away fromregions like North Africa, it would be a mistake to dial back engagement with-- or attention to -- the region. A further deterioration of economic,political and security conditions there would be dangerous and hurt US andEuropean interests – above all on counter-terrorism and humanitarian fronts.

Three countries along the southernlittoral pose particular policy challenges: Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – althoughif Algeria were to unravel it would become a first-tier challenge of its own.Conditions in these three states are intertwined and a coordinated approach isneeded. Investment of political, economic, and security resources in Tunisia isthe least problematic thanks to the country’s continued progress on democraticconsolidation. Tunisia’s needs are real, the country is small, and its stillyoung government is organized enough that the US and Europe can hope to have apositive impact. Yet it will need more assistance than it is currently getting,and that assistance must not only be sustained but also carefully coordinatedbetween relevant donors.

Progress in Tunisia, however, willeventually require progress in bringing the situation in Libya under control,and this will be much more difficult to achieve. Appetite for far-reachingmilitary stabilisation operations in Libya remains low in Europe and Washingtonand this appears unlikely to change in the near future. Thecurrent strategy is to contain the conflict in Libyaand combat ISIS, while supporting a political resolution through the Governmentof National Accord. A political resolution has not yet worked and will likelybe even more difficult as General Heftar gains influence at the expense of theGNA. It is unclear how long the GNA – in its present form – can remain viable.  

The prospects of a broader civilconflict in Libya remain. In the event of a wider war, the costs of acontainment strategy will only increase, yet so may the costs of deeperintervention. In either case, pressure to continue counter-ISIS operations, forexample in the South, is likely to remain despite ISIS’ ouster from Sirte. ISISand other jihadist groups will not be eliminated from Libya absent functioningstate structures. Eventually, it could become necessary to consider a divisionof the country, for example, under a highly federated system.

In Egypt, America and Europe willboth face the imperative of continued cooperation with the new regime in Cairo.Counter-terrorism cooperation will remain a priority and the US will continueto seek to engage the Egyptian military on counter-terrorism strategy in theSinai, at least as long as the regime does not engage in excessive violentrepression of its citizens. President-elect Trump has already signalled hisaffinity for President al-Sisi so additional US military support for the regimecould be forthcoming.

Finally, the future of US andEuropean strategy on Syria has been drawn into question due to the persistenceof ISIS and the resurgence of the regime, which is now solidly backed byRussian and Iranian forces. It is possible that the United States under Trumpmay opt to allow Russia to take the lead in bringing this crisis to an end.US-European cooperation will still be essential to achieving and sustaining anynegotiated settlement there. While it is difficult to imagine European publicsbacking a full-scale military intervention in Syria in which their troops wouldbe deployed in large numbers in a conflict, a negotiated settlement may requireat least some European peacekeeping deployments. Alternatively, Euro-Americancooperation will be essential – through NATO or otherwise – in the event of anagreement to establish no-fly or no-bombing zones to stem the humanitariansuffering in the country – especially if such operations undermine Russiansupport for the regime.

To better coordinate these efforts,key European and US leaders may wish to hold senior-level discussions to definetheir mutual objectives in the Mediterranean region and assess their tools andlevers of influence. A promising format for these discussions might be theE3+US format that led to the adoption of a ‘carrots and sticks’ approach toIran. Once it was clear that Iran would reject outreach, the EU and the US cametogether to adopt the strong sanctions regime that ultimately brought Iran tothe negotiating table – a diplomatic feat that required extensive diplomacy toconvince all parties not to cave in to their individual interests forconducting business with Iran.

Europe and the US also need bettertools for influencing developments in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they mustcoordinatemoreeffectively so that, for example, the Tunisians are not fielding offers ofsimilar border security assistance from France, Germany and the US. Anotherpossibility is to establish a regional training centre in a place like Malta,modelled as a civilian version of a Jordanian police training centre that hasbeen used to train Palestinian and Iraqi security forces. A more effectivesystem of disincentives for the region’s political spoilers is also needed. Forexample, one of the key penalties threatened against spoilers of the politicaldialogue process in Libya has been travel bans or frozen assets in Europe;however, because most spoilers have limited interests in Europe, thosesanctions have proven to be of limited utility. More effective might be to workthrough Turkey, which provides their access to the outside world.  

Coordination on political issuescan also be improved with the identification of shared goals. This meansidentifying opportunities, not only waiting to respond to crisis. Howeverintractable the Algeria–Morocco conflict seems, a renewed effort should be madetowards establishing a process that could lead towards opening the border andspurring much-needed intra-regional commerce. Similarly, the US and Europeshould use their collective political leverage to advocate for essentialreforms that would lead to more entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment(FDI), as well as job growth. For example, Tunisia requires macro-economicreforms and budget adjustments, which it is working with the IMF to implement.But it still ranks quite poorly on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Businessscale, especially in terms of getting credit and starting a business – aproblem that has even worsened slightly since the revolution (World Bank,n.d.). The Tunisia 2020 Investment Conference was a step in the right direction.Now the government must be seen to be delivering on the reforms it promised andmost importantly, job creation based on the funding it raised.

Finally, the central problems ofmigration and terrorism must receive more attention and financial resources fromboth sides of the Atlantic. European defence spending is woefully inadequate toaddress these threats compounded by Russia’s renewed hostility. It is alsoclear that no US White House is apt to heavily subsidise efforts against whatare primarily threats to Europe. At most, the US will stay politically engagedand act when it is needed to contain more imminent threats, as it did in thesummer 2016 effort against ISIS in Libya. Should a terror attack occuremanating from North Africa against US facilities or personnel overseas, thatcould change an administration’s short-term calculus, but it would be highlyunlikely that the region would rank in priority above Asia, Russia, Afghanistanor Iran in any scenario. There is no getting around the need for greaterEuropean investment or engagement in the region; otherwise, the southernMediterranean will continue to threaten European security.

 

 

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