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The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese Perspective
2017-03-11 15:54


   

Fangyin,Z. (2016), The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese Perspective. Asian Politics & Policy, 8: 207–218. doi:10.1111/aspp.12231

   

  

Abstract

   

The U.S. alliance system in the regionsurrounding China is a reality that will last for some time. An important issuein China's rise is how Beijing will coexist effectively with U.S. alliances. Inthis article, I argue that China will not establish its own alliance system tocounter the American alliance network, but will try to establish a new type of“major-country relationship” between China and the United States. In themeantime, it is pursuing a dual strategy of coexistence with the U.S. alliancesystem in the region and resisting those U.S. alliance policies that itperceives may be intended to contain the growth of Chinese influence and power.Over time, China will develop differentiated political and security policiestoward U.S. allies and will thus gain more strategic space by emphasizingcommon development strategies for the region, so as to decrease the securitypressure on itself.

   

As the People's Republic of China (PRC)searches for its strategic identity in a rapidly changing Asia-Pacific securityenvironment, debate is intensifying within that country on the extent to whichit can either coexist or supplant the dominant post-war security architecturein that region—the American network of bilateral security alliances. Discussionabout this subject, both within China and in the broader international arena,is intermittently quite explicit or more nuanced, depending on the intendedaudience and the specific occasion on which it is carried out. It is clear,however, that both Chinese policymakers and independent analysts are workingthrough what specific role their country should play in revising a regionalsecurity order that is widely regarded as too America-centric to accommodateevolving Chinese interests and capabilities.

   

It is argued here that the debate in Chinaover how the PRC can best overcome the continuing challenge of U.S. alliancepolitics is not yet resolved. However, China's promotion of a “major countryrelationship” and its consistent denigration of American-led alliance politicsin the region constitute the basis for a longer-term and increasingly distinctchallenge to recent American initiatives to shore up Washington's approaches toregional security. This challenge can be equated to a Chinese “carrot andstick” strategy directed toward both coexisting and confronting what Beijingviews as a continuing U.S. determination to exercise regional hegemony.

Contending Chinese Views of the U.S.Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific

   

After the Second World War, the UnitedStates established an American-centered alliance system in the Asia-Pacificregion that has critically influenced that region's security order. Althoughthe region's situation has experienced many complicated changes over thedecades, the structure of the so-called “San Francisco System” in the Asia-Pacifichas remained stable. The recent implementation of the United States’“rebalancing strategy” toward Asia and the strengthening American dominanceover regional affairs has been interpreted by Beijing as a U.S. effort toenhance its alliance system in this part of the world and to strengthen itssecurity partnerships with some countries in the region.

   

Some Chinese analysts believe the SanFrancisco System will continue to exist for some time. They note that theUnited States has demonstrated willingness to maintain this system with theBarack Obama administration's “rebalancing” or “pivot” strategy underscoringthis trend (see Sun R., 2012; Wu, 2013). Those who adhere to this school ofthought advocate a Chinese posture of “peaceful development” (originated duringHu Jintao's presidency) which embodies a “low profile” and generallynonconfrontational posture toward the United States and its alliance system inAsia (Zhang, 2012). Moreover, America's underwriting of this network meets someimportant security and political requirements of various U.S. allies such asJapan, South Korea, and Australia. Mitigating allied anxiety by the UnitedStates extending deterrence guarantees has traditionally contributed toregional stability by, for example, “capping the bottle” of Japanese militarismor maintaining a conflict threshold on the Korean Peninsula. This has beenespecially true in the absence of an effective or efficient macrosecurity architecture to solve the security problems faced byEast Asian countries. In this context, those in China who have acknowledgedthis situation have concluded that the U.S. alliance system in Asia has playeda fundamental role in regional security, even though its indefinite survivalmight not be welcomed as the preferred outcome by most Chinese policymakers.

   

With the introduction of the U.S.rebalancing or pivot strategy, however, this adherence to coexistence with theAmerican alliance system has been challenged by a different and increasinglypredominant school of Chinese thought. This faction views U.S. alliancepolitics in the region as more of a security impediment than securityfacilitator. Although U.S. policy spokespersons insist that rebalancing is notdirected specifically toward China, the PRC's rapid rise has been the obviouscatalyst behind Washington's decision to reinforce its strategic influence andpresence in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. pivot strategy, according to thisfaction, is nothing less than a U.S. effort to contain the PRC. Accordingly,China needs to break the new American-imposed constraints which are, accordingto China's 2015 defense white paper, imposed by Washington's Asian alliances(Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2015). U.S.strategy now increasingly resembles an offensive realist strategy directedagainst China that impedes the realization of a great rejuvenation of theChinese nation (see Liu & Li, 2014; Pan, 2015; Sun, R., 2015; Zhao, 2014).1In this context, China is attempting to improve its own security environmentand is endeavoring to play a more influential role in the security sphere inthis region. According to this increasingly predominant second school ofthought, it is not enough to focus only on economic strength and growth torealize China's economic and geopolitical rejuvenation. If the more precariousregional security environment brought about by the U.S. rebalancing strategyinitiative is not substantially improved, the fruits of Chinese economic growthmay be seriously compromised.

Ramifications of Chinese Thinking

   

What has emerged from recent Chinesethinking about the U.S. rebalancing strategy and alliances is a complicatedmixture of optimism about the future of Sino-American regional securityrelations developing positively as China expands its own economic networks inAsia and pessimism over the future of U.S. alliance management (Reis, 2014). AsMichael Swaine (2012) has observed, Chinese officials affiliated with the PRC'sMinistry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of National Defense have responded toU.S. regional strategies by expressing hope that Washington will project a“constructive” approach to Asia-Pacific security—understanding that the UnitedStates and the PRC have converging interests in the region and that the twosides should “develop a relationship featuring mutual benefit, win-win andsound interaction between emerging and established powers” (p. 5).Simultaneously, however, Chinese officials have resorted to tough rhetoric whenthey felt this has been required in response to Washington's use of itsalliances to encroach on Chinese sovereign rights and to fashion strategiccontainment at China's expense (Heath, 2014).

   

Consistent with the first outlook(emphasizing continuing regional stability and prosperity and a minimalizationof regional security dilemmas), China has gained increased strategic leveragein Asia. It has become the biggest trading partner with most of its regionalneighbors. Indeed, it has become the biggest trading partner with all of theU.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region, except for the Philippines.Consequently, some Asian countries are relying on China for economic growth andon the United States for security (Torode, 2010). The Asian InfrastructureInvestment Bank (AIIB), the establishment of which was advocated by China, hasattracted a large membership of countries in the region.2 The promotion of the“Belt and Road initiative” and the establishment of the AIIB may increase somecountries’ dependence on China economically.3 Understandably, the United Stateshas not been satisfied with this trend and will continue to pressureAsia-Pacific states to prevent spillover from the economic sector to thesecurity arena. In a sense, the more powerful China is, the less the UnitedStates hopes that China will play a bigger role in regional securitymechanisms. Clearly, the United States is keen to strategically constrain Chinafrom asserting its strategic will in the Asia-Pacific. At the same time,however, the United States wants to strengthen its economic relations withChina and with other Asian countries to promote long-term regionalorder-building. The Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative which has beenembraced by Washington is the epitome of this goal.

   

The hardline component of China's dualstrategy is based on an alternative vision to that of economics prevailing overgeopolitics. U.S. alliances are viewed as “structural obstacles” to Chinesenational security. At a key address delivered to the Conference on Interactionand Confidence Building Measures in Asia in May 2014, Chinese President XiJinping proposed an alternative Asian security order devoid of alliancepolitics, but instead oriented around an “Asia for Asians” formula (Xi, 2014).Noting that onecannot live in the 21st century with the outdated thinking from the age of ColdWar and zero-sum game,” Xi indirectly castigated the San Francisco System byinsisting that “to beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a thirdparty is not conducive to maintaining common [regional] security” (Xinhuanet,2014a). Xi's remarks followed up a Xinhuanet editorial appearing the previousmonth which argued that “strengthening alliances while excluding the commoninterests of other countries can achieve nothing but buttressing an unstablestatus quo” (Xinhuanet, 2014a).

The Evolving U.S. Alliance System

   

Presently, the power transition at theglobal level has not yet reached the stage of other powers or partieschallenging American predominance. But expectations that this power transitionwill occur in the future have clearly affected the policy behavior of theUnited States, China, Japan, and the Southeast Asian countries. In the future,the Asia-Pacific could indeed become an area of intense competition betweenmajor powers. According to one Chinese proponent of the second school ofthought discussed above—Yan (2013)—in the coming 10 years, strategiccompetition between the United States and China in Asia will be more intensethan geopolitical rivalries in any other part of the world. If the Asia-Pacificbecomes the core area for strategic contention between the major powers, therole of the U.S. alliance system in this region will only intensify. In thiscontext, the U.S. allies could become important tools for the United States tohelp it adjust to a global power transition. Accordingly, the San FranciscoSystem could become an integral element of U.S. global strategy, rather thanjust a mere security instrument mainly pertinent to only one region. Chinawould be forced to respond accordingly. Recent speculation over closer Chinesegeopolitical ties with Russia flows from this type of policy calculation.Potential Sino-Russian competition in Central Asia, however, may impede anyChinese propensity to view Russia as a counterweight to U.S. power in the broaderAsian region or internationally (Zhong&Guschin, 2015).

   

In terms of security cooperation, theUnited States has established a hierarchic relationship with its Asian alliesrather than an equal one. After the Second World War, these countries relied onthe United States in the security arena (for a discussion about the inequalityof relations between the United States and its allies, see Brooks, Ikenberry,&Wohlforth, 2012; Cha, 2009; Lake, 2009; Park, 2011; Sun, X. 2011; Yuen,2013). Such a high level of dependence on U.S. military protection affectedthese countries’ security policymaking and resulted in less of an emphasis ontheir own military capacity, which in turn enhanced their dependence in termsof their inability to cultivate their own strategic thinking and psychology.The presence of U.S. military bases and the forward deployment of U.S. forcesin the Asia-Pacific region confirmed this hierarchy.

   

The hierarchy in security relations betweenthe United States and its allies is represented partly in the “relationalauthority” of the two sides. The United States regards its exercise of power inthis region as justified, and therefore as entitled to limit the strategicindependence of its regional allies; in turn, those allies think that they areobliged to obey and support U.S. policy in the region. Both sides are quiteclear about their respective rights and obligations (Lake, 2009). However, thisauthority is based on the advantage in strength that the United States has, andwhich is backed by its powerful military and by other material capabilities.

   

This asymmetrical relationship between theUnited States and its allies enhances the status, legitimacy, and ability ofthe United States to act in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the United Statesexerts strong pressure on its allies’ policies in terms of military andsecurity and makes them conform with its global and Asia-Pacific strategies,requiring the allies to take on more obligations in security cooperation.4 Forexample, in the early stages of the war on terror, U.S. Deputy AssistantSecretary of Defense, Richard Lawless, warned the South Korean Ambassador tothe United States that if South Korea did not accept America's flexibledeployment strategy, the United States Forces Korea might withdraw from theKorean Peninsula (Park, 2011, p. 288).

   

This kind of relationship reinforces theU.S. alliance system in Asia but in a negative fashion; various changes inpower distribution or economic relations among countries in the region cannotchange or “break” the stranglehold that the U.S. alliance system exerts ontheir pursuit of distinctly national interests. It also makes it difficult forChina to achieve strategic reconciliation or to build effective securitycooperation with some of its surrounding countries, and limits the policy spacefor China to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific. In thissense, Chinese concerns about the offensive realist characteristics of the SanFrancisco System appear to be reasonable. China cannot allow the San FranciscoSystem to act as an impediment to solving the security issues in thesurrounding areas of China, such as the South China Sea issue, the DiaoyuIsland dispute, and Sino-Japanese relations.

   

From 2011 to 2014, China's overall diplomacyunderwent a transformation from “keeping a low profile” to “striving forachievement” (Yan, 2014). In this process, China exhibited a certain degree ofstrategic deterrence to the surrounding countries by showing its initiative andtaking a firm stand.5 As a result, China has gained more experience andconfidence in coping with the challenges from surrounding countries and hascome to recognize that there are indeed limitations on how many securityconstraints can be generated by the U.S. alliance system. This means that Chinahas greater space to act in the security field, notwithstanding the inherentstrength of American power and that the “coexistence” school of thought hasreasserted its role in the development of China's dual strategy toward U.S. alliances.

   

Indeed, China will most likely notexperience a direct confrontation with the U.S. alliance system any time soon,as U.S. allies will wish avoid military confrontation with China by adoptingstrategic hedging policies. Even countries like Japan and the Philippines thathave disputes with China over territorial sovereignty will prefer “softbalancing” to military conflict. Moreover, the possibility of improvingrelations with China remains highly appealing to most of these states.Interestingly, not only the U.S. allies but also the United States itselfprefers a strategic hedging policy which strengthens the alliance system thatconstrains China but which simultaneously engages China and allows for securitycooperation with China.

   

In the long run, China is becomingincreasingly confident in dealing with the U.S. alliance system in Asia, andwill become more so over time—reaffirming the coexistence school of thought'spremises. Chinese scholars widely opine that the United States will have tostrategically compromise with China sooner or later, but only if China keeps upits “rising” momentum (see Shi, 2014; Wang, 2015, pp. 29–37; Wei, 2014, pp.54–56; Zuo, 2014, pp. 19–22).6 Even in the short term, it will not be easy forthe United States to squeeze China's strategic space despite the United States’initiatives in the military and security fields. For the United States, while“light pressure” may not work on China, “strong pressure” in the security fieldmay lead to uncertain risks that the United States is not ready to take. Inthis sense, then, the United States’ options in manipulating the strategicspace are limited, especially if China's rise remains vigorous. The UnitedStates may find it difficult to effectively counterbalance China's influence byenlarging its deterrence and defense commitments to its regional allies.

Chinese Responses to the U.S. AllianceSystem in Asia

   

The above trend will have a critical impacton the regional structure and on the approach of China's rise. China faces asignificant challenge to coexist with this alliance system at a time when itsown strength and influence are rising. Therefore the policy options that Chinachooses to pursue will have an important effect on the overall regionalsecurity order.

   

Since the Second World War and certainlysince the end of the Cold War, the emergence of nuclear weapons, the widespreadrise of nationalism, and the development of sovereign norms and mutual economicinterdependence have all meant that major powers are quite unlikely to engagein direct military conflict with one another. In a sense, the internationalsystem has entered an age of inter-state peace and stability (on the issue ofno major wars between major powers, see Mueller, 2009; Väyrynen, 2006; Yang,2011), and there is only a slim chance that major powers will go to war withone another (Schweller, 2011). Given this backdrop, Beijing's leadershipbelieves that the United States is not motivated to go to war against itself aslong as China does not pose a challenge to the United States and does notengage in major military conflicts with its allies; in other words, the UnitedStates does not need to become involved in general wars just to fulfill itssecurity obligations. On this basis, China's response to the U.S. alliancesystem in Asia incorporates the following issues.

Will China Respond to the U.S. AllianceSystem by Confrontation or With “Tit-for-Tat” Measures?

   

If China chose confrontation it would haveto give up its long-held “nonalignment” policy, which was developed by DengXiaoping, and establish a China-centered alliance system which would act as apower balancing instrument against the United States. Embracing strategicconstraints is therefore questioned by a few Chinese scholars but is firmlysupported by most of them.7 China is unlikely to give up its nonalignmentpolicy because of its evaluation of the international situation and of theadvantages and disadvantages of allying or not doing so. Alignment cannotrelieve the security pressure against China's rise, but may aggravate it.Besides, China's adoption of an alignment posture would force China toundertake some unnecessary security obligations, which would increase the risksof being involved in disputes it could otherwise avoid.

   

Conversely, if China continues with itsnonalignment policy, this does not mean that it is satisfied with the currentpolitical and security relationship in the region. China would try to establishcloser security cooperation and strategic partnerships (rather than formal alliancesor alignments) with its surrounding neighbors (some Chinese analysts have putforward the notion of “quasi-alignment”; see Sun, D., 2012). This policy willhelp China maintain a more flexible strategic posture in the complicated andever-changing international environment.

A New Type of Major-Country Relationship?

   

If China continues with its “nonalignment”policy, there are other ways China might cope with the U.S. alliance system.First, in projecting its policy toward the United States, China could strivefor a stable Sino-U.S. relationship and could thus put forward the conceptionof a new type of major-country relationship. This means that two or more powersthat are competing strategically could simultaneously develop smooth andpredictable bilateral relations which would enable them to affect productivecooperation within certain policy areas. Such a dichotomous relationship is notnecessary if there is no strategic competition; it should not be called a newtype of major-country relationship if strategic and stable cooperation cannotbe achieved or if strategic competition dominates in the bilateral relations.

   

Generally speaking, this new type ofmajor-country relationship could be formed under a special power distribution,especially when such a distribution is undergoing a process of structuraltransformation. During this process, the Sino-U.S. relationship could generatethe type of stability that is acceptable to both sides, and that featurescooperation and competition which is under control and effective management. Itcould be a relationship based on realistic interests which results from theeffective management of bilateral relations to benefit both sides when eachother's strengths are more equal (Zhou, 2013).

   

When building a new type of major-countryrelationship, China would be concerned about how to cope with Sino-U.S.relations in the process of China's peaceful rise, especially in terms ofmanaging and controlling disparities in bilateral relations. The U.S. attitudeto these relations would reflect its macro-attitude toward China's peacefulrise. The United States does not want China to successfully extend itsinfluence within the international community, particularly in the Asia-Pacificregion, in ways that would undermine U.S. power and influence. Under thePresident Xi Jinping's leadership, China has pursued more visibly the goals ofrealizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and improving China'sinternational status and influence. However, the United States has not yetdecided how to coexist with a China that continues to rise incessantly. Inthese circumstances, the stronger that China's rise is, the more contradictoryinstincts the United States conjures toward this new type of major-countryrelationship. China, of course, will not impede its own growth just on thebasis of easing American perplexity! Even when tensions have been most evidentin the East China Sea and South China Sea, Beijing has still promoted theconstruction of a stable and enduring Sino-American relationship and has soughtglobal cooperation with the United States. Such efforts by themselves, however,are not enough to guarantee a happy outcome to Sino-American ties. This canonly be accomplished with more concerted effort by both sides, but even theseinitial efforts will contribute to the overall stability of Sino-U.S. relationsand therefore to Asia-Pacific stability as well.

   

As intimated above, any such major-countryrelationship will be carefully calibrated rather than carte blanche in nature.China cannot and will not submit to the United States in all aspects ofbuilding a new type of major-country relationship between them. If strategicrelations of the two countries do prove to be relatively stable, China willhave time to examine the determination and willingness of the United States toencourage bilateral confidence-building. This means Washington at leastcoexisting with if not fully understanding certain Chinese actions, includingthe oceangoing voyage of China's aircraft carrier fleet, the establishment ofthe ADIZ in the East China Sea, the confrontation in Huangyan Island of Chinaand the Philippines, and the large-scale island-building in the South ChinaSea, among other developments. Although China is generally defensive in itssecurity policy, it will not easily concede to the United States when pursuingits own core interests, and may even introduce initiatives within givensituations so as to better protect its rights and interests. It is acceptablefor China if Sino-U.S. relations are maintained at a low-intensity level ofmodus vivendi over a long period of time, during which the opportunity mayarise for building a new type of major-country relationship between China andthe United States.

   

Second, in regard to China's policy towardthe U.S. allies in Asia, some complicated issues arise. In terms of security,while China wants to maintain its territorial and development rights in theSouth China Sea and Diaoyu Island, it remains sensitive to not provoke theother countries that are involved. For example, China showed constraint in thefriction over Ren'ai Reef after obtaining de facto control over HuangyanIsland, despite the fact that its own presence and activities overwhelm that ofthe Philippines in the surrounding waters of Ren'ai Reef. China does not wantto project an arrogant image to the world and thus endeavors to adopt arelatively self-controlled stance. The flexibility of China's action ratherthan merely exerting pressure in such situations helps American allies torationalize that they need less U.S. security protection, or at least stopsalliance-related activities in such situations from being intensified. Chineserestraint also helps to reduce the pressure on other countries in the region tochoose sides between China and the United States.

   

At the same time, China's actions such asestablishing the ADIZ in the East China Sea have challenged the dominantposition of the United States in the region. The competition of interests inthe surrounding areas of China is of varying importance to China and the UnitedStates. China has clearly become more decisive in maintaining its rights in theSouth China Sea and Diaoyu Island. Therefore, it is realistic and reasonablefor the United States to pause and contemplate relevant strategic ramificationsbefore taking strong counter-measures to China's initiatives. Such Americanrationality may be seen by some U.S. allies as reducing the reliability of theU.S. security guarantees.

   

Both China and the United States are tryingto attract more followers in Asia to cement and enhance their influence and toimprove the legitimacy of their leading roles so as to be in a more favorablestrategic position in the Asia-Pacific's increasingly dynamic and at timeshighly competitive regional environment (for a discussion of how risingcountries attract followers, see Schirm, 2010). In this respect, they havecomparative advantages with the United States being stronger in the militaryand security fields and China in the economic sphere. If the agenda in theregion could be changed from one of security to the economy, China would have acommensurate amount of greater influence in this area. One of the importantfunctions of the “Belt and Road initiative” and the establishment of the AIIB isto change the major focus of regional cooperation from security disputes tocommon development. This transformation would reduce the effectiveness of theUnited States to restrain China in the military security field. In the future,the two topics of the economy and security will increasingly dovetail inChina's surrounding neighborhood. It would be difficult to go back to thesituation that was prevalent between 2011 and 2013 where regional topics werefocused almost exclusively on security issues.

   

China has different policies toward eachU.S. ally. Relations between China Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,Thailand, and Australia are all quite different in nature. While there aredisputes over territorial sovereignty and on land and water between China andcountries such as Japan and the Philippines, the other three countries do nothave serious security conflicts with China. South Korea has developed anextensive series of politico-economic relations with China and views Beijing asa key player in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula; Thailand regards China as areliable partner; and Australia does not view China as a real security threatbecause its own territory is far from the throes of Northeast Asian and evenSoutheast Asian geopolitics. Australia is still highly dependent on the Chinamarket and finds the economic link with China to be invaluable.

   

China will not alienate one country in itspolitical and economic cooperation just because it is an ally of the UnitedStates. Instead, we have witnessed a steady improvement of relations betweenChina and Thailand, South Korea, and Australia over the past several years. Thesigning of the Sino-South Korean free trade agreement and the Sino-Australianfree trade agreement are illustrative of this trend.

   

An important effect of China'sdifferentiated policies toward countries in the region will be a lack ofconsensus when confronting China just because they are allies of the UnitedStates. These policies help to highlight the disparity of interests between theUnited States and its allies on many issues. It is clear that South Korea andAustralia joined the AIIB for their economic interests, regardless of anyopposition they might have felt from Washington's China policy. Even Japan andthe Philippines are more flexible toward de-linking economic relations fromstrategic interaction with China to a greater extent than Washington wouldprobably prefer to be the case. Such differentiated policies help to reveal theinconsistency of the allies considering the current situation and thus lowersthe collective effect of the U.S. alliance system targeting Chinese power.

Conclusion

   

The San Francisco System posits a majorstrategic constraint and geopolitical reality that China must face in its longperiod of a peaceful rise. It creates an asymmetrical situation for China andthe United States in terms of security competition in the Asia-Pacific region.But it also, under the right conditions and with enlightened U.S. policymanagement, acts as a regional stabilizer and works to coincide with China'sown geopolitical interests. How to effectively coexist with this system is akey issue for the Asia-Pacific region's overall stability.

   

Since 2013, Chinese diplomatic behavior haschanged from one of passive response to U.S. power and influence in theAsia-Pacific to one of more active strategic design. This is reflected inChina's relations with the U.S. allies in the region. The promotion of the Beltand Road initiative and the establishment of the AIIB not only affects the regionaleconomic order, but also shapes political and security relations between Chinaand its surrounding countries. Such initiatives show that China has coped withthe U.S. alliance system in Asia in ways that could not be predicted by normaltheories or perspectives of alliance relations. China will not easily prevailover the U.S. alliance system, nor will it concede under pressure. Meanwhile,it is not easy to find a more inclusive regional security structure. Arecurrent theme of this article is that the U.S. alliance system is likely tobe in place for some time to come and that China must seek a way to effectivelycoexist with it. However, China has generated both more strategic confidenceand greater patience in regard to this issue. Xi's Asian Security proposalrepresents a long-term alternative strategic design that could eventuallysupplant the zero-sum or containment-oriented traits of U.S. alliance politicsin the Asia-Pacific. Even though the San Francisco System continues to exist,the strengthening of China's strategic and economic influence in itssurrounding neighborhood is very real and the continued growth of suchinfluence is inevitable. How to finesse this transformation smoothly is acritical test for the political wisdom of China, the United States, and otherAsian countries.

Notes

   

  1

   

  At the Center forForeign Affairs Working Meeting in November, 2014, Xi Jinping pointed out thatChina had “entered the critical phase to realize the great rejuvenation of theChinese nation” (Xinhuanet, 2014b).

  2

   

  By April 15, 2015, thenumber of confirmed founding members of the AIIB was 57, including 37 Asiancountries. Most of the U.S. allies and security partners in this region aremembers of the AIIB. See Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China(2015).

  3

   

  The Belt and Roadinitiative is an abbreviation for the Silk Road Belt and the 21st centuryMaritime Silk Road, which is an ambitious strategic initiative raised by Chinain 2013.

  4

   

  The allies’ securityobligations increase with their unchanged dependence on the United States.Their abilities and obligations will not increase if they are independent fromthe United States. The increase in security abilities and obligations onlyadvantages the United States. In this case, the United States will not loosentheir strategic ties.

  5

   

  This was mostlyreflected by the conflict on Huangyan Island between China and the Philippines,the establishment of the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the EastChina Sea, the long confrontation between China and Japan over Diaoyu Island,and the large-scale island-building activities of China in the South China Sea.

  6

   

  Shi Yinhong claims thateventually, there may be a peaceful “final resolution” between the UnitedStates and China.

  7

   

  The most influentialChinese scholar in this regard is Professor Yan Xuetong from TsinghuaUniversity. While he admits that there is a huge political difficulty in Chinagiving up its nonalignment policy, he argues that the concept of “allies” canbe replaced by other terms with less bellicose connotations. See Yan (2012,2013, p. 194).




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