Fangyin,Zhou. “Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s SouthChina Sea Policy.” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 869–90.

  

Abstract

Since 2010, there has been obviousescalation of tensions in the South China Sea, coinciding with China's rise andthe United States’ ‘pivot’ to Asia. Has China become more aggressive in itsapproach to the South China Sea? What strategic goal is China is pursuing inthis area? Where does the South China Sea rank in China's overall foreignpolicy agenda? This article addresses these issues from the Chinese perspective. In the first part, the article discusses China'schanging strategy and the leadership's thinking behind the changes. In thesecond part, it examines in detail several incidents involving China in theSouth China Sea, including confrontations with the Philippines over ScarboroughShoal and the Second Thomas Shoal and China's more recent land reclamation. Thearticle argues that China's strategic goal in the South China Sea is arelatively modest one. The South China Sea disputes do not rank particularlyhighly among China's strategic priorities. To a great extent the handling ofthese issues is also subject to the dynamics of the overall relationshipbetween China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Since 2010 the situation in the South ChinaSea, which had been calm during the post-Cold War era, has become more volatile.This has happened in the context of China's rapid rise and the US ‘pivot’ toAsia. The state of affairs in the South China Sea has been affected by a rangeof factors, including the transformation of regional power structures, thecognitive adjustments made by the countries involved, and the strategic choicesmade by powers outside the region in deciding how to deal with the changingregional power structure. Not surprisingly, China's South China Sea policy hasbeen subject to close international scrutiny; in particular, its assertivebehaviour has become a fertile source of controversy and has been muchcriticized. What are China's strategic objectives in dealing with theterritorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea? Is China attempting tomaximize its power, and to gain as much de facto control over the islands aspossible? Is China's changing South China Sea policy opportunistic behaviour,aimed at establishing regional dominance at a time when it believes there isleast likelihood of resistance from the neighbouring countries concerned? Or isChina trying to defend its sovereign rights and national interests withoutjeopardizing stability in the area?

This article addresses these questions froman inside-out perspective; that is, it seeks to bring internal Chinese debatesand views about China's strategic goals and policy options to bear on thecurrent debates, and thereby to shed light on hotly debated topics with regardto the controversial Chinese policies towards the South China Sea disputes. Therest of the article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses thecontentious topic of China's strategic goals in the South China Sea. The secondpart traces the changing Chinese approaches to the South China Sea disputes.The third part provides an empirical and analytical examination of four casesof Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea disputes. The central argument ofthe article is that China has limited strategic goals in the South China Sea.Its changing approaches to the territorial and maritime disputes in this areaare conditioned by and contingent on its national grand strategic goal ofrejuvenating the Chinese nation; the US pivot to Asia; rising nationalism inChina; and the interactions between China and other claimants in the SouthChina Sea disputes, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. Whereas it isarguably true that Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea has become moreproactive and assertive in some instances, there are also noteworthy caseswhere the Chinese government has exercised considerable self-restraint. Allthis calls for a more nuanced understanding of the intricacy of China's SouthChina Sea policy than is commonly expressed in the existing literature.

China's strategic goals in the SouthChina Sea

In order to develop a better understandingof China's strategic thinking and policy choices in regard to the South ChinaSea disputes, we must first clarify two things. The first is what China istrying to achieve, in other words its strategic goal, in dealing with thesematters; the second is what measures and approaches the Chinese governmentbelieves to be the most effective in pursuing this goal. Once these two thingshave been established, it will then become possible to evaluate the availablepolicy options for the Chinese government and why and how a particular courseof action has been taken in a specific political context. An examination ofChinese foreign policy considerations on these lines promises to yield moreuseful insights than an approach that asks simply whether or not Chinesediplomacy has become more assertive (or aggressive), or whether or not China'sintentions have changed.

China's strategic goal in dealing with theSouth China Sea territorial and maritime disputes is determined in part by itsoverall diplomatic aims and how the South China Sea fits into this largerpicture, and in part by how China reads the changing international environmentand its room for manoeuvre in determining policy on this issue. These factors,of course, are not static, but are constantly evolving. An analysis of China'schanging approaches to the South China Sea disputes can yield at best only asuperficial interpretation if it does not take into consideration both theevolution in Chinese diplomatic strategy and policy thinking and the shiftinglocus of these disputes on the Chinese foreign policy agenda.

Outside observers considering only theimmediately apparent manifestations of policy are likely to conclude that Chinahas become more assertive in its approaches to the South China Sea territorialand maritime disputes.1 However, this interpretation overlooks theintricacy, some might say inconsistency, of Chinese behaviour in regard tothese disputes. For example, while China gained de facto control over theScarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao) from the Philippines by adopting a proactiveapproach—considered successful by many Chinese analysts2—it did not replicate this approach in dealing withthe Second Thomas Shoal (Ren'ai Jiao) or other disputed islands. As another example,in July 2014 China called a halt to the operations of the Haiyang Shiyou 981drilling platform in the South China Sea, even though in Beijing's view theoperations were taking place in waters not under dispute. On the other hand,for over a year it has insisted on continuing land reclamation on a large scaleon some islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Moreover, while Chinaestablished an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea on23 November 2013, it has been very cautious about establishing an ADIZ in theSouth China Sea. Claims of increasing Chinese assertiveness cannot explain thisseemingly paradoxical behaviour. To arrive at a more accurate understanding ofthis apparent inconsistency, it is necessary to take into account the broaderdebate within China about whether higher priority should be given in nationalforeign policy to defending sovereign and maritime rights or to maintainingregional stability in the South China Sea, and whether Chinese foreign policyis to move decisively from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving forachievement’.3

Since the introduction in 1978 of thereform agenda, with its new openness to the wider world, the goal of China'sdiplomatic work has been to secure a peaceful and favourable internationalenvironment for economic development. The result of this policy of ‘diplomacyserving the economy’ has been that China has usually chosen to refrain fromassertive pursuit of its own interests with a view to maintaining peace andstability and preventing any deterioration in its international environment.4 This approach to foreign policy has often beenreferred to as ‘keeping a low profile’.5 After 2010, with the rapid increase in China'seconomic power and growing concern and vigilance in the United States aboutChina's rise, the policy of keeping a low profile became markedly lesseffective.6 China's confrontations over territorial disputes inthe South China Sea with other claimants, notably the Philippines and Vietnam,have not only prompted the adjustment (arguably even the abandonment) of thispolicy, but also reflect and put to the test a more proactive foreign policyapproach.

Against the background of an increasinglyinflamed situation in the South China Sea, two top-level diplomatic workconferences were held by the Chinese government in successive years: thePeripheral Diplomacy Work Conference on 24–25 October 2013,7 and the Central Conference on Work Relating toForeign Affairs on 28–29 November 2014.8 All members of the Standing Committee of the ChineseCommunist Party's Politburo attended both meetings, which are the highest-levelwork conferences on foreign policy to have been held by the Party CentralCommittee since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. One of the maintasks of these conferences was to further clarify the strategic goals and basicprinciples of Chinese foreign policy for the next decade or so. It is worthnoting that the South China Sea is not mentioned in the public documents thatemerged from the two conferences, which suggests that these disputes are not atthe top of China's foreign policy agenda. While there is no doubt that theSouth China Sea disputes are real challenges to Chinese foreign policy, it isalso clear that there are many other important foreign policy objectives thatthe current Chinese government is trying to pursue. In 2012, the notion of‘building China into a maritime power’ was introduced in the 18th PartyCongress report. Although this is a clear sign of the growing importance of themaritime domain in China's pursuit of Great Power status, ‘maritime power’covers a whole array of maritime issues, of which maritime security is justone.9 The point worth reiterating is that the importanceof the South China Sea disputes must be evaluated within the framework ofChina's overall strategic and foreign policy goals rather than inferred from anarrow interpretation based on examination of particular actions taken by Chinain respect of these disputes.10

According to the documents publishedfollowing the two top-level conferences on foreign policy mentioned above, thefundamental goal of Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade is to serve thegreat rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which is how China's rise is referredto within the Chinese context. As China's rise is a complicated and multidimensionalprocess, political and social stability within the country, and the sustainedand steady upgrading of its comprehensive national power, are both and at thesame time part of, and important prerequisites for, this process. Foreignpolicy is to serve this grand strategic goal. It is in this context that theSouth China Sea disputes can be ranked in the hierarchy of Chinese foreignpolicy considerations.

The first point to make is that, althoughin practical terms the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes areimportant, their status may fluctuate significantly within the bigger picturefor Chinese diplomacy. If China and the other countries in question were ableto shelve the disputes, the issue would slip to a low rank on China's foreign policyagenda. By the same token, if the disputes threatened to provoke militaryconflict, and thereby to affect the stability of the overall neighbourhoodenvironment—particularly if they were to influence the development of China'srelations with other major powers, above all the United States—they would moverapidly up to the top of the Chinese foreign policy agenda. Were this tohappen, China would lose flexibility in the policy options available, and itschoices would be dominated by other considerations. The same is true of otherparties involved in the disputes.

The second point to make is that differentapproaches to protecting China's interests in the South China Sea will havedifferent effects on its interests in other spheres, meaning that Beijing's attitudein dealing with the South China Sea disputes can have an impact on theachievement of other diplomatic goals. It is generally accepted in the Chinesedebates that if China were to adopt a restrained and moderate policy on thisissue for a considerable length of time, this could prompt certain countries tobecome more demanding in their relations with China. Restraint and moderationcould thus lead to direct damage to China's national interests, while at thesame time stimulating a rise in nationalism at home, making a moderate approachultimately unsustainable. If, on the other hand, China were to adoptconsistently tough, aggressive policies, this could not only elicit strongpolicy reactions from countries including the United States, the Philippinesand Vietnam, but also engender widespread misgivings among other countries insouth-east Asia and elsewhere in China's neighbourhood, prompting them toquestion Chinese intentions. As China enters a period of transition in itsforeign policy, it must adopt a combination of tough and soft measures. For aninternational community that has become accustomed to China's keeping a lowprofile in its foreign policy, it is only natural that this would cause somelevel of discomfort. The widespread claims about Chinese assertiveness must beunderstood in this context. China has not simply become more assertive in itsdiplomacy, nor does offensive realism have a compelling logic in explainingChinese behaviour.

Between 2011 and 2014, Chinese foreignpolicy went through an overall transition from ‘keeping a low profile’ to‘striving for achievement’.11 It can be argued that during this period, thestatus and ranking of the South China Sea disputes on the Chinese foreignpolicy agenda underwent a pronounced change. From 2012 to the first half of2014, the Chinese government was exploring the approach of ‘striving forachievement’, in part by testing it out in its handling of the South China Seadisputes. China's changing approach towards the South China Sea disputes,therefore, reflects a process of learning and accumulating experience inpursuing its new diplomatic line of ‘striving for achievement’.

By the second half of 2014, the developmentof the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative and preparations for setting up theAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were entering a critical stage.12 In this context, a proactive approach to dealingwith the South China Sea disputes seemed unlikely to secure many substantivebenefits, while also—and perhaps most importantly—promising no fundamentalsolution of the issues at stake, and possibly having a negative impact onother, higher-priority, diplomatic goals. In other words, a gain in one areamight be secured at the cost of a bigger loss in another. In this sense,adjustments to the direction of Chinese diplomacy at a macro level change theframe of reference for calculating cost and benefits.

China's changing strategic thinkingabout the South China Sea disputes

Not only has the status of the South ChinaSea in the bigger picture of Chinese diplomacy shifted; China's strategicthinking on dealing with these issues has also been adjusted since 2010,especially in terms of what is the most appropriate way of realizing thenation's broad strategic goals. The shift from keeping a low profile tostriving for achievement involves important adjustments to the policy andmeasures adopted by China in its foreign policy.

Broadly speaking, the change in thestrategic thinking behind the Chinese approach to dealing with the South ChinaSea disputes has gone through a series of stages.13 During the first stage, China adopted a principledpolicy of shelving disputes and seeking common development (gezhizhengyi,gongtongkaifa). This policy, which was guided by the principle of keeping alow profile, worked well for some time and helped China to maintain friendlyrelations with the ASEAN countries, although in the latter part of this firststage it became increasingly difficult to sustain.14 Nevertheless, the Chinese government generally keptto this line, drawing on economic cooperation and diplomatic dialogue to easethe rising tensions and to maintain overall stability.

In the second stage, as regional tensionsrose, the Chinese government realized that the policy based on keeping a lowprofile was becoming less effective and could not calm tensions in the SouthChina Sea. In this context, a debate emerged as to whether the priority indealing with the South China Sea disputes should be to ‘defend [China's]sovereign rights’ or ‘maintain regional stability’. Academic discussiondeepened the understanding of the relationship between the two, and a generalconsensus was reached that China should not allow its essential sovereignrights to be compromised for the sake of maintaining regional stability. It wasalso generally agreed that there was no simple and quick fix that would resolvethe matter: striving to reconcile the two aims in practice would be a long andtortuous process.15 Similarly, the government departments concernedunderwent a cognitive shift from the presumption that regional stability was ofthe highest importance to prioritizing the defence of China's sovereign rights,or at least to a realization that equal importance should be placed on both inpolicy-making.16 At the same time there was a surge in nationalismin China, prompted by the South China Sea disputes.17 Against this background, China's South China Seapolicy gradually began to become more proactive and assertive. This trend wasreflected in the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012, during which China took arobust approach towards the Philippines and gained full de facto control of theshoal.

China's successful assertive approach tothe Scarborough Shoal standoff, which ushered in the third stage, had twoimportant implications. First, China realized that it had the necessarycapacity to attain further such successes. Second, ordinary Chinese citizenscame to believe that their government would not easily give up nationalinterests, and the upsurge in nationalist sentiment dissipated somewhat as aresult.18 These two factors have had a transformative effecton the Chinese government's approach to dealing with the South China Seadisputes, giving it more confidence in taking initiatives to deal with thosedisputes and consequently a wider choice of policy options. In the wake of theScarborough Shoal standoff, the Chinese government chose a delicately balancedcombination of assertiveness and self-restraint in dealing with the South ChinaSea disputes. The basic idea behind this stage has been that China could drawon a variety of methods short of military force to explore possible ways tostabilize the situation and ease tensions in the South China Sea, while beingprepared to use force, if necessary, as a means of persuasion.19

During the fourth stage, with thepromulgation of the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative and the preparations forthe establishment of the AIIB, the focus of Chinese diplomacy shifted todevelopment issues in the countries surrounding China, giving regionaldevelopment precedence over, or at least making it of commensurate importancewith, traditional security issues. Regional development is an area in whichChina has a clear comparative advantage. During this stage, China has becomemore restrained in its approach towards the South China Sea disputes, but thishas not stopped it from steadily working to enhance its physical presence inthe areas under its effective control. This intention is highlighted by China'slarge-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea between 2014 and 2015. Landreclamation, it should be noted, is a practice that has already been commonlyused by other claimants, notably the Philippines and Vietnam, in the SouthChina Sea. The difference is that China has been doing it on a much largerscale over a much shorter period of time, evoking strong opposition from otherregional countries and from the United States. It is still too early to see howthis shift will affect the situation in the South China Sea.

Several important points can be drawn fromthis outline of China's changing strategic thinking in dealing with the SouthChina Sea territorial and maritime disputes. First, the changes in Chineseforeign policy towards these disputes have occurred in the context of the USpivot to Asia, rising tensions in the South China Sea, and China's own rapidlyincreasing power and capacity. China's policy shift has not come about as aresult of the wishes of any particular leader, but can instead be seen as acontingent development. More specifically, having long been guided by theprinciple of keeping a low profile, Chinese diplomacy needs to go through aperiod of ‘becoming assertive’ in order to establish the level of deterrencenecessary for China to be in a position to defend its sovereign rights andnational interests in the South China Sea. The Chinese government has learned fromexperience that during a process of conflict and confrontation, a unilateralpolicy of moderation will not achieve stability, and may even whet the appetiteof the other side. As the situation in the South China Sea has becomeincreasingly heated, Chinese government and academic circles have graduallycome to understand that although China hopes to maintain peace and stabilitythere, this goal cannot be achieved simply by adopting a consistently moderateapproach, or only by applying self-restraint in its diplomacy. The policy ofself-restraint may instead encourage some countries to be more demanding intheir relations with China.

Second, although Chinese foreign policyduring this period of transition has become more assertive, assertivenessitself is neither the goal nor an inherent characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.The priority of Chinese foreign policy in the short term is to keep thesituation in the South China Sea under control and to contain the escalatingprovocations of certain neighbouring countries in defence of its own nationalinterests. During this process, China has attempted to establish necessary andreliable deterrence of a kind likely to have only a very limited negativeimpact on regional stability.20 What is important for China is not to provoke anyphysical confrontation with the claimants in question, but to change theexpectations of those claimants about how China will behave in a givensituation, making sure that they fully understand China's firmness of purposeand resolve to defend its fundamental rights and interests. This can beachieved through adopting an approach that is consistent and reasonable and atthe same time firm and assertive. In order to achieve this aim, in the shortterm, rather than worrying about being perceived as too ‘tough’ and‘assertive’, China should avoid being seen as ‘not tough enough’, because thatcould undermine all previous efforts it has made to establish a credibledeterrence.

Our focus of attention during this processshould be the scale of China's actions to defend its sovereign rights. ThoughChina has more recently adopted a firmer approach to defending its sovereignrights and interests, it has been careful to avoid resorting to militarymeasures or using simplistic and heavy-handed means in doing so. In otherwords, China is attempting to defend its rights without compromising regionalstability, and to become more sophisticated in its use of different techniquesto achieve this goal, even though it has clearly developed a stronger capacityto withstand external pressure.

By the middle of 2014, China had alreadyachieved a certain level of success in this respect.21 A major reflection of this initial success is thatJapan, the Philippines and Vietnam have all stopped taking provocative measuresto escalate their physical confrontation with China over the Diaoyu/SenkakuIslands and in the South China Sea.22 From this point, without compromising the necessarydeterrence it has managed to establish, the Chinese government has been tryingto demonstrate a certain amount of flexibility over the issues in the SouthChina Sea. An important indication of this flexibility can be found in theadvocacy of ‘dual track thinking’, an expression first used by Wang Yi, China'sForeign Minister, on 9 August 2014. According to Wang, this means, first, thatany relevant dispute should be addressed by the countries directly concernedthrough friendly talks and negotiations to find a peaceful solution; andsecond, that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointlymaintained by China and the ASEAN countries.23 This formulation shows that China does not rule outthe idea of drawing on multilateral cooperation to solve the South China Seadisputes, and that it is not opposed to the establishment of regional rules andnorms. Even in a context where China clearly has a power advantage, it is notattempting to impose its will by assertion.24

Since 2012, China's behaviour in dealingwith issues in the South China Sea has remained relatively consistent. In itsinteractions with south-east Asian countries, it has demonstrated a high levelof strategic patience, and its use of strategic measures in handling specificissues has become more flexible and effective. Today, China's policy on theSouth China Sea disputes is more proactive and confident than it has been inthe past. It is largely implemented according to China's own strategic designand thinking, and is not easily influenced by international opinion or externalpressure.

An analysis of four specific cases

As noted above, there have been twoimportant shifts in China's approach to dealing with the South China Seadisputes. The first is the shift from a moderate and principled policy ofself-restraint to a more proactive and assertive approach with the aim ofdeterring other countries from further provocations and escalation. This shiftcan best be seen in the way China approached the Scarborough Shoal standoff of2012. The second shift took place when, having established what it believes tobe an effective level of deterrence, the Chinese government began to show moreflexibility and to explore the feasibility of different solutions of the SouthChina Sea disputes. This section of the article analyses four cases in whichthe Chinese government has taken different approaches to the South China Seadisputes to illustrate these two important shifts and thereby contributetowards a better understanding of China's South China Sea policy in practice.

From the Scarborough Shoal to the SecondThomas Shoal: seeking de facto control

The Scarborough Shoal is the only island inthe Macclesfield Bank (ZhongshaQundao) that is visible above water. In 1978 thePhilippines announced its intention to establish an exclusive economic zone toa distance of 200 nautical miles and attempted to include the Scarborough Shoalwithin this zone. From May 1997 onwards the Philippines strengthened itssurveillance over the shoal and sent naval vessels to patrol and monitor thesurrounding waters. In November 1999 the Philippines tried to occupy the shoalby grounding a naval vessel there, but under diplomatic pressure from Chinatowed the vessel away later that month.25 Earlier that year, in May, the Philippines had usedthe pretext of a grounded naval vessel on the Second Thomas Shoal to stationsoldiers there in an attempt to gain de facto control over it.

In April 2012, twelve Chinese fishing boatsworking in the lagoon by the Scarborough Shoal had their path blocked and weredetained by the Philippine naval frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar (thePhilippines' largest naval ship). On hearing what had happened, the No. 84 andNo. 75 vessels of the China Marine Surveillance, which were on regular patrolnearby at the time, rushed to the scene and stopped the Philippine navalfrigate from detaining the Chinese fishing vessels and fishermen. Followingthis incident, both countries replaced and increased the number of vessels theyheld in the area to defend their rights in this part of the sea, creating theconditions for the eventual standoff between the two countries. On 11 May 2012,several hundred Filipino protesters gathered in front of the Chinese Embassy inManila to demand that Chinese ships be withdrawn from the Scarborough Shoal.26 On the same day, a number of Chinese people alsoprotested outside the Philippines' Embassy in Beijing.27

On 13 May, the Nanhai (South China Sea)Fishery Bureau under China's Ministry of Agriculture announced that the summerfishing off-season would begin in most parts of the South China Sea at 12 noonon 16 May and would last for two and a half months. The waters of theScarborough Shoal fall within the controlled area where this regular seasonalban on fishing takes effect.28 The Philippines did not recognize the Chinesefishing ban and instead imposed its own, which was to last from 16 May to 15July.29 On 18 June, the Philippine ships were evacuatedfrom the Scarborough Shoal owing to a typhoon in the area; but a large numberof Chinese ships remained in the waters adjacent to the shoal. On the same day,Hong Lei, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, stated that China wouldcontinue its administration of and guard over the waters around Huangyan Island(the Chinese name for the Scarborough Shoal).30 At this point, the standoff between the two sidesover the shoal had come to a provisional conclusion, with China in de factocontrol. On 1 January 2013, this was recognized as a lasting outcome when theDepartment of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines acknowledged that China hadcome to effectively control the Scarborough Shoal and expressed the belief thatChinese ships would be a permanent presence there.31

The standoff over the Scarborough Shoalbetween April and June 2012 was a key development in the South China Sea. Theinitial incident that triggered the confrontation was, to all intents andpurposes, a chance occurrence, but it was also a clear demonstration of China'smore proactive approach to defending its sovereign rights in the South ChinaSea. If China had taken a less assertive approach in the same scenario (thePhilippine military frigate detaining the Chinese fishing boats, and theChinese patrol boats making their timely arrival at the scene), the outcomewould have been different: the Chinese fishermen would have been protected, butwithout prompting a large-scale and long-lasting standoff at sea. The coursethe episode actually took arguably resulted from a number of misjudgements onthe part of the Philippines: about China's determination to defend itssovereign rights, about the adjustment of Chinese policy towards the SouthChina Sea, and about what support would be forthcoming from the United Statesin such confrontations.32 These misjudgements led the Philippines to provokea confrontation at sea with insufficient material capacity to compete withChina in this area, getting itself into a standoff which it could neither winnor sustain, with the eventual result of China's obtaining de facto controlover the Scarborough Shoal.

The Scarborough Shoal standoff and itsfinal outcome have had an important impact on subsequent confrontations andconflicts between China and the Philippines and Vietnam over other South ChinaSea islands and reefs. The capacity and resolve demonstrated by China duringthis incident have helped it to establish a certain level of deterrence, andhave had a significant impact on the expectations of the Philippines andVietnam with respect to the way it will behave, making them more cautious aboutchallenging Chinese territorial claims and maritime rights in the South ChinaSea. In this sense, the tense standoff over the Scarborough Shoal has actuallyhelped to ease the intensity of conflicts between the countries concerned overdisputes in the South China Sea.

There are two other questions worthexploring here. The first is why China has begun to adopt a more assertiveapproach to protecting its sovereign claims and interests in the South ChinaSea. There are several dimensions of this question to consider. First, China'sreactive and passive approach to defending its rights in this area had been acause of great discontent among the Chinese public. If China had failed toadopt a firmer and more assertive approach fairly quickly on this occasion,such discontent would have rapidly mounted. It is worth noting that perceptionsinside and outside China were in sharp contrast at this time. Whereas peoplewithin China believed that the behaviour of their government was still too weakin its approach to the South China Sea dispute, many observers outside thecountry took the view that China was already becoming more and more assertive.It was in this context that the PLA daily (Jiefangjunbao), the officialpublication of the People's Liberation Army, published an article that went outof its way to explain to a domestic audience that the Chinese government'sdecision to send marine surveillance ships to patrol the areas in questionrather than to retaliate by using warships was a manifestation ofself-restraint, not of weakness.33 There was also an op-ed in the People's Dailyoverseas edition on 8 May, as the confrontation was still going on, whichstated that the Philippines should not regard China's goodwill as weakness andthat if China reached the point where it felt it could no longer tolerate thesituation, there was no need for it to continue to do so.34 The main domestic pressure faced by the Chinesegovernment was to keep a realistic balance between rising nationalist sentimentand practical capabilities for action in the South China Sea.35

Second, after many years of development,the number and quality of China's marine surveillance ships have markedlyimproved. China's awareness about law enforcement at sea has also beensignificantly strengthened. This leaves China both physically andpsychologically better prepared for confrontation at sea. Take, for example,the two marine surveillance ships that were first on the scene where the Chinesefishing boats were being detained by the Philippine naval frigate. Ship No. 75,weighing in at 1,290 tonnes and with a range of 5,000 nautical miles, joinedthe ranks of the Nanhai Corps of China's Marine Surveillance in October 2010;Ship No. 84 (1,500 tonnes), which joined the corps in May 2011, was a new styleof vessel, one of the seven built during the second stage of a State OceanicAdministration project to build up China's air and sea capacity for marinesurveillance.

Third, developments in the South China Seasince 2009 have convinced more and more Chinese analysts and scholars that ithas become increasingly unrealistic to expect making unilateral concessions tocalm the situation or ease tensions in the South China Sea, and that such an approachmight in fact lead only to greater damage to Chinese sovereign rights andnational interests and trap China in an even more unfavourable position.Instead, they argue, China should show sufficient resolve to force thePhilippines and Vietnam back to the path of negotiation.36 There is at the same time a clear understandingthat in the short term it will not be possible to reach a fundamental solutionto the disputes in the South China Sea. Chinese policy has to serve a dualpurpose, that is, effectively defending China's sovereign rights and interestswhile seeking to establish long-term stability in the region. China needs,therefore, to establish credible deterrence in order to forestall opportunisticaction by other countries in the South China Sea.

The second question worth examining iswhether China will repeat the approach it adopted in dealing with theScarborough Shoal standoff by using its material power advantage to gaingreater de facto control over other South China Sea reefs in dispute. Though itwould be unwise to jump to conclusions prematurely, developments so far seem toindicate that China does not have any clear or strong intentions of doing so.The friction between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoaloffers a valuable case-study through which to examine this question.

After March 2013, China stepped up itspatrols around the Second Thomas Shoal, and during the first two weeks of Maythe struggle between China and the Philippines for control over the shoalescalated, with both sides sending a number of naval vessels to these waters.Three Philippine warships attempted to carry provisions and concrete to theSecond Thomas Shoal to reinforce the Philippine ship that had long beenstranded there, although in the end these plans were cancelled because Chinesenaval vessels were on patrol nearby. On 27 May Abigail Valt, deputypresidential spokesperson of the Philippines, stated in a media interview thatthe Philippines would not respond to any form of provocative behaviour andwould not take any action to exacerbate tensions.37 This policy stance on the part of the Philippinesreflected the country's calculations about the likely outcome of any futureconfrontation between the two sides, which had changed markedly since thebeginning of the Scarborough Shoal standoff. This shows that China didestablish a certain degree of deterrence through its approach to theScarborough Shoal standoff.

On 19 June, with Chinese naval vesselspresent, the Philippines completed the rotation of its marines stationed at theSecond Thomas Shoal and the delivery of logistical supplies.38 From this point, the tensions over the SecondThomas Shoal eased. Yet this new state of relative calm was inherentlyunstable, and there was a lack of clarity about who had what rights when itcame to the Second Thomas Shoal. China and the Philippines asserted theirpresence in the area in different ways. The Philippines, as noted above, hashad personnel stationed longterm in the tank landing ship stranded on theshoal, while China's marine surveillance ships have regularly patrolled thearea nearby. This state of affairs is not satisfactory to either side, and soeach country has used various means in an attempt to strengthen its ownposition while weakening that of the other.

On 29 March 2014, the Philippines sent acivil fishing boat to the Second Thomas Shoal with replacement troops andsupplies. The boat met with a vessel belonging to the Chinese coastguard in thewaters nearby and a standoff lasting two hours ensued. Then the Philippinefishing boat took advantage of its shallow drift to enter the shoal, which theChinese vessel was unable to enter, and was able to successfully complete thetroop rotation and delivery of supplies. The Philippines had invited a numberof western journalists to witness the move in order to put pressure on theChinese coastguard. The next day, the Department of Foreign Affairs of thePhilippines made a statement announcing that its government had submitted amemorandum to the Arbitral Tribunal that is hearing the case it brought againstthe PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) inJanuary 2013.39

If we compare China's approach to thisincident with its behaviour during the Scarborough Shoal standoff, we can seethat China practised self-restraint in the Second Thomas Shoal episode. Themost obvious difference is that although Chinese vessels continued to patrolthe waters around the shoal, China tacitly acknowledged the Philippine presenceon the shoal instead of striving for exclusive de facto control, as it had doneover the Scarborough Shoal. This was in spite of the fact that China's materialcapability would have allowed it to adopt stronger measures. For example, Chinadid not choose to tow the grounded Philippine ship away, which would have beenthe most direct way of dealing with the issue.

At this point we may make the logicalinference that China's desire to gain exclusive de facto control over theSecond Thomas Shoal is not strong enough to warrant more assertive action.There are several probable reasons for this. First, the South China Seadisputes are only one of many problems that China faces in the process of itsrise; and, although these disputes do pose a serious question as to how Chinawill protect its own national interests in the long term, they do notconstitute a core issue. Relations between China and ASEAN have to be takeninto consideration, which means that China will not try to strengthen itscontrol over islands and reefs in the South China Sea at any cost. Second, evenif China were to adopt a strong approach and gain de facto control over theSecond Thomas Shoal, this would afford only a very limited improvement inChina's overall strategic position in the South China Sea, and only at apotentially high cost in terms of a serious setback in relations between Chinaand many south-east Asian countries. Had China adopted a more assertiveapproach to the Second Thomas Shoal dispute, it would have risked giving theimpression to the outside world that it would keep moving from one reef to thenext in an attempt to extend its control over the entire South China Sea. Thiswould in turn generate widespread anxiety and a sense of hostility towardsChina among the countries of south-east Asia and even more broadly among otherneighbouring countries. This kind of feeling is easy to arouse but hard toquell, and would be unfavourable for China's rise. Third, the Chinesegovernment clearly recognizes that the disputes over territories and rights inthe South China Sea will take a long time to resolve definitively, and thatthere is no quick fix that can offer a fundamental solution.40 Gaining control over the Second Thomas Shoal wouldnot necessarily be helpful with a view to a long-term solution, particularly asthis could push the South China Sea disputes further down a path towardsconfrontation and thus reduce the chances of finding a solution throughpeaceful negotiation. This is not something that China wants to happen.

The pace with which China is gaining defacto control over islands and reefs in the South China Sea has slowed to avirtual halt since the Second Thomas Shoal dispute. But this does not in anyway mean that China has softened its resolve on the issue of sovereignty. Chinahas been pursuing relatively modest medium-term goals and is seeking to gainthe initiative in the disputes, while managing any short-term conflictseffectively, as may be seen in the two cases analysed below.

The Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig and landreclamation in the South China Sea: aggressive China in action?

The Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig (HYSY-981)is China's first domestically designed and built sixth-generation deep-watersemi-submersible drilling platform. Its construction began on 28 April 2008 andwas completed in May 2011.41 On 2 May 2014, the drilling platform was moved tothe waters south of Triton Island (Zhongjian Dao) in the Paracel Islands(XishaQundao) to explore and drill for oil and gas. The operations of theplatform were to be split into two phases, with the second beginning on 27 May2014. The two areas designated for the operations were around 17 nautical milesfrom Triton Island and the baseline of the territorial sea of the Paracels, andabout 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam's continental shelf.

As Vietnam also claims sovereignty over theParacel Islands (known as the HoàngSa Islands in Vietnamese) and the operationswere to take place in the waters surrounding them, Vietnam sent a large numberof boats, including armed vessels, to disrupt the drilling work, and rammed theChinese public service vessels sent to escort and safeguard the platform.Vietnam also sent underwater agents to cause blockages and interfere with thedrilling by dumping fishing nets and other debris. By 5 p.m. local time on 7June 2014, at the peak of their activity, there were as many as 63 Vietnamesevessels at the scene, and the ships had broken into the precautionary areadelimited by China and rammed Chinese public service vessels as many as 1,416times.42 While this was going on, back in Vietnamlarge-scale anti-Chinese demonstrations were gaining momentum. In mid-May,thousands of Vietnamese nationals attacked, smashed, looted and set fire toChinese and other foreign-owned enterprises in Vietnam, killing four Chinesenationals and injuring over 300, and causing significant financial loss forChinese invested enterprises. By June, Sino-Vietnamese tensions had reachedboiling point.

On 15 July, the HYSY-981 drilling platformended its operations near the Paracel Islands and the maritime standoff betweenChina and Vietnam gradually eased. Five days prior to this, on 10 July, theUnited States Senate had passed Resolution No. 412 on the territorialsovereignty dispute in the Asia–Pacific, calling on China to withdraw thedrilling platform and associated maritime forces, and restore the status quo asit had existed before 1 May 2014.43 The coincidence between the timing of theresolution and the removal of the drilling platform, particularly given thatits operations had lasted only 73 days instead of the planned 100 days beforemoving to another area, led some in the international media to conclude thatthe drilling platform had been withdrawn as a result of pressure from the UnitedStates.

However, this explanation does not seem tostand up when examined in the light of the facts. First, if China had wantedto, it could have continued drilling in the area for the whole 100 days asplanned and moved the drilling platform on 11 August. This would have presentedno problem for China in terms of its ability to deal with maritimeconfrontation, as is clearly evident from the fact that the drilling platformhad already been operating for 73 days with constant Vietnamese attempts at obstructionand interference. Second, if we consider how China has behaved in similarcircumstances on other occasions, it is clear that it would be unusual for itto succumb to US pressure, especially over so sensitive an issue as that ofnational sovereignty. In any case, the pressure on China actually created bythe Senate resolution was limited. On 16 July, a spokesman from the ChineseMinistry of Foreign Affairs stated that the operations of HYSY-981 were‘entirely a matter that falls within the scope of China's sovereignty. Thechange in location of the 981 Platform is related to the enterprise's plans forits operations and has nothing to do with any external factors.’44 This was not merely diplomatic rhetoric. A few daysbefore, on 11 July, at a seminar held by the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies in Washington, Michael Fuchs, Deputy Assistant Secretaryof the US State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, urgedthat all claimants in the South China Sea stop establishing new outposts,refrain from seizing features that another claimant has occupied, ‘freeze’alterations that ‘fundamentally change the nature, size, or capabilities of thepresence of the reefs’ and ‘refrain from unilateral enforcement measuresagainst other claimants’ long-standing economic activities that have beentaking place in disputed areas’.45 China paid no heed to these recommendations and,throughout the latter half of 2014, continued its large-scale land reclamationin the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, the removal of the HYSY-981drilling platform ahead of schedule is significant. There are several possiblereasons for the relocation. First, from the operational perspective, HYSY-981had already successfully completed its drilling operations near Triton Islandand was therefore free to begin work on other tasks at a different location. AsSuper Typhoon Rammasun was expected in the area, relocating at this time seemsto have been a rational option. Second, political factors are sure to haveplayed an important role—referring not to any pressure from the United States,but rather to China's own strategic considerations. First, China's South ChinaSea policy is implemented within the broader framework of its ASEAN policy. TheMinisterial Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was to be held on 10August. Relocating the drilling platform before the ARF could help to easeregional tensions and create a more positive atmosphere for the meeting.Second, at this time Chinese regional diplomacy was undergoing a significantshift at the grand strategic level, with the focus turning to the developmentof the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative and preparations for the establishmentof the AIIB. In May 2014 China had proposed the notion of the ‘new Asiansecurity concept’, which was to be based on common, comprehensive, cooperativeand sustainable security in Asia; and in November, Beijing was to host theAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Thus China had a number ofmajor diplomatic activities to attend to during the latter half of 2014, andwas unlikely to want any of them to be seriously affected by a disagreementover the HYSY-981 drilling platform. In this sense, the early relocation of theplatform was of practical significance. Eventually, both the Philippines andVietnam participated in the signing ceremony for the establishment of the AIIBin Beijing on 24 October, suggesting that China's efforts had at leastpartially paid off. Third, the reaction in Vietnam to the HYSY-981 drillingplatform's operations near the Paracel Islands was beyond anything that Chinahad anticipated. This was particularly true of the surge of Vietnamesenationalism, which even jeopardized the stability of the Vietnamese regime. Asthis was certainly not something the Chinese government wanted to see, thepossibility may have also influenced Chinese policy.

At the same time as all this was going on,China was also putting significant effort into land reclamation activities toconstruct large artificial islands in the South China Sea. China's first landreclamation initiative in this area had begun in February 1988, and it has foryears been undertaking limited construction activities on all seven outcropsunder its de facto control in the Spratly Islands. In the 1970s, Vietnam andthe Philippines began land reclamation initiatives on the islands and reefsunder their control. Since then, Vietnam has carried out large-scale landreclamation on over 20 islands and reefs, and has established fixedinstallations such as harbour basins, runways, missile bases, office buildings,barracks, hotels, lighthouses and so on. It has also built a number of stilthouses and helicopter flight decks on Vanguard Bank (Wan'an Tan), PrinceConsort Bank (Xiwei Tan), Grainger Bank (Lizhun Tan) and Orleana Shoal(AonanAnsha). The Philippines, meanwhile, has constructed and expanded anairport on Thitu Island, as well as constructing ports and other facilities.46

In response to the continuous expansion ofsuch activities by Vietnam and the Philippines on the Spratly Islands, Chinahas markedly stepped up its own land reclamation on the islands and reefs underits de facto control since 2014. Within the space of just a few months, thesurface area of Hughes Reef (Dongmen Jiao) and Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao) wasexpanded by tens or even hundreds of times, and more installations were builton the reclaimed land. Images taken on 1 February 2014 by the US satelliteimaging company DigitalGlobe show Hughes Reef before the land reclamation witha concrete platform of 380 square metres. Further images taken on 24 January2015 show an artificial island of 75,000 square metres and a huge installationunder construction. China's land reclamation activities on the Gaven Reef(Nanxun Jiao) began at some point after 20 March 2014. Images taken on 30January 2015 show a causeway connecting this island with the originalinstallation and a helipad under construction.47

Following a period of reclamation activity,Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao), Subi Reef (Zhebi Jiao) and Fiery Cross Reef(Yongshu Jiao) have become the largest artificial islands among the Spratlys,with areas of 5.42 square kilometres (in June 2015), 3.95 square kilometres(June 2015) and 2.2 square kilometres (March 2015) respectively.48 All of them are larger than Itu Aba Island (TaipingDao), originally the largest natural island among the Spratlys, which has anarea of 0.443 square kilometres.

In contrast with the confrontation betweenChina and Vietnam over the operations of the HYSY-981 drilling platform and thefriction between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal,China's land reclamation activities on the islands and reefs under its control havenot triggered a maritime confrontation with the two other claimants concerned.Instead, the counter-measures of the other claimants have been mostlydiplomatic, combined with attempts to attract the attention of theinternational community. Although China and the Philippines have been competingthrough diplomacy and international discourse over land reclamation in theSouth China Sea for over a year now, the struggle is apparently less intensethan the standoffs between different vessels in the region.

Land reclamation in the South China Sea hasbeen conducted by several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam andChina. From a longer-term perspective, unless something quite unexpectedhappens, the islands and reefs under China's de facto control are likely toremain part of Chinese territory for the foreseeable future. Many in theinternational community tacitly recognize China's right to undertakereclamation activities on these islands and reefs. The aspect that has causedmost concern among other countries is the scale and speed of China's landreclamation activities, as well as the capability that China has demonstratedin the process. In practical terms, China's firm approach to moving forwardquickly with these activities can actually help reduce tension and uncertainty.The speed with which China has acted, and the measures it has taken, are ademonstration of strong determination. Had it taken a slower, more gradualapproach, the prolonged process of land reclamation could have afforded more opportunitiesto other claimants to take counter-measures, which in turn would have extendedthe duration of confrontation and resulted in greater uncertainty. Oncestarted, China's land reclamation activities do not offer much scope for makingconcessions.

Between April and May 2015, tensionsbetween China and the United States over China's land reclamation activities inthe Spratly Islands grew, but then began to ease off again in June. On 16 June2015, Lu Kang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, relayed a message that the landreclamation project on which China was working on some islands and reefs in theSpratlys would soon be completed according to plan.49 This was a clear message from China to theinternational community that the land reclamation activities will be limited inscale and duration. The effect of this attempt by the Chinese government toease tensions related to the Spratly Islands is yet to be seen.

Conclusion

On the whole, China's strategic goal indealing with the disputes in the South China Sea is a relatively modest one.China is not seeking to fundamentally change the status quo in the South ChinaSea. Instead, it is taking a long-term approach, seeking to deal with issues inthe region through the process of development. Although the disputes in theSouth China Sea have important practical implications, they are not matters ofpriority in the strategic framework of Chinese foreign policy. Not only arethese disputes of minor significance in the context of grand strategicconsiderations such as China's rise and the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative,their handling is also subject to other foreign policy considerations such as China'soverall relationship with ASEAN.

From the perspective of policyimplementation, China's approach to the South China Sea disputes has become ingeneral firmer and more assertive since 2012. This trend is, however, temperedby self-restraint from time to time. As we have seen, when it has taken a moreassertive approach, it is in instances where China has been defending itsrights and interests rather than attempting to extend its control. In thissense, the Scarborough Shoal standoff was more the exception than the rule. Inboth the friction over the Second Thomas Shoal and the dispute over theHYSY-981 drilling platform, China demonstrated notable self-restraint in spiteof its clear advantage in terms of both material power and capability. In otherwords, the action China has taken is far milder than that of which it iscapable. When there is a crisis, it is very rare to see China making any kindof move to escalate it, let alone demonstrating any intention of steeringthings towards military conflict. Such a restrained approach is not without itscritics in China. But restraint is predominantly the result of rationalcalculations and practical considerations. Ironically, the adoption of a moreassertive approach by China over the South China Sea disputes is very muchdefensive in nature, with the key aim of preventing losses. There is a strongelement of flexibility in China's South China Sea policy. The Chinesegovernment clearly does not want the situation to arrive at the point ofdeadlock.

It is unlikely that a fundamental solutioncan be found to the disputes in the South China Sea. China has already begun toestablish basic deterrence with its improved material power and capability;however, it does not attempt to use this material power advantage in any waythat could be viewed as too aggressive. At the same time, neither Vietnam northe Philippines wishes to become entangled in high-intensity confrontation, asthis would give China the opportunity to exert its material power advantage. Inaddition, as the development of the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Roadgathers momentum, the AIIB comes into operation, the China–ASEAN Free TradeZone is upgraded, and the focus of the regional agenda in south-east Asiashifts from traditional security issues to regional development issues, Vietnamand the Philippines do not want to miss important opportunities for economicdevelopment because of their confrontations with China.50 This context has created more favourable conditionsfor ensuring longer-term stability in the South China Sea on the basis of thesituation as it currently stands. In the future, there are likely to be fewerconfrontations between China and Vietnam and the Philippines in the South ChinaSea. The claimants will continue to adopt different and softer approaches tocompete and contend with each other on sovereign and maritime rights, turningto international laws, courting international support, strengthening theirability to set the agenda in the South China Sea disputes, improving domesticlegislation, and tightening administrative control over the islands and reefsalready under their control.

1. 1

Since 2010, a trend has developed amonginternational observers of interpreting Chinese diplomacy as becomingincreasingly assertive. This view has sparked much debate. See Michael D.Swaine, ‘Perceptions of an assertive China’, China Leadership Monitor,no. 32, 2010, p. 10, and ‘China's assertive behavior, part one: on “coreinterests”’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 34, 2011, p. 8; Alastair IainJohnston, ‘How new and assertive is China's new assertiveness?’, InternationalSecurity 37: 4, 2013, pp. 7–48; Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu and Alastair IainJohnston, ‘Debating China's assertiveness’, International Security 38:3, 2013–14, pp. 176–83; BjörnJerdén, ‘The assertive China narrative: why it iswrong and how so many still bought into it’, Chinese Journal ofInternational Politics 7: 2, 2014, pp. 47–88.

2. 2

Yong Zeng, ‘Conghuangyandaomoshikanzhongguonanhaizhengcezouxiang’ [The trend of China's policyin the South China Sea viewed from the perspective of the ‘Scarborough Shoalmodel], ShijieJingjiyuZhengzhiLuntan [Forum of world economics andpolitics] 311: 5, 2014, pp. 127–44; Jie Zhang,‘Huangyandaomoshiyuzhongguohaiyangweiquanzhengcezhuanxiang’ [The ScarboroughShoal model and the shift in China's maritime strategy], DongnanyaYanjiu[South-east Asian studies] 205: 4, 2013, pp. 25–31.

3. 3

See Yitian Gao,‘Guojiaanquanzhanlüechouhuahuhuanweiquan he weiwenxiangtongyi’ [Nationalsecurity strategic planning calls for the integration of safeguarding rightsand maintaining stability], ShijieZhishi [World affairs] 1563: 16, 2011,p. 65; Xuetong Yan, ‘Cong nanhaiwentishuodaozhongguowaijiaotiaozheng’ [From theSouth China Sea issue to the adjustment of Chinese diplomacy], ShijieZhishi[World affairs] 1572: 1, 2012, pp. 32–3; Xiangyang Li,‘Zhongguojueqiguochengzhongjiejuebianhaiwenti de chulu’ [The solution to seaborder issues during China's rise], XiandaiGuojiGuanxi [Contemporaryinternational relations] 274: 8, 2012, pp. 17–18; Sheng Wang and Xiao Luo,‘Guojitixizhuanxingyuzhongguozhoubianwaijiaozhibian: congweiwendaoweiquan’ [Thetransformation of the international system and the change in China's regionaldiplomacy: from maintaining stability to defending rights], XiandaiGuojiGuanxi[Contemporary international relations] 279: 1, 2013, pp. 9–15.

4. 4

For example, Swaine and Tellis argue that Chinais adopting a ‘calculative strategy’, the underlying logic of which is simplythat it is seeking to increase its power in a variety of issue areas in asnon-provocative a fashion as possible to avoid precipitating those regional orglobal responses that would seek to retard the growth of that power. SeeMichael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's grand strategy:past, present, and future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 113.

5. 5

For more in-depth discussion of thispolicy, see Jisi Wang, ‘Zhongguo de guojidingweiwentiyu “taoguangyanghui,yousuozuowei” de zhanlüesixiang’ [The international positioning of China andthe strategic principle of ‘keeping a low profile while getting somethingaccomplished’], GuojiWentiYanjiu [International studies] 142: 2, 2011,pp. 4–9; Fangyin Zhou, ‘Taoguangyanghuiyuliangmianxiazhu:zhongguojueqiguochengzhong de zhongmeizhanlüehudong’ [Hiding capabilities anddeveloping strengths and hedging bets: strategic interactions in US–Chinarelations and China's rise], DangdaiYatai [Journal of contemporaryAsia–Pacific studies] 179: 5, 2011, pp. 6–26; Bingguo Dai,‘Jianchizouhepingfazhandaolu’ [Sticking to the path of peaceful development],China news net, 7 Dec. 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/12-07/2704984.shtml,accessed 25 May 2016.

6. 6

Yan Xuetong, ‘From keeping a low profile tostriving for achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 7:2, 2014, pp. 153–84.

7. 7

‘Wei woguofazhanzhengqulianghaozhoubianhuanjing, tuidong wo guofazhangeng duohuijizhoubianguojia’ [Working for an environment conducive to China'sdevelopment in the area around China and promoting China's development tobenefit the countries in this area], People's Daily, 26 Oct. 2013, p. 1.

8. 8

‘Xi Jinpingchuxizhongyangwaishigongzuohuiyibingfabiaozhongyaojianghua’ [Xi Jinping attendsthe Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs and delivers animportant speech], 29 Nov. 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-11/29/c_1113457723.htm,accessed 20 April 2015.

9. 9

On 5 March 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiangdelivered the annual report on the work of the government at the TwelfthNational People's Congress, in which he noted that: ‘We need to draw up andimplement a strategic maritime plan, develop the marine economy, protect themarine environment … improve coordinated maritime management … resolutelysafeguard China's maritime rights and interests … and move closer to achievingthe goal of building China into a maritime power.’ See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2014-03/14/c_133187027.htm.

10. 10

On the changing importance of maritimeissues in Chinese foreign policy, see Irene Chan and Mingjiang Li, ‘New Chineseleadership, new policy in the South China Sea dispute?’, Journal of ChinesePolitical Science 20: 1, 2015, pp. 35–50.

11. 11

Xuetong Yan, ‘Zhongguowaijiaoquanmiangaigede kaishi’ [The beginning of comprehensive reform in Chinese diplomacy], ShijieZhishi[World affairs] 1619: 24, 2013, pp. 15–16, and ‘From keeping a low profile tostriving for achievement’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 7:2, 2014, pp. 153–84; Jin Xu, ‘Zaitaohuiyuyouweizhijian:zhongguozaibaozhangguojianquanzhong de zuoyong’ [China's role in internationalsecurity: between keeping a low profile and playing a certain role], GuojiAnquan Yanjiu [Journal of international security studies] 31: 4, 2013, pp.83–102.

12. 12

The ‘one belt, one road’ initiative is theabbreviation for the combined Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-first CenturyMaritime Silk Road—an ambitious initiative proposed by Chinese President XiJinping during the latter half of 2013. This initiative has gradually becomethe focus of Chinese foreign policy.

13. 13

It should be pointed out that this is amacro-level description; there is no suggestion that everyone across all thedifferent government departments in China shares the same views on the issuesinvolved. On the contrary, the understandings of different people and differentdepartments vary widely, and are at times even entirely conflicting.Nonetheless, even with such diversity of opinion, it is still possible toidentify some macro trends and patterns and their influence on Chinesediplomacy in practice. In terms of the complexity of decision-making related tomaritime issues in China, Linda Jakobson has offered valuable insights. SeeLinda Jakobson, China's unpredictable maritime actors (Sydney: LowyInstitute for International Policy, Nov. 2014).

14. 14

In 2010 and 2011, an increasing number ofChinese scholars began to question the effectiveness of the policy of shelvingdisputes and seeking common development. See e.g. Wei Chen, ‘Gezhizhengyi,gongtongkaifazaijiejuenanhaiwentizhong de kunjingjizhanwang’ [Predicaments andprospects of handling the South China Sea issue by shelving disputes andseeking common development], JinyingGuanliZhe [Managers] 234: 13, 2010,pp. 197–8; Weihua Tong,‘Nanhaiduicezhonggezhizhengyiyugongtongkaifazhichongtujiqitiaozheng’ [The conflictbetween shelving disputes and seeking common development in the South China Seaand adjustment of our strategy], Zhongguo Haiyang DaxueXuebao (ShehuiKexueBan) [Journal of Ocean University of China (social science edition)], no.6, 2011, pp. 1–6; Zewei Yang, ‘Gezhizhengyigongtongkaifayuanze dekunjingyuchulu’ [The principle of shelving disputes and seeking commondevelopment: dilemmas and the way out], Jiangsu DaxueXuebao (ShehuiKexueBan) [Journal of Jiangsu University (social science edition)] 13: 3, 2011,pp. 70–75.

15. 15

Gao,‘Guojiaanquanzhanlüechouhuahuhuanweiquan he weiwenxiangtongyi’; Wang and Luo,‘Guojitixizhuanxingyuzhongguozhoubianwaijiaozhibian: congweiwendaoweiquan’.

16. 16

Zhang,‘Huangyandaomoshiyuzhongguohaiyangweiquanzhengcezhuanxiang’.

17. 17

In April 2012, during the standoff betweenChina and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, the Global Timesconducted a survey in seven Chinese cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,Chengdu, Xi'an, Changsha and Shenyang), in which 46.2% of respondents expressedthe opinion that China should take firm measures to gradually obtain de factocontrol over most of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and 28.6% ofrespondents expressed the belief that China should recover those islands andreefs occupied by the Philippines and Vietnam at any cost as soon as possible.Compared with this fierce nationalist sentiment, the behaviour of the Chinesegovernment in the South China Sea was relatively restrained. See http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2012-05/2676809.html.

18. 18

Anecdotal evidence of this shift in publicsentiment can be found in the fact that after the end of 2013 there were fewerinstances of people sending calcium tablets to the Chinese Ministry of ForeignAffairs, and by the end of 2014 this phenomenon had almost entirelydisappeared. In contemporary Chinese discourse, to refer to something as being‘calcium deficient’ essentially means that it is weak, while giving ‘a boost ofcalcium’ to something means to strengthen or embolden it. Thus by sendingcalcium tablets to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ordinary Chinese peoplewere conveying their belief that Chinese foreign policy was too weak. (Author'sinterview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Beijing, 12 April 2015;see also ‘Waijiaobulingdao: geiwaijiaobujigaipian de renyuelaiyue shao le’[Senior official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs: fewer and fewer Chinese peopleare sending calcium tablets to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 9 Dec. 2014, http://www.guancha.cn/strategy/2014_12_09_302831.shtml,accessed 10 Dec. 2014.

19. 19

During this stage, China also worked hardto integrate its maritime law enforcement agencies. Before 2013, there werefive civilian law enforcement agencies, each with its own fleet, and eachadministratively subordinate to a different central government ministry oragency. This changed significantly with the establishment of the China MaritimePolice (also known as the Chinese coastguard) in 2013 under the State OceanicAdministration, improving China's policy implementation capability. See‘Guowuyuanjigougaige he zhinengzhuanbianfangan’ [State Council institutionalreform and transformation of functions plan], Xinhua, 14 March 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013lh/2013-03/14/c_115030825.htm;see also Jakobson, China's unpredictable maritime actors.

20. 20

Zhou Fangyin,‘Zhoubianhuanjingzouxiangyuzhongguo de zhoubianzhanlüexuanze’ [Trends inChina's neighbouring environment and China's strategic options], WaijiaoPinglun[Foreign affairs review] 31: 1, 2014, pp. 29–42.

21. 21

Yan, ‘From keeping a low profile tostriving for achievement’.

22. 22

The Philippines, however, has continuedefforts to engage China in ‘soft’ confrontation through international law anddisputes over the fisheries industry.

23. 23

‘Wang Yi: yishuangguisiluchulinanhaiwenti’[Wang Yi: handling the South China Sea issues using ‘dual track thinking’], 9Aug. 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-08/09/c_1112007229.htm,accessed 26 May 2016.

24. 24

Minghao Zhao, ‘Zhongguoshouti“shuangguisilu”, zhongmeiboyijinruxinjieduan?’ [Does China's introduction ofthe concept of ‘dual-track thinking’ mean the game between China and the UnitedStates has entered a new stage?], 10 Aug. 2014, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1260855,accessed 11 Aug. 2014.

25. 25

Huai Jiang,‘Feilübinranzhizhongguohuangyandaohuisu’ [Review on the Philippines encroachingon China's Scarborough Shoal], ShijieZhishi [World affairs] 1581: 10,2012, pp. 20–22.

26. 26

BBC News, ‘Protest in Philippines overSouth China Sea stand-off’, 11 May 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18030805.

27. 27

‘Zhongguominzongfufeilübinzhuhuashiguanqiankangyi’[Chinese people go to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing to protest], 12 May2012, http://china.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2012/0512/37346.shtml,accessed 11 March 2015.

28. 28

‘Woguonanhaidabufenhaiyujiangjinrufujixiuyuqi’[Most waters in South China Sea will enter the summer fishing off-season],Xinhua, 13 May 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-05/13/c_111940832.htm,accessed 11 March 2015.

29. 29

‘BFAR declares fishing ban at PanatagShoal’, Philippine Star, 17 May 2012, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/807422/bfar-declares-fishing-ban-panatag-shoal,accessed 14 March 2015; ‘Philippines and China to impose fishing bans amidstand-off’, Daily Telegraph, 14 May 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9264697/Philippines-and-China-to-impose-fishing-bans-amid-stand-off.html,accessed 14 March 2015.

30. 30

‘2012 nian 6 yue 18 riwaijiaobufayanrenHong Lei juxinglixingjizhehui’ [Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry spokesman, held aregular press conference on 18 June 2012], Xinhua, 18 June 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-06/18/c_123300895.htm,accessed 25 May 2016.

31. 31

‘Feiwaizhangchengrenzhongguoyikongzhihuangyandao,feichuanyibunengjinzhu’ [The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippinesacknowledges that China already controls the Scarborough Shoal and Philippineships cannot be stationed there], Sina Net, 21 Jan. 2015, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-01-21/1026713325.html,accessed 21 Jan. 2015.

32. 32

Hailin Ye, ‘Huangyandaoshijian duizhongguonanhaiweiquandouzheng de qishi’ [What the ‘Scarborough Shoal dispute’can teach us about China's protection of its interests in the South China Sea],in Xiangyang Li, ed.,YataiLanpishu 2013 [Blue book of Asia–Pacific 2013](Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013), pp. 150–51; JuHailong and DaiFan, ‘Feilübin de nanhaizhengce’ [The South China Sea policy of thePhilippines], in Cao Yunhua and JuHailong, eds, NanhaiDiquXingshiBaogao,2012–2013 [Situation report on the South China Sea, 2012–13] (Beijing:Current Affairs Press, 2013), pp. 161–2.

33. 33

Xinjun Wang,‘Zhongguohaijianweiquanshikezhierfeiruanruo’ [Defending rights through marinesurveillance patrols is a sign of self-restraint rather than weakness], JiefangjunBao[PLA daily], 14 April 2012, http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2012-04/14/content_4358454.htm,accessed 22 March 2015.

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‘Ren wukerenjiuwuxuzairen’ [When thesituation is no longer tolerable, there's no need to continue to practisetolerance], RenminRibaoHaiwai Ban [People's Daily overseasedition], 8 May 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/17829343.html,accessed 9 May 2012.

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Hongliang Ge,‘Zhongguonanhaiweiquanyuguojixingxiangchongsu’ [Legal rights protection in theSouth China Sea and China's international image rebuilding], TaipingyangXuebao[Pacific journal] 21: 4, 2013, pp. 55–61.

36. 36

Before the Scarborough Shoal standoff, Iargued that peace and stability in the South China Sea area ‘cannot not beachieved through unilateral concessions and efforts made by China, and anyeasing in the tensions achieved in this way will not be stable’. See ZhouFangyin, ‘Nanhaizhengduanyuzhongguo de celüexuanze’ [Disputes in the SouthChina Sea and China's strategy], in Li Xiangyang, ed., YataiDiquFazhanBaogao(2012) [Annual report on development in the Asia–Pacific (2012)] (Beijing:Social Sciences Academic Press, 2012), pp. 145–58.

37. 37

‘Feichengwei fang renaijiaojushishengji,dui zhongguorenhetiaoxindoubuhuiying’ [The Philippines states that it will notrespond to any provocative behaviour by China to prevent escalating tensionsaround the Second Thomas Shoal], Xinhua, 28 May 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-05/28/c_124776603.htm,accessed 29 May 2013.

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‘Philippines sends fresh troops to disputedshoal’, New Indian Express, 19 June 2013, http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/Philippines-sends-fresh-troops-to-disputed-shoal/2013/06/19/article1642695.ece,accessed 25 May 2016.

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Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic ofthe Philippines, ‘Statement of Secretary Alberg F. del Rosario’, 30 March 2014,http://www.dfa.gov.ph/newsroom/dfa-releases/2460-statement-of-secretary-albert-f-del-rosario-on-the-submission-of-the-philippines-memorial-to-the-arbitral-tribunal,accessed 2 April 2014.

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Policy-makers and academics agree on thecomplexity and long-term nature of these maritime disputes. See Xu Yan,‘Zhengquerenshinanhaizhengduan de changqixingfuzaxing’ [Correctly recognizingthe complexity and long-term nature of the South China Sea disputes], XuexiShibao[Study times], 5 Dec. 2011 (Xu Yan is a professor at the National DefenceUniversity of China); China Institute for Maritime Development Project Team,State Oceanic Administration of the PRC, Zhongguo Haiyang FazhanBaogao(2015) [China's ocean development report (2015)] (Beijing: China OceanPress, 2015).

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Sandong Shi, ‘Zoujinhaiyangshiyou 981shenshuizuanjingpingtai’ [A closer look at the Haiyang Shiyou 981 deepwaterdrilling platform], GuofangKejiGongye [Defence science and technologyindustry] 144: 6, 2012, p. 52.

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‘The operation of the HYSY 981 drillingrig: Vietnam's provocation and China's position’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofChina, 8 June 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml,accessed 8 March 2015.

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Senate Resolution No. 412, 10 July 2014, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-resolution/412,accessed 24 March 2015.

44. 44

‘Waijiaobufayanren Hong Lei dajizhewen’[Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei's remark], Ministry of Foreign Affairsof China, 16 July 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1175058.shtml,accessed 18 July 2014.

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Keynote address by Michael Fuchs, FourthAnnual South China Sea Conference, Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, Washington DC, 11 July 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229129.htm,accessed 12 July 2014.

46. 46

‘2015 nian 4 yue 29 riwaijiaobufayanrenHong Lei zhuchilixingjizhehui’ [Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry spokesman, held aregular press conference on 29 April 2015], Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofChina, 29 April 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/t1259195.shtml,accessed 30 April 2015.

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Sean O'Connor and James Hardy, ‘Imageryshows progress of Chinese land building across Spratly Islands’, Jane'sDefence Weekly 52:7, 18 Feb. 2015, pp. 8–9.

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‘Weixinggaoqingzhiji:zhongguonanshameijijiaoyuzhebiijaojiejinwangong’ [High resolution images fromsatellite: China's reclamation activities at the Mischief Reef and Subi Reefnear completion], 10 June 2015, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150620/44014321_0.shtml#p=1,accessed 15 June 2015.

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Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang,remarks on issues relating to China's construction activities on the Nanshaislands and reefs, 16 June 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1273370.shtml,accessed 17 June 2015.

50. 50

Although both the Philippines and Vietnamhave disputes with China in the South China Sea, both countries activelysupported, rather than opposed, the AIIB, which was first proposed by China andwill have its headquarters in Beijing. Both countries attended the signing ceremonyof the memorandum of understanding on establishing the AIIB on 24 Oct. 2014.See Xinhua, 24 Oct. 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-10/24/c_1112965880.htm,accessed 5 April 2015.