July 27, 2016

The Pacific Islands are given little attention and rarely make the news unless there has been a natural disaster of some sort. This is a mistake since these islands are of critical importance to any US strategy to counter Chinese adventurism in the Pacific and maintain thepeace. Not only are the US affiliated islands an important source of basing forlogistic infrastructure (should there be a military conflict with China), butthey are also important to US Pacific Command for training, contingency andforward basing, the deployment of potential strike weapons, anddeterrence.
   
Any “island strategy” must not be solely a military strategy but includeinterlacing development, diplomatic, economic, and culture strategies. At aminimum, islands in the Compact of Free Association States (Micronesia,Marshall Islands, Palau), US Territories Guam, American Samoa, and the Marianas(CNMI) should be the target of key investment initiatives in health education,nontraditional security (for example, maritime security and energy security),and economic development in order to strengthen island societies as a whole andas part of a wider, foundational, and sustained US strategic approach.
   
From Hawaii to the first island chain, compact states and US territories form anatural and strategic pathway for US forces that must be strengthened,maintained, and integrated within any Asia rebalance initiative. But sadly,within the US government’s Asia rebalance initiative, the Pacific Islands arenot viewed through the same strategic lens as, for example, the countries ofSoutheast Asia. The islands were given more resources in the first Obamaadministration in various US government programs, spread across many agencies,including defense security assistance. However, given the vast challenges facedacross the Asia Pacific, there is little renewed attention from Washington onthe island communities and virtually no focus on preparing for a strategicfuture.
   
The US has a special obligation and shared cultural ties to the islandsstemming from the end of World War II and throughout the Cold War. Thiscultural legacy should be fully recognized, reaffirmed, and maintained. Anyperceived lack of US interest in island development/welfare becomes anopportunity for China. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Fiji in November2014 and hosted a meeting with regional leaders where he announced that tieswould be upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership.’ China has invested $1.4 billionin island development since 2006.
   
During a 2015 conference at the National University of Samoa, “China and thePacific: The View from Oceania,” Chinese participants specifically counteredmisperceptions among attendees about China’s aid and development program androle in the region. Professor Liu Hongzhong of the Centre for Oceanian Studiesat Peking University, a presenter at the event, stated: “China has a bigpopulation and people will have doubts about the motives and whether they’regoing to take the lead or change the rules, or whatever. So why don’t we justtake China as another traditional member of the donors?” she asked.
   

The island nations/communities have a Pacific regional architecture withstanding bodies and are to be commended for their work in addressing commondevelopment and social problems. There is the Pacific Island Conference ofLeaders (PICL), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the oldest regionalorganization, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), of which the USwas a Founding Member and provides 17 percent of the core budget. Rounding outthis group is the Council on Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) with10 member organizations. A new regional body – the Pacific Islands DevelopmentForum (PIDF) – was inaugurated at an international conference organized andhosted by the Fijian government in 2013. “Leadership, Innovation andPartnership for Green/Blue Pacific Economies” hammered home the aims to advancethe vision of a “United, Distinctive and Sustainable Pacific Society.”
   
What is missing in public reports and declarations by these organizations isrecognition that economic and social development must have a foundation ofsecurity, both traditional and nontraditional. Without security, problems likedisaster preparedness and recovery, illicit trade (international criminalactivity in general), IUU fishing, public health, and  climate change,among others, will disrupt and destabilize development, education, and goodgovernance goals, divert valuable resources, and contribute to the “braindrain.” Aiding islanders in addressing security is the lynchpin of acomprehensive strategy requiring the strength and attention of US leadership.
   
A comprehensive Pacific Island strategy must include allies, friends, and“donors,” especially Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the Republicof Korea, Taiwan, the European Union, and other internationalorganizations.  Australia, the single largest aid donor to island nations,and New Zealand have a regional “island strategy” of their own working closelywith island nations in the South Pacific.  Like-minded donors must alsoinclude the private sector.
   
To take a leadership role in a more productive and proactive view of theislands, Washington should consider creating a standing Pacific IslandStrategic Council, or similar type of organization, permanently focused onengaging island states in developing a strategy for the interwoven and crucialissues of defense, nontraditional security challenges, diplomatic engagement,development, emergency preparedness and resilience, and governance. A strategy,part comprehensive blueprint, part plan, and part ongoing dialogue, will be afuture-oriented solution that reflects a long-term commitment to those oftenoverlooked states.

David W. Hamon (hamons5@gmail.com) is an independentinternational security analyst and a non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

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