https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-84-tale-two-tales-competing-narratives-asia-pacific

Author: Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS

 

 

PacNet #84 - A tale of two tales: competingnarratives in the Asia Pacific

 

December 1, 2014

 

Remember when the US used to call on Chinato step up and be a “responsible stakeholder”? Well, be careful what you wishfor! Xi Jinping used the bully pulpit provided by China’s hosting of thisyear’s Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting last month topresent China (and himself) as the new power in Asia, touting his new AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiative while calling for theconclusion of a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), originally aUS initiative. “We are getting killed here,” confided one Asia-based USofficial, pointing to two headlines in that day’s paper: one heralded progressin ROK-China trade negotiations; the other noted US efforts to block the AIIBwhile seemingly rejecting China’s efforts to move forward on the FTAAP.

 

Echoes of this dismay are being heardthroughout the region. While President Obama’s Asia tour is touted as a successfor the administration – and there were some notable accomplishments – thecontrast with Chinese diplomacy was striking. Beijing is increasingly seen as anuanced and aggressive actor, responding to regional needs (and its own), whileWashington is playing defense, working to block new initiatives and seeminglystruggling to keep pace with China. Meanwhile, those convinced (wrongly in ourview) that the US rebalance is really aimed at somehow containing China pointto these obstructionist efforts as confirming their worst suspicions.

 

To be fair, China was supposed to look goodlast month. As in the 2008 Olympics, Beijing milked APEC for all it was worth.Every component of the national bureaucracy was devoted to stage managing theAPEC forum and all associated festivities. Xi even managed to patch updifferences with Japan (at least temporarily and begrudgingly) to allow him tomeet visiting Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. Meeting with Obama in Beijing, the twomen concluded a series of agreements designed to breathe new life into Xi’sconcept of “a new type of major country relations,” among them a potentiallyhistoric pledge on climate change. And unlike Obama, Xi is thought to be ableto deliver on his promise to cut emissions. Obama had hardly stopped speakingwhen Congress began negating and berating the agreement, reinforcing the imageof a president (and nation) in decline.

 

But APEC and the AIIB were just part of alarger demonstration of Chinese power and largesse. Xi has been touting oneinitiative after another, whether the “Asia for Asians” security conceptunveiled at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures inAsia (CICA), a New Silk Road Land Belt, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) New Development Bank(NDB), or trade agreements with the ROK and Australia. And those aren’t justempty words. China has pledged half the capital for the AIIB, at least 20percent (and probably more) of the NDB funds, $20 billion for investment inIndia, and $40 billion for the Maritime Silk Road.

 

Meanwhile, the US is playing defense. Therun-up to the APEC meeting was dominated by reports of Washington’s behind thescenes efforts to undermine the AIIB, pushing allies and partners to keep theirdistance from the new bank. The US was also allegedly impeding Chinese effortsto promote the FTAAP: rightly (to avoid distractions from the Trans-PacificPartnership process) or not, the image is of a government set on blockingprogress, not shaping the future.

 

All this is overlaid across the narrativeof a sclerotic US political system, with a lame duck president deeply woundedby midterm election results. Most have given up hope that Obama will muster thepolitical courage, much less the political support, to move forward with TradePromotion Authority (TPA or “fast track”) legislation deemed essential for anyhope of successful conclusion of the TPP. Obama is increasingly seen as weak,overly intellectual, indecisive, perhaps even feckless. The US public is rivenby ideological discord, soft, and prone to disengagement. Even the US militaryis overextended and battling the budget cuts triggered by take no prisonersdomestic politics and decades of profligacy; the image of Defense SecretaryChuck Hagel (the only Republican in Obama’s Cabinet) being forced to resignonly deepens this image, one that fits the story of a weak and decliningcountry, battling to maintain its hegemony in the face of a rising power.

 

This hapless state of affairs is a starkcontrast with the image of Xi, a strong and powerful Chinese leader, bendingeven a rapidly modernizing PLA to his will, determined to root out corruption,to enhance the legitimacy of the Communist party and to realize the Chinesedream that culminates in the emergence of the Middle Kingdom. He has ralliedthe Party and the public behind him and his vision. Xi has even shown acapacity for correction, recognizing the damage done by four years ofaggressive diplomacy and showing more nuance in recent weeks in remarks andactions toward neighbors.

 

These perceptions are distorted. Theyexaggerate US problems and misinterpret domestic developments. In fact, the US economyis on the mend, registering growth in excess of 3 percent, with unemploymentdropping below 6 percent for the first time since the global financial crisis,the budget deficit dropping, and US exports surging. Obama may be wounded buthe is not enfeebled, as his recent executive actions testify. The US commitmentto Asia remains strong; the rebalance is continuing. And while the US public iswary of foreign adventurism, polls show that the demand for US leadership inthe world remains undimmed. When problems require action, the public will backintelligent responses.

 

China’s growth continues to outpace that ofthe US, but it should since it is a less developed economy. Still, the nation’sgrowth rate has dropped by one-third, and internal strains are increasing: thebanking system is stressed, real estate prices are frothy, corruption may beunder assault but it is deep rooted and eradicating the cancer threatens to dogreat damage to the Party itself. Beijing’s citizens derisively talk about“APEC Blue,” the (temporary) clear skies manufactured for APEC, which havealready been replaced by hazardous pollution ratings now that the spotlight hasbeen turned off. Neighboring countries are happy to accept China’s largesse butthat has not stopped them from forging stronger security ties with the US tohedge against Chinese assertiveness as Beijing violates its own pledges not tochange the status quo in the South China Sea, for example.

 

US foreign policy in Asia may seemself-interested, especially when contrasted with China’s generosity, but thefact remains that there is a strong demand for the US presence and profile inthe region. If partners and allies are troubled by US behavior, it is becausethey still expect much of Washington. And Washington is right to raise seriousquestions about the standards that the NDB and AIIB will follow and how theywill complement rather than compete with existing organizations like the WorldBank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

 

Nevertheless, the two divergent narrativesshould worry US policy makers. Washington is losing the PR battle, and whileperception doesn’t always match reality, in many cases it shapes reality. Whilethe US must not substitute public relations for policy, it must do more tomanage the message and help rewrite those headlines. For instance, movingforward with IMF reform (currently languishing, like many other initiatives, inthe US Congress) would send a signal that the US is committed to adaptingexisting institutions to allow China and the other BRICS countries to play anexpanded role commensurate with their growing economic influence, rather thanhaving to create alternative mechanisms.

 

Critical to the US effort is somehowaccommodating and coopting Chinese efforts to shape the internationalenvironment. Washington cannot be perceived as opposed to Chinese (or othergovernment’s) initiatives to deal with regional problems; it cannot be seen aspetty or petulant, more concerned with the provenance of an idea than itsability to solve problems. It needs to encourage participation from allcountries to handle the myriad challenges of the 21st century. Otherwise, theUnited States will appear as increasingly obstructionist and weak, rather thanthe world leader it still proclaims itself to be.

 

Ralph Cossa (ralph@pacforum.org) ispresident of Pacific Forum CSIS. Brad Glosserman (brad@pacforum.org) isexecutive director of Pacific Forum CSIS and co-author with Scott Snyder of TheJapan-Korea Identity Clash (Columbia University Press, forthcoming, 2015).

 

PacNet commentaries and responses representthe views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are alwayswelcomed.