Is the Crisis of the Liberal Order Exaggerated?

——Livefrom the Munich Security Conference

    

                                                                                         Postedby: Judy Dempsey

                                                                                         Saturday,February 18, 2017

    

Carl Bildt Former prime minister of Sweden

No,it’s not exaggerated. But that’s not the same as saying that the demise of theliberal order is either imminent or unavoidable.

Thefundamentals of the world order are fraying, and some of its ideologicalfoundations are being challenged in a way that is seriously worrying. Theliberal global order, which has been astonishingly successful and whosewidening and deepening has produced a golden quarter-century, was built on strongsecurity relationships and a commitment to an open global economy.

Now,those security relationships are under pressure as isolationist sentiments growin key countries and revisionist powers become more assertive. There is anuninhibited questioning of free trade and the open global economy. There istalk of protectionism and bilateralism in a way that risks taking the worldinto trade wars and slower global growth. Add to this the rise of nostalgicidentities and tribal politics, and the result is a longing for a mythicalbetter past stolen by evil forces.

Thisis the time for the EU to stand up for its core values and core interests,which are intimately linked to the liberal global order. The world needs aforward-looking, confident, and fighting European Union.

IanBremmerPresident of Eurasia Group

Notat all. The world is at the beginning of a geopolitical recession, in which theU.S.-led order is coming apart. President Donald Trump’s America First policyis above all a rejection of American exceptionalism and, with it, America’srole in the liberal order. No country or group of countries are presentlycapable of replacing U.S. leadership; China will play a greater globalleadership role on economics (and economics alone), but that’s hardly going tobolster the liberal order.

It’snow every nation for itself. No liberal order—and, for now at least, no order,period.

TobiasBundeHead of Policy and Analysis at the Munich Security Conference andresearcher at the Centre for International Security Policy of the Hertie Schoolof Governance

Asthe Munich Security Conference argues in its Munich Security Report,the world is witnessing an illiberal moment. The three core elements of theliberal international order—liberal democracy, open economies, and multilateralinstitutions—are all under pressure.

Accordingto Freedom House, there has been a steady decline in global freedom for morethan a decade. Support for populist leaders has grown in Western societies,where many citizens doubt that the system works for them. U.S. President DonaldTrump has questioned both free trade and the value of internationalorganizations and U.S. alliances, signaling a clear shift from post-1945 U.S.foreign policy. Tellingly, notions such as democracy and human rights wereabsent from Trump’s inaugural address. For decades, Europeans have taken forgranted the role of the United States as the main guardian of this liberalorder. Judging from the discussions in Europe, including about a possibleEuropean nuclear deterrent, this crisis is not exaggerated.

Whetherthis illiberal moment turns into an illiberal era will depend on how liberaldemocrats respond to it. The continuous weakening of the liberal internationalorder is far from preordained. But its demise has become much more likelyrecently.

IstvánGyarmatiPresidentof the International Centre for Democratic Transition

Yesand no.

Onthe one hand, what is being seen is not a crisis of the liberal order, but theinability of liberal forces to give appropriate answers to the challenges ofresurgent nationalism and extremism as well as the communication challengeposed by the Internet.

Nationalismand extremism are quite easy to understand: at the end of an era—in this case,the Westphalian era of nation-states—such tendencies always emerge. In thepast, policymakers have each time been able to find a satisfactory response,albeit after some hesitation.

Thespecial difficulty today is that the Internet has changed the way politicalelites communicate with the public: communication used to go through opinionmakers such as intellectuals and the reputable press; today, it takes place viathe Internet. And the web and social media can be used more easily to transmitsimple (or simplistic) messages than sophisticated arguments. That’s whypopulists and extremists are much better at using such platforms, and thereforealso better at influencing the public. Liberals need to become populists aswell, in the good sense of the word: actors who can communicate in such a waythat the general public understands.

Onthe other hand, these challenges are severe. It takes time for democracies towake up—maybe too much time. People are also hostages of their own ideas.Liberals need to recognize that times have changed and they must adapt.

CorinnaHorstDeputy director of the Brussels Office of the German Marshall Fund of theUnited States and president of Women in International Security Brussels

Thequestion is not so much whether the crisis of the liberal order is exaggeratedas whether policymakers realize that there is a crisis and what they do aboutit. In every crisis lies an opportunity.

Thetransatlantic partners and the West in general face many crises, internally aswell as externally. The disruptive impact of the newly elected U.S. presidentis fundamentally challenging how societies—from policymakers and journalists toadvocates and business representatives—do business. It has been a wake-up callthat the West cannot take its democracies for granted. New alliances amongdifferent civil-society groups have led to tremendous public outcries,including over the executive order banning travel from seven predominantlyMuslim countries to the United States or over women’s rights. Private-sectorassociations, businesses, and NGOs are organizing new alliances to address thedivisions in Europe.

Morethan ever, the Western world is being challenged on how to keep itself secure,peaceful, and prosperous. Whether the West remains this way has more to do withthe way its societies treat its people—including women—than any other factor.As a starting point, people need to remember to look beyond grand strategiesand states, and focus on how to keep reengaging citizens and creatediversity-sensitive behavior and policies.

ToomasHendrik IlvesBernard and Susan Liautaud visiting fellow at the Center forInternational Security and Cooperation of the Freeman-Spogli Institute forInternational Studies

Yesand no. The liberal order is in crisis. Increasing income disparities havecaused a backlash among those left behind, yet it is not clear what this has todo with free and fair elections, the rule of law, and respect for human rights,which after all define the liberal order. There is a widespread distrust ofelites, though that term applies to anyone who has been democratically elected.Fear of immigration is a legitimate worry. But crises are nothing new for thesystem derived from the Enlightenment. It has coped with far worse.

Whatis not exaggerated is the threat to the liberal order from authoritarianregimes that capitalize on liberal openness in the digital age. Hacking thee-mail accounts of Western politicians and parties, doxing hacked documents,sharing fake news more widely than serious journalism: all these are newthreats. In 2017, parliamentary elections will be held in the Netherlands,France, and Germany, with a possible snap election in Italy as well as acrucial presidential election in France. In all of these countries, anauthoritarian Russia has used the same techniques as in the 2016 U.S.presidential election.

Thethreat to the liberal order is asymmetric. Authoritarian regimes don’t have toworry about election results; the techniques and ploys they use don’t threatenthem. But such techniques do threaten the liberal order.

BalázsJarábikNonresidentscholar in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program

Thecrisis of the liberal democratic order is real, but it is caused more byinternal factors than by external ones. Russia and so-called illiberals arepiggybacking on the eroding trust between citizens and governments, the faultlines of the global economy, growing inequality, and increasing politicalpolarization. For these reasons, there is a global backlash against elites.Ukraine’s 2013–2014 Euromaidan revolution was originally about the same issues.

Defendersof liberal democracy should take into account that in this system, howthings happen is as important as what happens. Labeling and blacklistingare not cornerstones of liberal values. Slight majorities—for example, theBrits who voted in June 2016 to leave the EU—are now openly questioned by thosetrying to defend liberal democracy.

Central and Eastern Europehave undergone traditionalist turns. In the East, these internal challengescame earlier than in the West. Instead of doubling down, the West needs toaddress internal issues while managing external factors in a differentway—fewer interventions and more observations would be a fresh start. There isa risk, though, that by overemphasizing Russia’s influence, some in the Westmay increasingly adopt Russian tactics to strike back against real andperceived threats, internally and externally.

BahadırKaleağasıChiefexecutive officer of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) andpresident of the Bosphorus Institute

Thisis not simply a crisis of liberal democracy. The world is going through a veryrisky phase in the transition toward what could be described as democracy 4.0:a better-functioning political system based on instant and direct access bycitizens to fact checking, impact analyses, and policymaking. As the FourthIndustrial Revolution begins to take hold around the planet, processes ofsocietal change and democracy are going through stages of fluctuation as wasthe case in every other industrial revolution.

Industry4.0 is quickly being uploaded into citizens’ daily lives, but there is analgorithmic problem with coding a modern democracy 4.0. The current evolutionhas several adverse dimensions as well as beneficial ones. On the one hand,innovations like quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and the Internetof things have the potential to lead to more transparency, direct democracy,and public scrutiny. On the other, liberal democracy’s turbulent evolution mayeventually result in authoritarian manipulation of communication in the digitalpublic sphere. Maybe a technology inspired by the blockchain that makesfinancial transactions more transparent through decentralized trust anddistributed consensus can be adapted to the flow of information between publicauthorities and citizens.

Karl-HeinzKampPresident of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy

No,it is not exaggerated. The crisis clearly exists, particularly as the UnitedStates is about to lose its role as the spearhead of the West. How can thebenefits of liberal democracy over dictatorship or autocracy be advocated ifthe U.S. president has cultivated the lie and regards ignorance or incompetenceas a quality? How can liberal democracy be promoted if the alleged leader ofthe free world does not even sign up to its basics, namely acceptance of theresults of elections?

Europeis plagued by similar trends: populist movements in France, Germany, andelsewhere are united in their rejection of pluralism, alliances, commitments,solidarity, and consensus—all ingredients of a liberal world order withinstitutions like NATO, the EU, and the UN.

Fortunately,it is not a zero-sum game in which democrats lose and autocrats win. Autocratsare also reaching their limits. In China, growth remains below expectations andan increasingly self-confident population is speaking up against environmentaldisasters and bad governance. Moscow’s great-power ambitions are economicallyand politically built on sand; Greece has a bigger GDP per capita than Russia.

Theliberal order is still alive and worth fighting for—against all the odds.

SylvieKauffmannEditorial director of Le Monde

Firstof all, observers should stop calling it the “liberal” order. Not only does thelabel confuse the French, for whom libéral refers to right-wing freemarketeers, but it also legitimates the proponents of an illiberal order—as ifthey had a real alternative to offer, which they do not.

Ifwe’re talking about the crisis of the rules-based order, then no, it is notexaggerated. Utmost confusion reigns at the very center of that order,Washington, D.C. The U.S. leadership does not seem to know by which rules toabide, and its foreign partners are at pains to identify what or who the U.S.leadership is—today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow.

Yetthe world needs rules, and many people outside the United States still valuesome of the basic rules of the global system, like international treaties andthe rule of law. This is where the EU has an enormous responsibility. Aredefined, reinvigorated EU must become the new shining city on a hill. Europemust offer a political compass in a chaotic world that needs new, more balancedrules, to be written with others. This is why the upcoming French and Germanelections are crucial.

JessicaT. MathewsDistinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace

Worldtrends are deeply frightening. Many causes—growing income inequality, too-rapidsocial change, effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, disappointment ingovernments’ performance—have produced widespread anger and a backlash againstreal and perceived losses of sovereignty. Constantly pushed forward by theInternet and social media, anger and fear of change have made whole populationsvulnerable, in Garrett Mitchell’s apt phrase, to “slash-and-burn sloganeering.”

Threateningconditions can change from unthinkable to inevitable seemingly overnight, butcrisis still seems the wrong word. Neither Russia nor China is as strong as itis painted. Russia’s one-legged economy cannot be transformed without wrenchingpolitical change. China suffers from profound corruption, a government whoselegitimacy rest on a weak base, and slowing (though still strong) economicgrowth. Neither country commands the loyalty of a single strong ally.

Andso the threat to the liberal, rules-based world order comes from within Westerndemocratic societies. The threat is substantial, but it can still be addressed.Domestically, that will require restoring a degree of shared purpose,diminishing polarization, and improving government performance. Internationally,it will mean reminding older generations and teaching younger ones—especiallyAmericans—of the seventy years of growth, prosperity, and general peace thatthe postwar order has produced and the unrelenting effort and investment ittakes to maintain it.

MikhailMinakovAssociate professor in the Department of Philosophy and ReligiousStudies at the University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

No,it isn’t exaggerated.

Currently,the key institutions responsible for the functioning and development of theliberal order can only react to the snowball of challenges they face, notanticipate them. These institutions respond properly only to immediate risksand fail to avert medium- to long-term problems. This strategic blindness ofliberal centers of power must be cured.

Whatmakes this crisis of liberal globalism exceptional is the profound shift in thecultural order. Recent elections and referenda in the EU and United States showthat enemies of liberal universalism are winning the trust of Western societies.Isolationism, obscurantism, and ultraconservatism are taking over Westerncapitals.

Universalismprovided the liberal order with legitimacy. After the fall of the Soviet Unionand in the absence of a disciplining enemy, Western elites betrayed their adherenceto universalism and turned instead to more egoistic practices. As a result,illiberal conservatism offers Western societies alternative solutions thatpeople find more convincing. With the fall of liberalism in the West, theliberal order has no future in other regions.

Liberalismis losing the competition for citizens’ hearts in the West. But it still canwin their minds and consciences. Liberals should return to taking universalvalues seriously and put them at the core of new global agenda.

NoraMüllerHead of the International Affairs Department of the Körber Foundation

Populistparties are on the rise all over Europe. Autocrats and extremists of variouspersuasions are testing the West’s resolve to protect its values. The newoccupant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue harbors a barely disguised penchant forstrong leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin, vows to put Americafirst, and believes that the Doha Round is a Qatari golf course. Against thisbackdrop, it is impossible to deny that the liberal order faces dramaticchallenges—from inside and outside.

Fora country like Germany, where stability and prosperity are inseparably tied toa rules-based international order, functioning multilateral institutions, andthe American security guarantee, U.S. retrenchment and the advent of apostliberal global order (or disorder) do not bode well. But succumbing toweltschmerz is not an option for Berlin.

Facedwith the domestic fallout from the refugee crisis and the shock waves of adisintegrating EU, Germany may not have the capacity or the political will toact as the knight in shining armor who leads the free world in the struggleagainst its foes. Nevertheless, Berlin must fulfill its role as what Germanpolitical scientist HerfriedMünkler has called the Macht in der Mitte,or power in the middle. Germany needs to act as a counterweight to thecentrifugal forces in Europe and a defender of an old-fashioned virtue: respectfor international law in the context of a cooperative international system.

TsvetaPetrovaAdjunctassistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the EuropeanInstitute of Columbia University

Froma Central and Eastern European perspective, one is struck by the United States’unprecedented swing in a politically illiberal direction. The United States nolonger has the will or standing to promote or project liberal values. This hasalready emboldened some of Central and Eastern Europe’s illiberal elites—inHungary, Poland, and Romania, for instance.

Yetin a region where the perceived inescapability of history is always palpable,there are also significant segments of the elites and citizens who believe thatthe historical pendulum will eventually swing back, perhaps even as theeconomic cycle turns and fiscal room is constrained. Recent political protestsin Romania show that there are many in the anti-establishment camp who aremobilizing not to support but to resist the current wave of illiberalism.Moreover, even the illiberal governments in the region buoyed by this wave arecommitted to remaining in the EU club of liberal democracies while working tochange some of its rules.

Finally,there is an awareness that the next liberal moment will not be a return to theprevious liberal order, and there is an appetite for change—especially when itcomes to liberal economic policies, national sovereignty, and political-rightsentitlements.

JerzyPomianowskiExecutive director of the European Endowment for Democracy

Thetrauma of World War II led the fighting nations to build an order that wouldreduce the risk of history repeating itself. Collective security, free trade,economic cooperation, and international institutions were established topromote and protect liberal values. The liberal order was based on trust inelites and a belief that societies are driven by rational choices. Yet what hasbeen discovered over the last fifty years is that playing with people’semotions brings in bigger profits than fostering deep debate and wisearguments.

TheInternet has destroyed the fragile pact between the mainstream media andpoliticians to avoid the overuse of negative emotions in the democraticprocess. Fear, hate, and populism spread at the speed of light with noreflection or comment. New elites surf this wave gladly. The quest forpopularity and power has no rules. Societies polarized and confused bypost-truth messages seek refuge in the comfort zone of what sounds familiar,leading to a return to traditional identities. The best example: Britain’s voteto leave the EU, under the flag of restoring sovereignty.

Ifthe liberal democratic order is to survive in the long term, its elites cannotbecome a closed circuit but must be an open network that feels the pulse ofsociety. When trust is more important than truth, liberals must be passionate,committed, and credible enough to defend democratic values.

AndersFoghRasmussenFounder and chairman of Rasmussen Global

Notnecessarily, but the question is whether anything good can come out of thiscrisis.

Theliberal order is challenged today not by one but by two separate forces, onedomestic and one external. Domestically, it is challenged by populists whobring volatility to political systems; externally, by forces that seek toundermine democracies. The Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine—a country embarking onreform and integration with Western Europe—are an example of that. And theseforces are not operating in isolation. Russia is known to support populistparties. The consequences are dire; the world could become defined by nativism,protectionism, and authoritarianism.

However,the key strength of the liberal way of life is that it is malleable andpredisposed to generate new ideas. Through crisis, liberal democracy has anopportunity to renew itself. Rather than coalesce against populists and feedtheir rhetoric, the mainstream should engage with them. When I was primeminister of Denmark, we shared with populists the responsibility of government.This can go a long way toward moderating them. Another strength is free andopen debate. When speaking of outside challengers, liberals need to call outaggression when they see it and sanction the aggressors.

NorbertRöttgenChairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag

Firstof all, it is crucial to note that there is no one liberal order. Thepost–World War II order instituted and embodied by the United States was and isa Western order that materialized in constructs such as the European Union, thetransatlantic partnership, NATO, and other multilateral organizations.

ThisWestern order is clearly under threat from within. In Europe, Hungary andRomania are cases in which the rule of law is being disassembled from above. InFrance, right-wing populism is part of the erosion of the internal liberalorder. And in the United States, there is a president—and thus the so-calledleader of the free world—who has effectively labeled the political systemrotten and promised a complete overhaul, in a most illiberal and antipluralistfashion. These are examples of nationalism and egotism and, ultimately,demonstrations of how hamstrung the liberal order has become with regard totoday’s problems.

Therefore,there is a real ideological illiberal potential that must be taken seriously.The problem is not exaggeration; the true threat is underrating the crisis andcontinuing with business as usual. The crisis is real and present. A collapseof the liberal order, however, can still be prevented.

MarietjeSchaakeVice-chairof the European Parliament Delegation for Relations With the United States

Thereis no room for complacency amid the multiple threats to open societies. Whileexternal attacks from terrorism or an assertive Kremlin should unite peoplearound the core of open societies, the risk is that paralysis, fragmentation,and compromise on fundamental values may exacerbate the crisis of liberaldemocracy from within.

Thatis not to say there is no need for reforms, but the agenda of change risksbeing monopolized by forces seeking destruction. Reform cannot be left tonationalists, populists, and protectionists.

Thecrisis of liberal democracy should be turned into energy to fight for it,rather than misplaced self-defeat. With U.S. President Donald Trump in theWhite House and his assaults on the rule of law and the press, the UnitedStates is quickly losing credibility as a global liberal democratic leader. Itis now up to Europe to take a big step forward, along with like-mindedcountries like Canada, where the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeauhas proved that uncompromising progressive leadership can be popular. A globalmovement of politicians, the private sector, civil society, and citizens shouldcome together to defend liberal democratic values.

Itis high time for more robust leadership and outspokenness in standing up forthe values that have offered people in liberal democracies the highest qualityof life and the many rights and freedoms they enjoy.

DanielaSchwarzerDirector of the Research Institute of the German Council on ForeignRelations (DGAP)

Theworld has reached a turning point at which substantive further economicliberalization without serious compensation for the losers of market openingand deregulation will no longer be politically possible in democraticcountries. Nondemocratic market economies may be able to push economicliberalization further, until uncontrollable protest builds up.

However,even the status quo is at stake in Western democracies. Moderate political leadersand liberal societies are under serious pressure from forces that cater togrowing fears by promising nationalistic responses to the losses of sovereigntycaused by globalization and incomplete integration. Governments no longercontrol the socioeconomic tracks their countries are on unless governancemechanisms match the level and scope of monetary, financial, and economicintegration.

Itis only by dealing with the challenges to liberal democracy in nation-statesand the EU that governments will have the drive and power to maintain theliberal international order and improve it to accommodate global power shifts.The challenge to that order is very serious and needs to be answered on boththe national and the European level. If this doesn’t happen, order will erode.

AlisonSmaleBerlin bureau chief at the New York Times

Thatthe question is posed at all could be taken as an affirmative answer. But herein Berlin, a city where paths were once blocked shut by an ugly, deadly wall,it is impossible to lose faith in the strength of the human desire for freedom.At the same time, Berlin is a reminder that people always need to try to imposesome sort of order on societies, so that clashing wills and visions do notdeteriorate into disorder or, worst of all, an ungovernable chaos that wouldalmost inevitably result in some authoritarian course.

TheCold War was terrible, but it had rules, and a hot war in Europe was avoidedfor decades until the Soviet bloc collapsed. In the ensuing twenty-five years,many mistakes were made. But more people in Europe arguably live more freelytoday than they did before. The liberal order has not collapsed. In Europe, itfaces strong tests of its own making—namely, democratic elections—particularlyin the Netherlands, France, and Germany this year. How they turn out is up tothose who vote, and indeed all of us.

AngelaStentDirector of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies atthe Georgetown School of Foreign Service

Britain’svote to leave the EU, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, and therise of European far-right parties have prompted a cacophony of doomsdaypredictions about the end of the liberal world order. Meanwhile, PresidentVladimir Putin’s Russia flexes its military and cyberwarfare muscles as Westernpolitics becomes more polarized and inward looking. Moscow demands a new worldorder whose rules Russia and China would largely determine.

Isit really that bad? In the United States, less than a month into the Trumppresidency, a robust reaction to the attack on the liberal order has mobilizedmultiple groups to defend the institutions of democracy. In Europe, theprospect of an American downgrading of the transatlantic relationship hasopened a lively debate about Europe taking more responsibility for its owndefense amid uncertainty about the U.S. commitment.

Europeand the United States can use this unsettling situation to engage in along-overdue reassessment of their own political order and their mutualrelationship. Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, a Europe wholeand free is under stress. The West should use the moment to reimagine what arobust twenty-first-century liberal order should look like and committhemselves to defending it.

SylkeTempelEditorin chief of InternationalePolitik and the Berlin Policy Journal,published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Whenthe main pillar of a building is about to erode, it isn’t exaggerated to assumeimminent danger. U.S. President Donald Trump and his chief ideologist, SteveBannon, certainly think that the liberal order is a framework for free riders,to the disadvantage of the United States. They strongly believe in the survivalof the fittest. To them—as for Russian President Vladimir Putin, French NationalFront Leader Marine Le Pen, Turkish President RecepTayyipErdoğan, and others—arules-based order to the advantage to everybody is for decadent weaklings.Welcome back, world of Thomas Hobbes.

However,erosion isn’t destruction. The international liberal order is greatly weakenedif the United States, the architect of that order after World War II, no longersupports it. Trump can cause enormous harm. But not everyone in hisadministration thinks that a liberal order has outlived its days, and the presidentdoesn’t even have a majority of Americans behind him. Plus, a liberal order, arules-based system, and peaceful negotiations on diverging interests—in otherwords, the bulwark against a nasty, brutish, and short life—still form arevolutionary and attractive idea.

Yes,the liberal order is in imminent danger. But the jury is still out on whetherTrump and his fellow populists will prevail, or whether the world can shore upan order that is the only guarantor of security, wealth, and freedom.

MahaYahyaDirectorof the Carnegie Middle East Center

Itis no exaggeration to say that populists are on the rise across the globe,elected into office by citizens angry at the economic shortcomings of theliberal order, its exclusionary politics, and widening inequalities. Instead ofopen borders and open societies, which populists present as the causes ofeconomic decline and rising insecurity, they seek walls that shelteridentity-based communities, whether by sect, tribe, or ethnicity. The rise ofthe self-proclaimed Islamic State is in part a more extreme reflection of thisanger. In politics, this translates into a decline in Western support forprinciples like universalism and disengagement from the responsibility toprotect.

Nowhereis this crisis more palpable than in Syria, where demands for freedom have spuninto a six-year conflict and proxy wars that have generated the biggest refugeecrisis the world has seen since the end of World War II. An inability toaddress both conflict and crisis has exposed the costs of withdrawal by theUnited States, the principle underwriter of this liberal order, and theweaknesses of the current multilateral system of governance.

Thestrength of this order lies in its ability to adapt policies to address its ownshortcomings. Unless like-minded political elites, intellectuals, and citizensferociously defend the political gains of the liberal order and engage with itssocioeconomic failures, the world may witness even greater strife anddislocation at ever-expanding cost to lives and values.

    

Website:http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=68041