The South–North Water Transfer Project:remaking the geography of China-广东国际战略研究院

The South–North Water Transfer Project:remaking the geography of China

2017-03-11 15:51

George C. S. Lin. (2017) Water, technology, society and the environment: interpretingthe technopolitics of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. Regional Studies 51:3, pages 383-388.

Abstract

The South–North Water Transfer Project:remaking the geography of China. Regional Studies. This paper uses atechnopolitical approach to analyse China’s South–North Water Transfer Project.The project promises to channel 25 billion cubic metres of water a year fromthe Yangtze River northward, connecting four river basins, three megacities,six provinces and hundreds of millions of water users. The paper argues thatthe project embodies a particular, engineering-heavy approach to watermanagement; that, even so, it poses fundamental challenges to existing regionalstructures of governance; and that it promises continuing detrimentalenvironmental impacts in source regions even as it invites similar futureinterventions in China’s hydrological environment.

RÉSUMÉ

Le projet de transfertd’eau Nord-Sud:refaire la géographie de la Chine. Regional Studies.Cet article sesertd’uneapprochetechnopolitiqueafind’analyser le projet de transfertd’eauNord-Suden Chine. Le projetcherche à acheminervers le nord 25 milliards de mètrescubes d’eau par an à partir du fleuve Yangtze, reliantainsiquatrebassinshydrographiques, trois mégalopoles, six provinces et descentaines de millions d’utilisateursd’eau. Ce présent article affirme que leprojetincarneuneapprocheparticulière de la gestion des eauxlourded’ingénierie;que, toutefois, ilreprésente un défifondamental aux structures degouvernancerégionalesenvigueur; et qu’ilannonce deseffetspréjudiciablesenvironnementauxcontinusdans lesrégionsd’originetandisqu’ilsollicite des interventions futures similaires auniveau de l’environnementhydrologiqueen Chine.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das Süd-Nord-Wassertransferprojekt:Umgestaltung der Geografie von China. Regional Studies.IndiesemBeitraganalysierenwirmithilfeeinestechnopolitischen Ansatzes das Süd-Nord-Wassertransferprojektin China.Durch das Projektsollen pro Jahr 25 MilliardenKubikmeter WasservomJangtsenachNordenumgeleitet und vierFlussbecken, dreiMegastädte,sechsProvinzensowiehunderteMillionen von Wasserverbrauchernangeschlossenwerden.Wirargumentieren, dass das Projekteinenbesonderen und techniklastigen Ansatzder Wasserbewirtschaftungverkörpert, dassesdennoch dievorhandenenregionalenRegierungsstrukturenvorgrundlegendeHerausforderungenstelltund dasseszufortgesetztenschädlichenUmweltauswirkungen in denQuellregionenführenwird, währendesdarüberhinauszuähnlichenkünftigenEingriffenin die hydrologische Umwelt von China einlädt.

RESUMEN

El proyecto de trasvase de aguadel sur alnorte: transformación de la geografía de China. Regional Studies. Medianteunplanteamientotecnopolítico, enesteartículoanalizamos el proyecto de trasvasede agua del sur al norteen China. Con esteproyecto se canalizarán 25.000millones de metros cúbicos de agua al añodesde el ríoYangtzéhacia el norte,conectandocuatrocuencashidrográficas, tresmegaciudades, seisprovincias ycientos de millones de usuarios de agua. Enesteartículoargumentamos que elproyectoimplica un particular enfoquecentradoen la ingeniería para la gestióndel agua, que no obstante plantearetosfundamentales a lasactualesestructurasregionales de gobernanza, que amenaza concontinuosefectosperjudiciales para el medioambienteen las regiones de fuente, yque ademásconlleva la creación de programassimilaresen el futuro para elentornohidrológico de China.

KEYWORDS: China, South–NorthWater Transfer Project (SNWTP), technopolitics, water management, governance, pricing

MOTS-CLÉS: Chine, projetde transfert d’eau Nord-Sud, technopolitique, gestion del’eau, gouvernance, tarification

SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER: China, Süd-Nord-Wassertransferprojekt(SNWTP), Technopolitik, Wasserbewirtschaftung, Regierungsführung, Preisgestaltung

PALABRAS CLAVES: China, proyectode trasvase de agua del sur al norte, tecnopolítica, gestión delagua, gobernanza, precios

JEL: P26, Q25, Q28, R52

INTRODUCTION

The South–North Water Transfer Project(SNWTP) is the most ambitious inter-basin water transfer scheme in the world.It is a complex of diversion channels that promises to deliver tens of billionsm³ of fresh water a year over 1000 km from the relativelywell-watered south of China to the drier north. The project connects four majorriver basins, three megacities, six provinces, and hundreds of millions ofwater users and polluters.

The project comprises three routes. TheEastern Route has the capacity to supply 14.8 billion m³ per yearfrom the lower Changjiang (Yangtze River) to the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui,Shandong and Hebei and the municipality of Tianjin through a system of pumps,rivers, lakes, reservoirs and canals, including the Grand Canal, itself morethan 2500 years old. The route began operating in late 2013. The Middle Routecan provide 9.5 billion m³ per year to the provinces of Henan andHebei and the municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin from Danjiangkou reservoiron the Han River (a tributary of the middle Changjiang). Ten years inconstruction, it involved raising the wall of the dam at Danjiangkou by nearly15 m and constructing a pair of tunnels to carry water under the HuangHe (YellowRiver). Water began to flow in late 2014 and there are plans to expand itscapacity to 13 billion m³ per year. A third (western) route would becapable of diverting another 20 billion m³ of water annually fromtributaries of the upper Changjiang through tunnels to the upper reaches of theHuangHe. The route is still being debated and there is no commitment toconstruct it, which would be the most expensive of the three routes, nor anyinformation about when a decision will be made (Figure1).

Figure 1.The three routes of theSouth–North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP).

PowerPointslide Originaljpg (75.00KB)Displayfull size

Planning and design for the project wereoverseen by the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), through its Planning, Designand Management Bureau of the SNWTP (Chinese Government Public InformationOnline, 2015Chinese Government Public Information Online. (2015).[Ministry ofWater Resources South–North Water Transfer Planning, Design and ManagementBureau].Retrieved from http://govinfonew.nlc.gov.cn/gtfz/i11-24-18362 ).In 2002, this bureau completed a blueprint for the construction period and, in2003, the Office of the Construction Committee for the SNWTP (Office of theSNWTP) was established directly under the State Council to oversee construction(State Council, 2003State Council. (2003). [Notice from the State Councilon the founding of the State Council’s Construction Committee for theSouth–North Water Transfer Project, official communication (2003) No. 17].Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2008-03/28/content_7672.htm ).Various design institutes and river basin commissions compiled the designs andplans, while construction was done by Hanjiang Water Resources and HydropowerCorporation on the Eastern Route and Danjiangkou Water Resources andHydroelectric Corporation on the Middle Route (water-technology.net, n.d.water-technology.net. (n.d.).South-to-north water diversion project, China.water-technology.net.Retrieved from http://www.water-technology.net/projects/south_north/ ).

Estimates of the project’s cost differenormously. The cost of constructing the Eastern and Middle routes has beenestimated at US$79.4 billion (Chang, 2014Chang, G. (2014). China’s water crisis made worse by policy failures. WorldAffairs.Retrieved from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/china%E2%80%99s-water-crisis-made-worse-policy-failures );an official of the Office of the SNWTP told Li (2014Li, Y. (2014). [Will the investment of RMB 210 billion in the Middle Route of thesouth–north water transfer be reflected in cost-based water pricing?]. 21stCentury Business Herald. Retrieved from http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140614/032619411109.shtml )that the construction of the two routes would likely end up costing RMB 300billion (US$47 billion at late 2015 exchange rates). There are many otherestimates within this range. These costs do not include evicting and resettling365,000–375,000 people for the enlargement of Danjiangkou reservoir andconstruction of canals (the Office of the SNWTP estimates 300,000 people, butlater estimates are higher). The experience at Three Gorges (Webber, 2012Webber, M. (2012).Making capitalism in rural China. Cheltenham: Elgar.[CrossRef], [Google Scholar]) suggests that the evictions cost at leastRMB 100,000 each (excluding the costs to households), adding another US$5.75billion to the construction cost. Nor do estimates of construction cost includeenvironmental protection and evicting farmers from the catchment of Danjiangkoureservoir. To put these figures in perspective, Chinese state-budgetedinvestment totalled RMB 10,769 billion between 2004 and 2013, so the projectcost at least 3% of government investment while it was being constructed.

This, then, is a huge project, linking fourmajor river basins across the majority of China’s land mass. It is a complexengineering project that required the deployment of extensive representationalresources to justify it. As a socio-technical infrastructure the SNWTP mediatesbetween Chinese society and its environment, comprising a political and amaterial response to social needs and environmental demands and complementingat least another five interbasin diversion projects within China (Chen & Wenger,2014Chen, H., & Wenger, R. B. (2014). Water diversion projects in China. In R.M. Clark & S. Hakim (Eds.), Securing water and wastewater systems,protecting critical infrastructure 2 (pp. 213–232). Cham: Springer.[CrossRef], [Google Scholar]). Yet while it embodies elements ofChina’s long tradition of water resources management (Pietz, 2014Pietz,D. (2014).The Yellow River: The problem of water in modern China.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar]), the SNWTP nevertheless poses challengesto the existing structure of China’s socio-environment.

The literature on the operation andimplications of the SNWTP is still in its infancy, and is principally concernedwith the management of the project. Three topics dominate. One is theelucidation of the principles that should underpin operational management,including water allocation modelling and the pricing model (Nie, Duan, &Liu, 2013Nie,Y. H., Duan, W. G., & Liu, D. (2013). Water allocation model for Shandongsegment of the East Route of South-to-North Water Transfer Project.Journalof Yangtze River Scientific Research Institute, 30(8), 75–78. [inChinese] [Google Scholar]; Wu, Dong, Guo, & Li, 2013Wu, Z. N., Dong, M. L., Guo, R. L., & Li, Y. (2013). Study on two-partwater price calculation and its impact factors for main line of Middle Route ofSouth-to-North water diversion project. South-to-North Water Transfers andWater Science & Technology, 11, 148–152. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Zhang, Lu, &Fei, 2013Zhang, L. C., Lu, H., &Fei, X. X. (2013). Analysis and research on waterresources optimal allocation of Henan province intake area of the Middle Routeof South to North water diversion project. Yellow River, 35,61–63, 67. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]). Another concerns the evaluation of, andpotential mitigating measures against, the principal risks that face managersof the project (Hu, Zheng, Li, & Shi, 2013Hu, D., Zheng, L., Li, S., & Shi, G. K. (2013). Study on the riskevaluation method for the open channel operation in the Middle Route of South-to-Northwater diversion project. South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science& Technology, 11, 98–101. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]), especially floods (Cong, Kang, Cheng,& Ding, 2012Cong, H. X., Kang, L., Cheng, X. J., & Ding, Y. (2012). Flood risk analysisin the Middle Route of South-to-North water diversion project of China based onBayesian network. South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science &Technology, 10, 10–13. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]), security of water supply (Lin, Liu,& Chen, 2012Lin, C. S., Liu, W., & Chen, H. (2012). Unified allocation of waterresources of intake area at Henan province in the South-to-North waterdiversion Middle Route project.South-to-North Water Transfers and WaterScience & Technology, 10, 11–12. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Zhang, Jiang, Li, Yang, & Sun, 2012Zhang, Z. W., Jiang, H. J., Li, C. G., Yang, J., & Sun, X. Z. (2012). Fuzzycomprehensive evaluation of water security in central water source area ofMiddle Route of South-to-North water diversion project.South-to-North WaterTransfers and Water Science & Technology, 10, 16–21. [inChinese] [Google Scholar]) and high groundwater levels (Hu&Weng, 2013Hu, G. Q., &Weng, Y. Z. (2013). Variation of groundwater level along thesection of Sha River to Yellow River of the Middle Route of South-to-Northwater diversion project.South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science& Technology, 11, 120–124. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]). The risk of pollution in sources andalong the route has received particular attention (Guo& Ren, 2014Guo,P., & Ren, J. (2014). Variation trend analysis of water quality along theEastern Route of South-to-North water diversion project.South-to-North WaterTransfers and Water Science & Technology, 12, 59–64. [inChinese] [Google Scholar]; Guo, Wu, & Ren, 2013Guo,P., Wu, P. R., & Ren, J. (2013).Analysis of annual variation of mainpollutants discharge into the river along the Eastern Route of South-to-Northwater diversion project.South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science& Technology, 11, 62–66. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Guo, Xiao, Shang, & Wang, 2013Guo,H., Xiao, W. H., Shang, J. S., & Wang, W. C. (2013). Impact assessment ofEastern Route of South-to-North water diversion project operation on the waterenvironment of Nansi Lake.South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science& Technology, 11, 49–53, 57. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Xin, Li, Finlayson, & Wei, 2015Xin, X. K., Li, K., Finlayson, B., & Wei, Y. (2015).Evaluation, prediction,and protection of water quality in Danjiangkou reservoir, China.WaterScience and Engineering, 8, 30–39. doi:10.1016/j.wse.2014.11.001[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). The third topic concerns theimplications of the SNWTP for source regions (Chen et al., 2013Chen, D., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., Barnett, J., Chen, Z. Y., & Wang, M.(2013). The impact of water transfers from the lower Yangtze River on watersecurity in Shanghai. Applied Geography, 45, 303–310.doi:10.1016/j.apgeog.2013.09.025[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Fan, Yang, & Tang, 2012Fan, W. X., Yang, Z. X., & Tang, H. F. (2012). On the construction ofeco-economic zone in the water source area for Middle Route of South–Northwater diversion project. Forestry Economics, 2, 39–42. [inChinese] [Google Scholar]; Huang & Zhang, 2014Huang, L. J., & Zhang, Z. W. (2014). Ecological compensation standard ofXiangyang section of Han River middle and lower reaches in the Central Route ofSouth-to-North Water Transfer Project. Journal of Xiangfan University, 35,57–61. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Webber et al., 2015bWebber, M., Li, M. T., Chen, J., Finlayson, B., Chen, D., Chen, Z.Y., … Barnett, J. (2015b). Impact of the Three Gorges Dam, the South–NorthWater Transfer Project and water abstractions on the duration and intensity ofsalt intrusions in the Yangtze River estuary.Hydrology and Earth SystemSciences, 19, 4411–4425. doi:10.5194/hess-19-4411-2015[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) and the use of local water resources inthe destinations (Ling, You, Wang, &Gan, 2014Ling, J., You, J. J., Wang, L., &Gan, H. (2014). Scenario analysis on watersource replacement effects of the 1st stage of South-to-North Water TransferProject. South-to-North Water Transfers and Water Science & Technology,12, 16–20. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]). None of these is concerned with therelations between the SNWTP and the broader development of China’ssocio-environment or between the project and ongoing processes of watermanagement. (Socio-environments are the manner of interaction of people, socialgroups, cities, firms, governments and the like, as well as elements of the‘produced environment’.)

Relatively fewer are studies of thepolitical and economic implications of the SNWTP, placing the project within theframework of socio-environmental relations within China (Barnett, Rogers,Webber, Finlayson, & Wang, 2015Barnett, J., Rogers, S., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., & Wang, M. (2015).Sustainability: Transfer project cannot meet China’s water needs. Nature,527, 295–297. doi:10.1038/527295a[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Crow-Miller, 2013Crow-Miller, B. (2013). Water, power, and development in twenty-firstcentury China: The case of the South–North Water Transfer Project(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of California – LosAngeles. , 2015Crow-Miller, B. (2015). Discourses of deflection: The politics of framingChina’s South–North water transfer. Water Alternatives, 8,173–192.[Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Moore, 2014aMoore, S. M. (2014a).Modernisation, authoritarianism, and the environment: Thepolitics of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. EnvironmentalPolitics, 23, 947–964. doi:10.1080/09644016.2014.943544[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Crow-Miller argues that the SNWTPpermits economic growth to continue on the North China Plain, helping theChinese Communist Party to maintain political legitimacy. In doing this, theSNWTP is represented as an apolitical project that conceals the anthropogenicsources of water stress on the North China Plain; this argument resurfaceslater. In arguing that the SNWTP embodies a form of authoritarianenvironmentalism, Moore (2014aMoore, S. M. (2014a).Modernisation, authoritarianism, and the environment: Thepolitics of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. EnvironmentalPolitics, 23, 947–964. doi:10.1080/09644016.2014.943544[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 959) observes that the ‘SNWTP reflectsa powerful, technocratic, and controlling central government, but one capableof employing a variety of strategies, persuasive as well as coercive, to pursueits objectives’. Barnett et al. (2015Barnett, J., Rogers, S., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., & Wang, M. (2015).Sustainability: Transfer project cannot meet China’s water needs. Nature,527, 295–297. doi:10.1038/527295a[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) comment that in many respects the SNWTPrepresents an alternative to better local management of water resources andthus contradict Berkoff (2003Berkoff,J. (2003). China: The South–North Water Transfer Project – Is itjustified? Water Policy, 5, 1–28. [Google Scholar]), who argues that the social disruptionthat would be caused if conservation measures were adopted on the North ChinaPlain suffices to justify the project.

This paper develops some of these politicaland economic arguments. It argues first that the project embodies a particularengineering-heavy approach to water management in China. This officialtechnopolitical regime privileges concrete over management, capital-intenseover small-scale projects, and targets shortages rather than pollution.Secondly, the paper argues that, even so, the project poses fundamentalchallenges to the existing regional structures of governance (by requiringwater management at a greater-than-basin scale) and power (empowering centralas compared with provincial and local governments). Thirdly, it argues that theproject both promises continuing detrimental environmental impacts in sourceregions even as it invites similar future interventions in China’s hydrologicalenvironment. This paper does not survey the social and environmental impacts ofthe SNWTP (examining neither the resettlement of people for the project nor thedecisions about which regions should receive the water, for example); rather,it interprets some elements of the project in the light of concepts drawn fromthe study of technopolitics to substantiate these arguments.

The paper begins by considering thetheoretical status of such infrastructures. It then describes therepresentations that are offered to justify the project over alternative formsof water management, and proceeds to explain the challenges thrown up by theSNWTP and its continuing environmental impacts. Represented as astraightforward, technical solution to quantitative imbalances between the regionaldemand for and supply of water in China, the project instead foregrounds theenvironmental, economic and political challenges posed by China’s patterns ofgrowth. While technopolitical studies demonstrate how technical choices andpolitical development march hand in hand, this paper reveals that hugeinfrastructure projects not only represent the state of relations betweensociety and environment, but also – as Gandy (2014Gandy, M. (2014). The fabric of space: Water, modernity, and the urbanimagination. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]) has emphasized – pose new challenges tothose relations.

THE TECHNOPOLITICS OF INFRASTRUCTURES

Infrastructures are networks that enablethe flow of goods, people or ideas and allow their exchange over space (Larkin,2013Larkin, B. (2013). The politics and poetics of infrastructure.Annual Reviewof Anthropology, 42, 327–343.doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155522[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). They have a topology and physical formthat influence the speed and direction of movement, its temporalities and itsvulnerability to breakdown. Infrastructures, in this sense, are technologicalobjects. Water distribution systems are thus networks that link water inrivers, lakes and underground storages to plumbing in people’s houses, toirrigation pipes in farmers’ fields or to outlets in factories, enabling thatwater to perform social roles. Infrastructures mediate between societies and theirenvironments.

Water infrastructure consists of pipes,pumps and water treatment plants (machines); the links between those machinesthat make them into a system that delivers water; and techniques oforganization – corporations, accounting, bureaucracies and the like (Molle,Mollinga, & Wester, 2009Molle,F., Mollinga, P., & Wester, P. (2009). Hydraulic bureaucracies and thehydraulic mission: Flows of water, flows of power. Water Alternatives, 2,328–349. [Google Scholar]). Anand (2011Anand,N. (2011). PRESSURE: The politechnics of water supply in Mumbai. CulturalAnthropology, 26, 542–564. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2011.01111.x[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], 2012Anand,N. (2012). Municipal disconnect: On abject water and its urban infrastructures.Ethnography, 13, 487–509. doi:10.1177/1466138111435743[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), for example, considers the provision ofwater to Mumbai in India, tracing the interaction of two infrastructures. Onesystem delivers water, through networks of pipes, engineers and bureaucracythat make up the technique of water provision; the other comprises the socialnetworks, forms of patron–clientship, and relationship-building that are alsoimportant to water delivery in Mumbai. These two infrastructures interact toproduce what Anand (2011Anand,N. (2011). PRESSURE: The politechnics of water supply in Mumbai. CulturalAnthropology, 26, 542–564. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2011.01111.x[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 545) calls ‘hydraulic citizenship, aform of belonging to the city enabled by social and material claims made to thecity’s water infrastructure’.

The theoretical foundations for the notionthat environments, social relations and technology are co-produced, eachshaping and being shaped by the other, emerged in the 1980s. Variousprogrammes, including the social construction of technology, large-scaletechnical systems and actor–network theory, all attend to the construction ofthe borders between the social and the technical (Bijker& Pinch, 2012Bijker,W. E., & Pinch, T. (2012). Preface to anniversary edition. In W. E. Bijker,T. P. Hughes, & T. Pinch (Eds.), The social construction oftechnological systems: New directions in the sociology and history oftechnology [1987] (pp. xi–xxxiv). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]). They all contend that technologies aresocially constructed, evolving to fill niches in a world governed not only bybiophysical laws but also by social rules and government policies. A parallelargument contends that the environment, too, is socially and technologicallyconstructed, depending not only on biophysical laws but also on socialmodifications and technologically mediated interfaces between people and theenvironment (Bakker, 2012Bakker, K. (2012). Water: Political, biopolitical, material. Social Studiesof Science, 42, 616–623. doi:10.1177/0306312712441396[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Swyngedouw, 1999Swyngedouw,E. (1999). Modernity and hybridity: Nature, regeneracionismo, and theproduction of the Spanish waterscape, 1890–1930. Annals of the Associationof American Geographers, 89, 443–465. doi:10.1111/0004-5608.00157[Taylor& Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [CSA], [Google Scholar], 2004Swyngedouw,E. (2004). Social power and the urbanization of water: Flows of power.Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). That environment in turn has agency overhuman beings and societies’ technological trajectories, posing conditions thatshape people and their societies (Williams, 2010Williams, J. C. (2010). Understanding the place of humans in nature.In M.Reuss& S. H. Cutliffe (Eds.), Environment and technology in history(pp. 9–25). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. [Google Scholar]). The co-production of societies,environments and technologies is summarized in Hughes (2004Hughes, T. (2004). Human-built world: How to think about technology andculture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar], p. 156): much of the world ‘consists ofintersecting and overlapping natural and human-built systems, which togetherconstitute ecotechnological systems’.

An influential application of these ideasis the concept of the hydro-social cycle (Bakker, 2012Bakker, K. (2012). Water: Political, biopolitical, material. Social Studiesof Science, 42, 616–623. doi:10.1177/0306312712441396[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Swyngedouw, 2006Swyngedouw,E. (2006). Power, water and money: Exploring the nexus (Occasional PaperNo. 2006/14). United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human DevelopmentReport Office. ). As developed by Linton and Budds (2014Linton, J., &Budds, J. (2014). The hydrosocial cycle: Defining andmobilizing a relational–dialectical approach to water. Geoforum, 57,170–180. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.10.008[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), the hydro-social cycle incorporates theideas that the need to manage water affects the organization of society inimportant ways, which in turn modify the flow of water, and in their in turngive rise to new forms of social organization; nevertheless, the materialproperties of water play an active role in the cycle – water obeys its ownlaws. Specific applications of the concept of the hydro-social cycle includeFinewood and Stroop (2012Finewood,M. H., & Stroop, L. J. (2012). Fracking and the neoliberalization of thehydro-social cycle in Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale.Journal of ContemporaryWater Research & Education, 147, 72–79.doi:10.1111/j.1936-704X.2012.03104.x[CrossRef], [Google Scholar]), Clarke-Sather (2012Clarke-Sather, A. (2012). State development and the rescaling of agriculturalhydrosocial governance in semi-arid northwest China.Water Alternatives, 5,98–118. [Google Scholar]), Boelens (2014Boelens,R. (2014). Cultural politics and the hydrosocial cycle: Water, power andidentity in the Andean highlands. Geoforum, 57, 234–247.doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.02.008[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) and McDonnell (2014McDonnell, R. A. (2014). Circulations and transformations of energy and waterin Abu Dhabi’s hydrosocial cycle.Geoforum, 57, 225–233.doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.11.009[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). People, networks, institutions, water (H₂Oin Linton &Budds’, 2014Linton, J., &Budds, J. (2014). The hydrosocial cycle: Defining andmobilizing a relational–dialectical approach to water. Geoforum, 57,170–180. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.10.008[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], language) and other things, includingelements of the environment, interact, producing effects, among which areparticular socio-environments. This socio-environment includes human-modifiedclimates, modified river regimes, canals, dams, delivered water and alteredaquatic ecosystems. Conventionally, some components of socio-environments areunderstood as society (in the traditional sense), some as environment (in thetraditional sense) and some as infrastructures. However they are classified,the elements of socio-environments (things) then provide the context orframework within which people, networks, institutions, water and the likeinteract as preformed agents in another iteration to produce yet furthereffects, in a continuous evolution.

One set of the elements of asocio-environment is its infrastructures. These are, on the one hand,technological systems to be understood through an analysis of networkedmachines, bureaucracies and the like; on the other, they are political, used toconstitute, embody or enact political goals – they embody a technopolitics(Hecht, 2001Hecht, G. (2001). Technology, politics, and national identity in France.In M.T. Allen & G. Hecht (Eds.), Technologies of power (pp. 253–294).Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]). Infrastructures in this sense arehybrids of technology and politics. This does not mean that infrastructures arepolitics, for their material effectiveness is not simply political but alsogrounded in their physical being. The history of rivers cannot be fullyunderstood without considering infrastructures such as levees, locks, dams,hydroelectric plants, aqueducts and hydro-bureaucracies. But thoseinfrastructures cannot be understood without considering the ways of behavingof rivers and social groups. The choices related to those infrastructurescannot be examined without understanding the administrative apparatus ofmulti-jurisdictional governance peculiar to those rivers, or the policies thatguide that apparatus. ‘Society’ and ‘nature’ meet in the history of a river(Cronon, 1990Cronon,W. (1990). Modes of prophecy and production: Placing nature in history. Journalof American History, 76, 1122–1131. doi:10.2307/2936590[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]).

But infrastructures encourage pathdependence. Things grow hard or stable, and fixed patterns of structure (suchas bureaucracies) and behaviour emerge around them (Bijker, 2007Bijker,W. E. (2007). Dikes and dams, thick with politics.Isis, 98,109–123. doi:10.1086/512835[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), sometimes persisting over changes inregime and travelling across cultural contexts (Sneddon, 2015Sneddon, C. (2015). Concrete revolution: Large dams, Cold War geopolitics,and the US Bureau of Reclamation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.[CrossRef], [Google Scholar]). Grounded in these institutions, technopoliticalregimes (Hecht, 2001Hecht, G. (2001).Technology, politics, and national identity in France.In M. T.Allen & G. Hecht (Eds.), Technologies of power (pp. 253–294). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]) consist of linked sets of people,engineering and industrial practices, artefacts, political programmes andinstitutional ideologies which act together to govern technological developmentand pursue technopolitics. In a society at a given time there may existcompeting technopolitical regimes: in 18th-century China, Confucian and Daoistconceptions of water management (to actively direct the flow of rivers or movethe population and ‘let the water be’, respectively) competed for primacy(Purdue, 2010Purdue, P. C. (2010). Is there a Chinese view of technology and nature? In M.Reuss& S. H. Cutliffe (Eds.), Environment and technology in history(pp. 101–119). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. [Google Scholar]). In post-colonial Pakistan, centralist (Punjabi-dominated)conceptions of the ‘One Nation’ competed with regionalist imaginaries ofPakistan over the control and distribution of water from hydraulicinfrastructures on the Indus River (Akhter, 2015Akhter, M. (2015). Infrastructure nation: State space, hegemony, and hydraulicregionalism in Pakistan. Antipode, 47, 849–870.doi:10.1111/anti.12152[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). These studies do not, however, considerthe political, social and environmental challenges that are posed by hugeinfrastructure projects – and that is the principal purpose of this paper.

REPRESENTING THE NEED FOR THESOUTH–NORTH WATER TRANSFER PROJECT

The imaginary of a water-rich south versusa water-scarce north (Xinhua Net, 2014XinhuaNet. (2014). [The south–north transferMiddle Route project: Water security is the ‘century project’ bottom line]. XinhuaNet. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-12/17/c_127312541.htm )– is central to all accounts of the SNWTP, which seeks to ‘balance’ theallocation of water at the national scale. As Xinhua Net (2014XinhuaNet. (2014). [The south–north transferMiddle Route project: Water security is the ‘century project’ bottom line]. XinhuaNet. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-12/17/c_127312541.htm )expressed the words of prominent Chinese geographer, Liu Changming:

[China’s per capita water resources are low– only one quarter of the world average. A special characteristic is unevenspatial and temporal distribution, with much agricultural land but little waterin the North and little agricultural land but more water in the South. Inaddition, the water resources are concentrated in the summer. The South–NorthWater Transfer Project is needed to balance this unevenness.]

This geographical imaginary is evident inmaps of the project, and in the expression used to describe its overalloutcome, which refers to ‘four horizontals, three verticals: the four major rivers –Changjiang, HuaiHe, HaiHe and HuangHe – provide horizontal movement, while thethree routes of the SNWTP provide vertical movement (People’s Daily Online,2014People’sDaily Online. (2014). [Spanning more than half a century of water diversion dreams].People’sDaily Online. Retrieved from http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1210/c1001-26178581.html ).This imaginary implies absolute control over the water resources within China’sterritory: water no longer flows west to east as it did for centuries; it isalso now flowing south to north. The maps communicate the delivery of waterover space and the delivery of a political project to dominate hydrologicallandscapes that began thousands of years ago. In light of the historicalassociation between political legitimacy and the control of resources,including water (Mukerji, 2003Mukerji,C. (2003).Intelligent uses of engineering and the legitimacy of state power.Technologyand Culture, 44, 655–676. doi:10.1353/tech.2003.0175[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), the visible forms of the SNWTP areimportant political symbols, signifying the authority of the state.

Rather than approaching water managementfrom a local or bioregional perspective in which hydrological units (watershedsand river basins) serve as the management unit (Thayer, 2003Thayer, R. L. (2003). Bioregional thought and practice. Berkeley:University of California Press. [Google Scholar]), the SNWTP locates the problem of northChina’s water shortage at the national scale. The threat of water shortage is athreat to the survival of the Chinese nation, according to former premier WenJiabao (quoted in Moore, 2009Moore, S. M. (2009). Climate change, water and China’s national interest.ChinaSecurity, 5, 25–39. [Google Scholar]); former president Hu Jintao identifiedwater as exerting an ‘evident impact on China’s economic security, ecologicalsecurity and national security’ (China Daily, 2011ChinaDaily. (2011). China to set up water facilities construction.China Daily.Retrievedfrom http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-07/11/content_12875128.htm ).Water is needed to secure food supplies and energy production, vital tocontinuing national development and therefore the survival of the state andParty (Yong, 2006Yong, J. (2006). China’s water policy and practice.Water International, 31,127–130. doi:10.1080/02508060608691922[Taylor& Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) (Figure2).

Figure 2. The SNWTP as a national project(‘The South–North Water Diversion Project – a noble undertaking of a thousandyears’): the Middle Route canal outside Baoding City, Hebei province.

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The imaginary of the SNWTP as a solution tothe water scarcity of the north through the use of abundant water from thesouth hides the anthropogenic drivers of water insecurity in north China. It istrue that China’s north has less water resources per unit area and per capitathan the south (outside Manchuria, at least); in the Huang, Huai and Hai riverbasins, annual average per capita availability of water ranges between 314 and672 m³, well below the levels at which water shortages can threatenfood production and economic development (Jiang, 2009Jiang, Y. (2009). China’s water scarcity.Journal of Environmental Management,90, 3185–3196. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.04.016[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Wang &Jin, 2006Wang, X. C., &Jin, P. K. (2006). Water shortage and needs for wastewaterre-use in the north China. Water Science and Technology, 53,35–44. doi:10.2166/wst.2006.267[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Furthermore, in one year of four,discharges in the Huai and Hai rivers fall to less than 70% of their annualaverage (Berkoff, 2003Berkoff,J. (2003). China: The South–North Water Transfer Project – Is itjustified? Water Policy, 5, 1–28. [Google Scholar]). The shortfall is met by mininggroundwater resources (Jiang, 2009Jiang, Y. (2009). China’s water scarcity.Journal of Environmental Management,90, 3185–3196. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.04.016[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Varley, 2005Varley, R. C. G. (2005). The World Bank and China’s environment 1993–2003.Washington, DC: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. [Google Scholar]), the over-extraction of which affectsover 70% of the north China plain (MWR, 2007MWR (Ministry of Water Resources).(2007). The 11th Five-Year Plan of nationalwater resources.Development Gazette of the Ministry of Water Resources ofthe People’s Republic of China 2007, 34–48. ). However, China’s rapideconomic growth since 1978 has resulted in large increases in agricultural andindustrial production in the drier northern provinces, causing significantincreases in demand relative to supply, as well as pollution on such a scalethat much of the north’s water is unfit for consumptive uses (Barnett, Webber,Wang, Finlayson, & Dickinson, 2006Barnett, J., Webber, M., Wang, M., Finlayson, B., & Dickinson, D. (2006).Ten key questions about the management of water in the Yellow River Basin.EnvironmentalManagement, 38, 179–188. doi:10.1007/s00267-005-0068-7[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Jiang, 2009Jiang, Y. (2009). China’s water scarcity.Journal of Environmental Management,90, 3185–3196. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.04.016[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Ma, Hoekstra, Wang, Chapagain, &Wang, 2006Ma, J., Hoekstra, A. Y., Wang, H., Chapagain, A. K., & Wang, D. X. (2006).Virtual versus real water transfers within China. Philosophical Transactionsof the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 361, 835–842.doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1644[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Webber, Barnett, Wang, Finlayson, &Dickinson, 2008aWebber, M., Barnett, J., Wang, M., Finlayson, B., & Dickinson, D. (2008a).The Yellow River in transition.Environmental Science and Policy, 11,422–429. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2008.02.002[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Yang, Zhang, &Zehnder, 2003Yang, H., Zhang, X., &Zehnder, A. Z. B. (2003). Water scarcity, pricingmechanism and institutional reform in northern China irrigated agriculture. AgriculturalWater Management, 61, 143–161. doi:10.1016/S0378-3774(02)00164-6[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). In the north, 40–60% of the region’swater is continuously in the non-functional water classification categories(Jiang, 2009Jiang, Y. (2009). China’s water scarcity.Journal of Environmental Management,90, 3185–3196. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.04.016[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Xie, 2009Xie,J. (2009). Addressing China’s water scarcity: Recommendations for selectedwater resource management issues. Washington, DC: World Bank. [Google Scholar]).

Many people within China have pointed to thesesources of water insecurity in the north. Xie (2009Xie,J. (2009).Addressing China’s water scarcity: Recommendations for selectedwater resource management issues. Washington, DC: World Bank. [Google Scholar]), in a report for the World Bank, arguedthat to address China’s water scarcity there needed to be improvements to watergovernance, the development of water markets, increases in the price of water,new ecological compensation payments for the use of ecosystem services andcontrols over water pollution; the report did not even discuss the SNWTP. Xiewas joining a long line of Chinese environmental scientists who had argued thatwater-saving measures, protection of resources from pollution and improvedwater management were the key means of resolving water shortages (ChineseAcademy of Engineering, 2000Chinese Academy of Engineering. (2000). Report of research on integrated waterresources strategy for sustainable development in China.Engineering Science,2, 1–17. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Chinese Academy of Sciences, 1998Chinese Academy of Sciences.(1998). Ways out of China’s water problem.Advancesin Earth Sciences, 13, 113–117. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Mei & Luo, 2000Mei, X. R., & Luo, Y. P. (2000). Water shortage and China’s grainproduction: Problems, potentialities and solutions. Science and TechnologyReview, 6, 31–34. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Wang, 1990Wang, J. S. (1990). Water shortage and wastewater reuse. Journal ofEnvironmental Sciences (China), 2, 67–78. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]; Zhang, 1999Zhang, G. D. (1999).The problems of water resources facing China in the 21stcentury.Advances in Earth Sciences, 14, 16–17. [in Chinese] [Google Scholar]). Such views, moreover, were representedwithin the central government itself: the then Vice Minister of Housing andUrban–Rural Development, QiuBaoxing (Qiu, 2014Qiu,B. X. (2014). [QiuBaoxing: Urban water security in China and itscountermeasures]. China Water Network News. Retrieved from http://news.h2o-china.com/html/2014/02/125350_1.shtml ),observed that if one-third of Beijing’s buildings collected and used rainwater,that would have saved the investment in the SNWTP.

At the time when the critical decisions toproceed with the project were made, all nine members of the Politburo standingcommittee were trained as engineers (Kuo, 2014Kuo,L. (2014). China is so bad at conservation that it had to launch the mostimpressive water-pipeline project ever. Retrieved from http://journal.probeinternational.org/ );and party leaders have close personal ties to the corporations in China’s watermachine – Hu Jintao is a former employee of Sinohydro and Li Peng was father ofthe president of Huaneng. Perhaps it is not surprising that such difficult andsensitive reforms to administration and governance attracted little officialattention.

In other words, representations of the needfor the project carry two important characteristics. First, the problems ofwater supply are represented as national imbalances of national strategicsignificance rather than shortages that principally affect Beijing and Tianjinand that would be the responsibility of Beijing and Tianjin to resolve.Secondly, they are represented as issues of quantitative shortage rather thaninduced by poor pollution control (as argued by World Bank & SEPA, 2007World Bank and SEPA [State Environmental Protection Administration, People’sRepublic of China]. (2007). Cost of pollution in China. Washington, DC:World Bank. [Google Scholar]) and a national growth pattern that hasseen the north’s share of agricultural production expand dramatically in thepast 40 years (Webber et al., 2008aWebber, M., Barnett, J., Wang, M., Finlayson, B., & Dickinson, D. (2008a).The Yellow River in transition.Environmental Science and Policy, 11,422–429. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2008.02.002[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). Even though alternative diagnoses ofChina’s regional water shortages had been available long before the decisionwas made to commit to the SNWTP, the solutions to which those diagnoses pointedwere ignored in a political decision that prioritized investment in technologyand infrastructure over reforms to administration and governance. Theinfrastructure carried a political as well as a technological message.

CHALLENGES TO EXISTING REGIONALSTRUCTURES

The project in this sense reflects thedistribution of power in China – that the central government has greatercapacity to invest billions in an infrastructure scheme than to reform watermanagement systems in which local jurisdictions have a high degree of localautonomy and little incentive to manage water at the expense of jobs (Wang,Webber, Finlayson, & Barnett, 2008Wang, M., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., & Barnett, J. (2008). Rural industriesand water pollution in China.Journal of Environmental Management, 86,648–659. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.12.019[CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). The project is consistent with a modelof growth in the 1990s and 2000s that was dominated by investment, includingcentral government-led investment: according to World Bank data, gross capitalformation in China exceeded 35% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1980s,and since 1991 has averaged over 40%. Yet the SNWTP is throwing up challengesto China’s political order – the infrastructure is doing political work (nowand into the future) as well as reflecting political work of the past.

The first challenge is to China’sgovernance regime.

The governance of the SNWTP intervenes inan already highly complex regime, what some have called fragmentedauthoritarianism (Lieberthal&Oksenberg, 1988Lieberthal,K., &Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy making in China: Leaders, structures,and processes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]; updated in Mertha, 2009Mertha,A. (2009). ‘Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0’: Political pluralization in theChinese policy process.China Quarterly, 200, 995–1012.doi:10.1017/S0305741009990592[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). The management of water in China ishighly decentralized (Webber, Barnett, Finlayson, & Wang, 2008bWebber, M., Barnett, J., Finlayson, B., & Wang, M. (2008b). Pricing China’sirrigation water.Global Environmental Change, 18, 617–625.doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.07.014[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) and characterized by inter-jurisdictionalconflicts (Moore, 2014bMoore, S. M. (2014b). Hydropolitics and inter-jurisdictional relationships inChina.China Quarterly, 218, 1–21. [Google Scholar]). The state is unbundled intoill-coordinated congeries of territorial bureaucracies and vertically andhorizontally segmented administrative boundaries, which do not map well ontothe hydrological cycle (Nickum& Lee, 2006Nickum,J. E., & Lee, Y. S. F. (2006). Same longitude, different latitudes:Institutional change in urban water in China, North and South. EnvironmentalPolitics, 15, 231–247. doi:10.1080/09644010600562492[Taylor& Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar], p. 232). It involves the MWR; for mostriver basin management issues, the MWR’s responsibilities are delegated in oneline of command to river basin commissions and in another line to provinces,counties and townships or cities. But many other ministries have their hand inwater management, including the ministries of Environmental Protection, Housingand Urban–Rural Development, and Agriculture. Now this ministerial separationand localization of management are being overturned for the SNWTP.

The construction phase has been managed bythe SNWTP Construction Committee chaired by the Vice Premier, and under theauspices of the State Council (Nickum, 2006Nickum,J. E. (2006). The status of the south to north water transfer plans in China.United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/james_nickum_china_water_transfer.pdf ).The committee includes representatives of line ministries – the ministers ofWater Resources and of Environmental Protection as well as the Chair of theNational Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – and of provincial-leveladministrations – the mayors of Beijing and Tianjin, and the governors ofHebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei and Shaanxi provinces (State CouncilGeneral Office, 2013State Council General Office. (2013). [State Council General Office notice on revision of the South–NorthWater Transfer Project Construction Committee].Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-07/04/content_2440461.htm ).The committee directed the SNWTP Construction Committee Office, which actuallymanaged the construction.

The institutions to manage the operationsof the project are now being stitched together, though with disagreements (Caijing,2014bCaijing.(2014b). [Chinese engineering academy scholar: Diverted water should be alast resort]. Caijing.Retrieved from http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20140707/105619627126.shtml ).The Ministry of Environmental Protection is responsible for pollution control(State Council General Office, 2014State Council General Office. (2014). [South–North Water Transfer Project water managementregulations].Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/28/content_2625325.htm ).Responsibility for deciding on the volumes to be transferred lies with the MWRand its Bureau of South–North Water Transfer Planning, Design and Management, whichshould seek final approval for allocations from the State Council (StateCouncil General Office, 2014State Council General Office. (2014). [South–North Water Transfer Project water managementregulations].Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/28/content_2625325.htm ).These decisions are intended to reflect abstractions proposed by the riverbasin commissions and water-use plans prepared by provincial and municipalgovernments. However, the 2014 regulations did not conclusively establish aspecific management unit responsible for the operation of the project, with theresult that the MWR and the SNWTP Construction Committee Office are disputingtheir roles in this decision-making (MWR General Office, 2012bMWR (Ministry of Water Resources) General Office. (2012b).[Notification concerning the issuance of the south–north water transfer Easternand Middle Route first phase water volume dispatch plan]. Retrieved from http://max.book118.com/html/2014/0205/5779368.shtm ; Caijing,2014aCaijing.(2014a). [Media: Ministry of Water Resources and SNWT office disagree on whowill run the management]. Caijing.Retrieved from http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140707/41050790_0.shtml ).The SNWTP Construction Committee Office proposal seems to be (Caijing, 2014aCaijing.(2014a). [Media: Ministry of Water Resources and SNWT office disagree on whowill run the management]. Caijing. Retrieved from http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140707/41050790_0.shtml )that in accord with the requirements of a modern enterprise system each routeshould be managed by a limited liability company, with boards of directorscomposed of representatives of investors, as the project legal personresponsible for ongoing work on the project, its operational management, loansand the value of assets, and it should operate independently in accordance withthe law. Such a management company would remove the administration of somewater from the MWR.

The second challenge is to the hierarchicaldistribution of power in China, which is also being reorganized through theproject, as the centre takes over control over land use in some regions anddetermines the prices of water in specific cities.

The NDRC has developed an economic andsocial development plan for Danjiangkou reservoir and upper reaches of the HanRiver (NDRC, 2012National Development and Reform Commission. (2012). [Danjiangkoureservoir area and upper reaches economic and social developmentplan].Retrieved from http://fyzx.ankang.gov.cn/Article/Class5/201304/1353.html ).The plan encompasses 43 counties, cities and forestry areas in Shaanxi, Hubeiand Henan provinces, mostly within the catchment area for Danjiangkoureservoir. The plan attempts to manage water quality for the SNWTP by dividingthe catchment into water-source-conservation areas where new construction isprohibited and the population resettled; ecological agricultural areas whereeconomic restructuring will take place and fertilizer and pesticide usereduced; and cluster development areas where cleaner production will bepromoted (NDRC, 2012National Development and Reform Commission. (2012). [Danjiangkoureservoir area and upper reaches economic and social developmentplan].Retrieved from http://fyzx.ankang.gov.cn/Article/Class5/201304/1353.html ).In other words, economic and social planning for these water-source areas isnow being dictated by the central government in the interests of protectingwater quality. The source areas are said to be sacrificing their own interestsand development for the project (Southern Weekend, 2013SouthernWeekend. (2013). [Is Danjiangkou ready?Dam inflowbelow Grade 5, resurgence of shipping].Southern Weekend. Retrieved from http://www.infzm.com/content/95343 ;Caijing, 2014bCaijing.(2014b). [Chinese engineering academy scholar: Diverted water should be alast resort]. Caijing.Retrieved from http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20140707/105619627126.shtml ).In addition, the State Council has approved a water pollution and soilconservation plan for Danjiangkou reservoir and its upstream areas whichincludes targets for water quality, chemical oxygen demand and soilconservation (MWR General Office, 2012aMWR (Ministry of Water Resources) General Office. (2012a). [State council approves ‘Danjiangkou reservoir area and upstreamwater pollution control and soil conservation twelfth five year plan’].Retrieved from http://www.mwr.gov.cn/slzx/slyw/201206/t20120625_325019.html ).Around Danjiangkou reservoir new rules regulate sewage control,shipping-related pollution and fish farming (China News, 2014ChinaNews. (2014). [Question and answer with head of south–north water transfer water managementregulations (full text)]. China News.Retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/02-28/5896749.shtml ).Water quality protection at Danjiangkou has become the ‘core work’ for localofficials involved in the SNWTP (Southern Weekend, 2013SouthernWeekend. (2013). [Is Danjiangkou ready?Daminflow below Grade 5, resurgence of shipping].Southern Weekend.Retrievedfrom http://www.infzm.com/content/95343 ). In effect, thecontrol of land use in a small, distant region is now a prerogative of one ofthe most important central government agencies, the NDRC. Power over land usearound the SNWTP is moving up.

The pricing of water in China is alsohighly contentious. On one side are the World Bank, Asian Development Bank(ADB) and a good proportion of the nation’s economists arguing that watershould be priced at market rates to achieve allocative efficiency. On anotherside are the local water-resource bureaus, ultimately responsible to the MWR,that supply water to farmers for irrigation; they recognize, at leastimplicitly, that farmers are already the poorest group in society and havelimited capacity to pay prices that urban users could pay. And finally thereare the municipal water authorities, again ultimately responsible to the MWR,that are caught between the needs to restrain demand and to pay forimprovements to water supply infrastructure, on the one side, and vocal urbanconsumers who protest proposals to raise prices, on the other. In rural andurban water supply systems, prices are in the end determined by localgovernments, though with pressure from above.

The price of water supplied by the SNWTP,however, is going to be centrally determined. The NDRC stipulated in 2003 thatwater projects should involve a two-part pricing system (Jiangsu Province WaterConservancy Office, 2008Jiangsu Province Water Conservancy Office. (2008). What is the two-partwater price system?Retrieved from http://www.jswater.gov.cn/art/2008/11/5/art_870_25711.html ).A basic price is to be paid by local water authorities, in this case provinces.This basic price covers the capital and overhead costs of the project – payingoff construction loans, operational management, maintenance – and is payable nomatter what volume of water is used by that province. A calculated or meteredprice is to be paid to cover running costs and allow for profit; it is chargedvolumetrically. The theoretical basis for this system was laid out in 2006. Figure3 illustrates the corresponding calculated prices for the Middle Route. TheNDRC’s initial determination of actual prices to be charged for Middle Routewater (Office of the SNWTP, 2014Office of the SNWTP.(2014). [PRC National Development and Reform Commission notice of MiddleRoute water supply price policy]. Retrieved from http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/zxdt/201501/t20150107_365955.html )is slightly lower than the basic plus calculated prices; Beijing is to pay 2.33and Tianjin 2.16 RMB/m³ rather than the basic plus calculated pricesof 2.96 and 3.03 RMB/m³, respectively (allowing for a 1% profit onthe capital costs). Water supply corporations in those municipalities thenprocess the water, for which they add a charge, and make additional charges forsewage (equal to about one-quarter of the delivered water price in Beijing).Thus, the delivered price to most Beijing consumers was raised to 5 RMB/m³in 2014 (China Daily, 2014ChinaDaily. (2014). Price full cost of water. China Daily.Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2014-04/04/content_17405783.htm ).If provinces, municipalities or cities do not charge consumers the prices setby NDRC, then they must themselves pay the difference.

Figure 3. Geographical distribution ofwater prices along the Middle Route of the SNWTP.

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In fact, local jurisdictions face not onlyrelatively high prices for the SNWTP’s water, but also they have to constructthe infrastructure of pipes, pumping stations and treatment plants needed todeliver water to consumers. These two charges, for water and itsinfrastructure, have apparently led some jurisdictions to decline to use thewater supplied by the SNWTP (Chen, 2015Chen, T. P. (2015). Cities in China’s north resist tapping water piped fromsouth. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-in-chinas-north-resist-tapping-water-piped-from-south-1429781402[Google Scholar]), for it is cheaper to continue to depletelocal groundwater resources. Centralized pricing does have its oppositions.

The SNWTP, in other words, is creating boththe need for and a space within which the horizontal and hierarchicaldistribution of power in China can be remade. Some institutions of watergovernance are being brought under the control of a body that reports directlyto the State Council and some traditionally local policy arenas (water pricingand land use) are being determined centrally. These are only a few elements ofthe complex of bodies and environmental objects that constitute the managementof water in China, but they do illustrate how an infrastructure – admittedly abig one – can require changes in the very structure of governance.Paradoxically, the fragmentation of political authority – both vertically andhorizontally – that has contributed so much to failures of earlier programmesof water conservancy and pollution control (Economy, 2004Economy, E. C. (2004). The river runs black: The environmental challenge toChina’s future. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [Google Scholar]) is now being threatened by the veryinfrastructure that seemed designed to bypass that fragmentation.

ONGOING WATER MANAGEMENT

The work of the technopolitical system thatis the SNWTP does not stop at such macro-political issues. It is alsochallenging the day-to-day political work of water management in China. Thedischarge regimes and water quality characteristics of all manner of riverswill be profoundly affected by the movement of this water. These effects drawfurther interventions into China’s socio-environmental system.

For example, the discharge of the Hanjiangdownstream of Danjiangkou reservoir will be reduced by 30% (Wong, 2011Wong, E. (2011). Plan for China’s water crisis spurs concern. New York Times.Retrievedfrom http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/world/asia/02water.html?_r=0 ),leading to threats of higher pollution intensity in a river that was consideredone of the cleanest in China (Kuo, 2014Kuo,L. (2014).China is so bad at conservation that it had to launch the mostimpressive water-pipeline project ever. Retrieved from http://journal.probeinternational.org/ )and to problems of navigation. The response to this problem is to constructanother water diversion, a 67 km canal from the Changjiang (Three GorgesReservoir) to Danjiangkou (Hornby, 2014Hornby, L. (2014). Concern mounts in China over Yangtze diversion project. ft.com.Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a39d9c7c-4fa2-11e4-a0a4-00144feab7de.html#axzz41BBN1rqA ).Meanwhile, Shaanxi is building a project to divert water from the Hanjiang, inthe Yangtze basin, to the Wei He, in the Yellow river basin (Pohlner, 2016Pohlner,H. (2016). Institutional change and the political economy of watermegaprojects: China’s South-North water transfer. Global EnvironmentalChange, 38, 205–216. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.03.015[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), permission for which seems to have beencompensation for SNWTP’s use of Shaanxi’s water (Moore, 2014aMoore, S. M. (2014a). Modernisation, authoritarianism, and the environment: Thepolitics of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. EnvironmentalPolitics, 23, 947–964. doi:10.1080/09644016.2014.943544[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]): in other words, the exclusion of Shaanxifrom use of the SNWTP water is leading to the construction of yet anotherdiversion.

The cartographic and diagrammatic accountsof the SNWTP obscure the degree to which the scheme takes water from theChangjiang and may have critical effects on its flow (Chen et al., 2013Chen, D., Webber, M., Finlayson, B., Barnett, J., Chen, Z. Y., & Wang, M.(2013). The impact of water transfers from the lower Yangtze River on watersecurity in Shanghai. Applied Geography, 45, 303–310.doi:10.1016/j.apgeog.2013.09.025[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]; Li et al., 2015Li, M., Chen, Z., Finlayson, B., Wei, T., Chen, J., Wu, X., … Wang, M. (2015).Water diversion and sea-level rise: Potential threats to freshwater supplies inthe Changjiang River estuary. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 156,52–60. doi:10.1016/j.ecss.2014.07.007[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). The visual representation of the MiddleRoute (Xinhua, 2008Xinhua.(2008).[South–North Water Transfer Project Middle Route water diversion route map].Xinhua.Retrievedfrom http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2008-05/06/content_8112198.htm )shows the water originating from Danjiangkou reservoir, and not from theHanjiang, which is a tributary of the Changjiang (Crow-Miller, 2013Crow-Miller, B. (2013).Water, power, and development in twenty-first centuryChina: The case of the South–North Water Transfer Project (Unpublisheddoctoral dissertation). University of California – Los Angeles. ). Aflow chart of the water diversions for the Eastern Route (Geng, Jiang, Fu,& Mao, 2012Geng,L. H., Jiang, B. L., Fu, K. W., & Mao, Y. J. (2012). [Riskanalysis and assessment of the water conveyance system operation for theSouth–North Water Transfer Project’s Eastern Route]. Yellow River, 34,92–95. [Google Scholar]) similarly shows the diversion beginningat canals in Jiangsu and flowing along the Grand Canal, whereas the source isin fact the Changjiang. The Changjiang does appear in some descriptions of theEastern Route, though it is said that even in extremely dry years there is‘enough water’ in the lower reaches to be pumped north (see http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/).Such representations preclude discussion of negative impacts of the diversionson the lower Changjiang, thus helping avoid claims that people and provincesmay make for compensation, or for input into the management regime.

The official line is that the project willdivert only 5% of Changjiang’s annual discharge: the negative impacts will sosmall as to almost not exist (according to head engineer Shen Feng Sheng, asreported by Kuo, 2014Kuo,L. (2014). China is so bad at conservation that it had to launch the mostimpressive water-pipeline project ever. Retrieved from http://journal.probeinternational.org/ ).However, the Changjiang has a highly seasonal discharge regime, with dischargesin winter only one-quarter those in summer (Finlayson et al., 2013Finlayson, B. L., Barnett, J., Wei, T. Y., Webber, M., Li, M. T., Wang, M.Y., … Chen, Z. Y. (2013). The drivers of risk to water security in Shanghai.RegionalEnvironmental Change, 13, 329–340. doi:10.1007/s10113-012-0334-1[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). That difference is critical. Shanghai,for a variety of reasons associated with pollution in alternative sources andthe political difficulties of negotiating access to water intakes inneighbouring provinces (Webber et al., 2015aWebber, M., Barnett, J., Chen, Z. Y., Finlayson, B., Wang, M., Chen, D., … Xu,H. (2015a). Constructing water shortages on a huge river: The case of Shanghai.GeographicalResearch, 53, 406–418. doi:10.1111/1745-5871.12132[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), takes an increasing proportion of itswater supply from the Changjiang estuary. That estuary is subject to intrusionsof salt water that threaten this supply: the SNWTP together with otherabstractions on the river raise the likelihood of intrusions that threatenShanghai’s water supply. In 1950–2014, the number of consecutive days withchlorinity ≥250 mg l⁻¹ averaged 21.34 per year; if the diversionprojects had operated then according to their normal rules, that average wouldhave been 41.20 per year. For a randomly selected year of discharge historyfrom 1950–2014, under normal operating rules the probability of an intrusionrises from 0.25 (for 30-day intrusions) or 0.05 (for 60-day intrusions) to 0.57or 0.28, respectively (Webber et al., 2015bWebber, M., Li, M. T., Chen, J., Finlayson, B., Chen, D., Chen, Z.Y., … Barnett, J. (2015b). Impact of the Three Gorges Dam, the South–NorthWater Transfer Project and water abstractions on the duration and intensity ofsalt intrusions in the Yangtze River estuary.Hydrology and Earth SystemSciences, 19, 4411–4425. doi:10.5194/hess-19-4411-2015[CrossRef], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]).

Shanghai’s water storages can hold justover 60 days’ supply and cannot treat water with chlorinity ≥250 mg l⁻¹to a potable standard. In other words, because of the abstractions of water bythe SNWTP, the likelihood is high that Shanghai is going to have to reduce itsdependence on the Changjiang – by storing and using rainfall or recycling – orit is going to have to build new infrastructure to reduce the threat thatsaline intrusions pose to its water supply (such as barrages to prevent tidalintrusions into the estuary or desalinization plants).

But not all of the newly emerging needs arefor infrastructure. The quality of water in source regions has to be protected(as at Danjiangkou) and pollution of the canals along the routes has to beprevented, otherwise ‘[w]hen water comes to Beijing, there’s the danger of thewater not being safe to drink’ (Dai Qing, quoted in Wong, 2011Wong, E. (2011). Plan for China’s water crisis spurs concern. New York Times.Retrievedfrom http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/world/asia/02water.html?_r=0 ).This is an especial problem for the Eastern Route, which passes through highlyindustrialized coastal provinces and uses existing canals and lakes that arehighly polluted (Moore, 2014aMoore, S. M. (2014a). Modernisation, authoritarianism, and the environment: Thepolitics of China’s South–North Water Transfer Project. EnvironmentalPolitics, 23, 947–964. doi:10.1080/09644016.2014.943544[Taylor & Francis Online[Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]). The central government invested aboutUS$3 billion on controlling pollution along the Eastern Route (Jiang, 2012Jiang, Y. (2012). [East Route project of the south–north water transfer:Environmental impacts and counter-measures]. Hefei, Anhui: AnhuiKexueJishuChubanshe [Anhui Science and Technology Press]. ), includingover 400 sewage-treatment plants (Wong, 2011Wong, E. (2011). Plan for China’s water crisis spurs concern. New York Times.Retrievedfrom http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/world/asia/02water.html?_r=0 ),between 2003 and 2013. Accompanying this investment has been the rhetoric of‘three firsts, three laters’: ‘first conserve then transfer water; firstcontrol pollution then let the water flow; first protect the environment andthen use water’ that former premier Zhu Rongji enunciated in 2000 (Nickum, 2006Nickum,J. E. (2006). The status of the south to north water transfer plans in China.United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/james_nickum_china_water_transfer.pdf ).Figure4 is another expression of this rhetoric.

Figure 4.Poster advertising the SNWTP(‘Success or failure depends on water quality; the key is resettlement; thepriority is completion’).

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The SNWTP is a large and complexinfrastructure. It affects the operation of all manner of existing watermanagement systems and in so doing it requires changes in those systems. Oftenin China those changes comprise the creation of additional infrastructuralschemes – barrages, desalinization plants, new diversions. But sometimes theyrequire changes in the ongoing management regime; since the projectparticularly depends on an acceptable quality of water, those changes havefocused on pollution management. The political work being done by the projectcontinues.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has developed a technopoliticalinterpretation of the SNWTP. It argued that the project embodies an officialtechnopolitical regime that privileges concrete over management,capital-intense over small-scale projects and resolves shortages rather thanpollution. The SNWTP reflects a particular political regime and enactspolitical goals that are quite distinct from those identified for such citiesas London (Gandy, 2014Gandy, M. (2014). The fabric of space: Water, modernity, and the urbanimagination. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]). Nevertheless, the project posesfundamental challenges to existing regional structures of governance (requiringwater management at a greater-than-basin scale) and power (empowering centralas compared with provincial and local governments). In this sense, the SNWTPrequires political change, too. The project also interacts with existinghydrological conditions – the material characteristics of rivers, lakes andgroundwater storages – to do environmental work: it promises continuingdetrimental environmental impacts in source regions. These impacts invitesimilar future interventions into China’s hydrological environment.

In other words, the SNWTP embodies atechnopolitics in the sense of Hecht (2001Hecht, G. (2001). Technology, politics, and national identity in France.In M.T. Allen & G. Hecht (Eds.), Technologies of power (pp. 253–294).Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Google Scholar]): it constitutes, embodies or enactspolitical goals. It is a hybrid of technology and politics. However, theproject has political and environmental consequences that appear to have beenincidental to the original planning: like the Three Gorges Dam before it(Webber, 2012Webber, M. (2012). Making capitalism in rural China. Cheltenham: Elgar.[CrossRef], [Google Scholar]), the SNWTP does political andhydrological work, remaking the geography of water, pollution, authority,production and people into the future rather than simply reflecting thepresent. Huge infrastructure projects not only represent the state of relationsbetween society and environment, but also they require and set in motionchanges in those relations. This is not a Chinese way of being technopolitical;rather it is a technopolitics within the particular political and environmentalcontexts of China.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful to Jon Barnett,George Lin and Sophie Webber for comments made on earlier versions of thepaper.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest wasreported by the authors.

REFERENCES

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